



LONDON FIRE BRIGADE

Decision title

## Fire Survival Guidance- Policy Number 0790

Recommendation by

Assistant Commissioner, Operational Policy and Assurance  
Assistant Commissioner, Control and Mobilising

Decision Number

LFC-0390-D

Protective marking: **NOT PROTECTIVELY MARKED**

Publication status: Published in full

### Summary

Report LFC-0390y introduces the revised policy, PN 0790 Fire Survival Guidance. It is a major revision to the existing policy and has been developed in response to learning identified through the Brigade's Grenfell Tower safety and learning review process and to address particular issues relating to fire survival guidance that were identified during Phase 1 of the Grenfell Tower Inquiry (GTI).

Report LFC-0390y describes:

- the background and rationale for developing this new policy
- a summary of the key elements that form part of this policy
- the consultations undertaken
- the training and other outstanding dependencies that now need to be progressed before this revised operational policy is implemented

### Decision

That the London Fire Commissioner approves the revised PN 0790 Fire Survival Guidance policy, (provided as Report LFC-0390y Appendix 1), noting that the effective date for implementation is subject to training and that the policy is likely to be subject to further amendment before implementation.

**Andy Roe**

London Fire Commissioner

This decision was remotely  
Date signed on Friday 09 October 2020

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LONDON FIRE BRIGADE

Report title

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## Fire Survival Guidance- Policy Number 0790

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Report to	Date
Operational Delivery and Assurance DB	21 May 2020
Commissioner's Board	03 June 2020
Deputy Mayor's Fire and Resilience Board	18 August 2020
London Fire Commissioner	

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Report by	Report number
Assistant Commissioner, Operational Policy and Assurance Assistant Commissioner, Control and Mobilising	LFC-0390y

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### Summary

1. This report introduces the revised policy, PN 0790 Fire Survival Guidance. It is a major revision to the existing policy and has been developed in response to learning identified through the Brigade's Grenfell Tower safety and learning review process and to address particular issues relating to fire survival guidance that were identified during Phase 1 of the Grenfell Tower Inquiry (GTI).
2. This report describes:
  - the background and rationale for developing this new policy
  - a summary of the key elements that form part of this policy
  - the consultations undertaken
  - the training and other outstanding dependencies that now need to be progressed before this revised operational policy is implemented

### Recommended decision

The London Fire Commissioner approves the revised PN 0790 Fire Survival Guidance policy, provided as Appendix 1, noting that the effective date for implementation is subject to training and that the policy is likely to be subject to further amendment before implementation.

### Background and rationale for revisions to PN 0790

1. The Grenfell Tower fire demonstrated the very high risk which can be created for members of the public and emergency responders when a building does not behave as fire safety requirements intend and the resulting fire far exceeds 'normal' expectations. The initial process of reviewing and amending PN 0790 began in the months following the Grenfell Tower fire.
2. This included focussing on the issues in PN 0790 initially highlighted by the Grenfell Tower Investigation and Review Team (GTIRT) which were subsequently supported by firefighter and Control officer evidence during phase 1 of the Grenfell Tower fire inquiry.
3. A stakeholder group was formed between officers in Operational Policy & Assurance (OP&A) and Control to examine the challenges associated with managing fire survival guidance (FSG) calls. The

changes to the policy have been informed by carrying out approximately twenty fire survival guidance exercises in the time from 2018.

4. The revised policy seeks to address these challenges by ensuring that all those personnel who could either receive an FSG call in Control or are liable to attend incidents which may involve FSG calls will have a secure understanding of the procedures that underpin these activities. A definition of key terms will help to ensure more accurate communication and improved information recording and sharing, both before and during an incident.
5. A separate project for an IT solution has been started, expected delivery is quarter four 2020/ 21. Until that has been delivered with an improved data connectivity for Command Units, the revised PN 0790 describes the primary transfer of FSG information being the Airwave radio and associated forms.
6. The revised PN 0790 brings together Control and the incident ground response to FSG calls and is a OP&A and Control policy.
7. The revised FSG policy and associated training meets the following Grenfell Tower inquiry recommendations (taken from the Grenfell Tower Inquiry: Phase 1 report, Part V, Chapter 33);

Communication between the control room and the incident commander

- That the LFB review its policies on communication between the control room and the incident commander (33.14a).
- That all officers who may be expected to act as incident commanders (i.e. all those above the rank of crew manager) receive training directed to the specific requirements of communication with the control room (33.14b).
- That all CROs of Assistant Operations Manager rank and above receive training directed to the specific requirements of communication with the incident commander (33.14c).
- That a dedicated communications link be provided between the senior officer in the control room and the incident commander (33.14d).

Emergency calls

- That the LFB policies be amended to draw a clearer distinction between callers seeking advice and callers who believe they are trapped and need rescuing (33.15a).
- That the LFB provide regular and more effective refresher training to CROs at all levels including supervisors (33.15b).
- That all fire and rescue services develop policies for handling a large number of FSG calls simultaneously (33.15c).
- That electronic systems be developed to record FSG information in the control room and display it simultaneously at the bridgehead and in any command units (33.15d).
- That policies be developed for managing a transition from 'stay put' to 'get out' (33.15e).
- That control room staff receive training directed specifically to handling such a change of advice and conveying it effectively to callers (33.15f).

That steps are taken to investigate methods by which assisting control rooms can obtain access to the information available to the host control room (33.16).

#### Command and Control

- That the LFB develop policies and training to ensure better control of deployments and the use of resources (33.18a).
- That the LFB develop policies and training to ensure that better information is obtained from crews returning from deployments and that the information is recorded in a form that enables it to be made available immediately to the incident commander (and thereafter to the command units and the control room) (33.18b).
- That the LFB develop communications system to enable direct communication between the control room and the incident commander and improve the means of communication between the incident commander and the bridgehead (33.19).
- That the LFB investigate the use of modern communication techniques to provide a direct line of communication between the control room and the bridgehead, allowing information to be transmitted directly between the control room and the bridgehead and providing an integrated system of recording FSG information and the results of deployments (33.20).

8. Key changes and differences made to the FSG policy in order to meet these recommendations are;

- Determination of when a call involves FSG, according to the definition and guidance in the policy.
- The removal of the FSG section in PN539 Emergency call management into PN790 Fire Survival Guidance.
- Understand the actions undertaken by Control, including clear distinctions for dealing with callers seeking advice and those who are trapped or in need of rescue as outlined in Appendix A of the revised policy.
- Designation of a FSG pump and a FSG sector commander to improve communication lines and the passage of information.
- Clear guidance to incident commanders (IC) on operational considerations and actions for subsequent officers and ICs which include the requirement to prioritise rescues of FSG callers.
- Additional resources mobilised including a Command Unit, a Station Commander and a support pump.
- Establish an appropriate fire survival communications structure with Control as per Appendix B-E of the revised policy which includes the managing of multiple FSG caller information directly to a Bridgehead (or equivalent area of operations) if required.
- Enhanced recording and information exchange between the deployment of crews and those involved in the FSG communications structure.
- Development of an electronic 'app' to manage FSG information between the control room and the incident ground. (This is being delivered through a corporate project and once it has been tested and accepted as fit for purpose then the FSG policy will be reviewed and updated to include the utilisation of the 'app' during multiple FSG incidents).
- Understand the factors to consider when changing the operational tactical plan to emergency evacuation or mass rescue.

## Consultation

9. The revised policy has been subject to Heads of Service and General Counsel consultation and was introduced at the Brigade Joint Committee for Health, Safety and Welfare (BJCHSW) meeting on the 16<sup>th</sup> April 2020. We received comments back from the FBU on the 22<sup>nd</sup> June, no significant issues have been identified and consultation continues with the FBU with a view to reaching agreement in September. The revised policy will be subject to regular review and the Commissioners Board will be kept informed of ongoing discussions.

## Training and other dependencies

10. Before this policy goes live, operationally suitable and sufficient training will be required for all personnel including Control Room Operators (CRO) who are liable to be involved in its implementation at operational incidents.
11. The training solution has been finalised and Training Commissioning and Alteration Process (TCAP) has been produced. It is proposed that there will be a three-phase training package with the first stage being a Computer Based Training (CBT) package and face to face training. The revised PN 0790 will not go live until 80% of the work force have completed this first stage.
12. The proposed three-phased training package will be based on a combination of CBT materials and Tactical Decision- Making Exercises (TDEs) for phase one. A live exercise programme with some exercises being used to both validate the practicality of the policy and provide an assurance that the necessary understanding and skills has been embedded within the workforce will form phase two. The third phase is a proposal for a new 'Urban Firefighting and Rescue course', which will further support the original acquisition training, this will be undertaken by all operational staff every two to three years.
13. Given the synergies between PN 0790, PN 633 (High Rise) and the new policy on emergency evacuation and mass rescue, the training solutions for all three – like the policies themselves – are consistent with each other. Equally and where possible, every opportunity has been taken to deliver this training jointly and in ways that emphasise the inter-related content of these topics.
14. To ensure all operational staff have an enhanced understanding of the policies and how they interact with each other, the following face-to- face briefings will be delivered in addition to their individual CBT packages:
  - Training to cover the Emergency Evacuation and Mass Rescue will be provided to all 1200 station-based officers (Leading Firefighter, Sub Officer, Station Officer) during a one day session combined with the High-Rise policy training.
  - Training will be provided to Station Commanders and Group Commanders over one day sessions including FSG, Emergency Evacuation/Mass Rescue through the delivery of a TDE and further 'train the trainer' input to enable the learning to in turn, be delivered to watch based staff.
  - Training to the Deputy Assistant Commissioner and Assistant Commissioner group – will be provided in one day sessions.
15. This underlines the importance of ensuring that those involved in the design, planning and delivery of this training have a clear and finely calibrated understanding of the issues described in the policy and how the management of FSG calls can impact on other policies. Some of these – such as assessing the indicators which may indicate that emergency evacuation/mass rescue is necessary and how to prioritise the deployment of resources to help/rescue those at greatest risk – are complex, relatively nuanced and will involve finely balanced judgements.
16. In practise, it is anticipated that this will mean that only a limited and carefully selected number of people should support the development and delivery of this training solution, otherwise there is a risk that the standards and interpretation applied will cover too wide a margin. If this happened, there is a risk that key messages will be diluted, and the subtleties involved in assessing key issues could be lost.

17. Maintenance of competence for operational staff will be delivered through 4 to 12 pump exercises with the CBT package provided for annual individual maintenance of skills.
18. Training on the new policy and processes will be delivered to all control staff. This will include;
  - A knowledge based lesson on changes to the policy
  - A Subject Matter Expert (SME) session on fire behaviour and human behaviours
  - Process training for changes to the Vision Mobilising System
  - Scenario based practice for consolidation and validation
19. Maintenance of Control Officer skills will be ensured through the DaMOP competency of FSG, which includes;
  - A training session
  - Scenario session
  - Theory requirement

Control staff will also participate in the operational FSG exercises (paragraph 19), with specified learning outcomes to assess and test their own skills and knowledge.

20. A cost of approx. £7K has been agreed by Fire Stations to change the associated forms (control information form, casualty information poster and forward information board ((FIB)) overlay) to match the requirements in the revised policy.
21. The definition of 'persons reported' has been taken from Policy Note (PN) 518 'Messages from incidents'. For the purpose of PN 0790 fire survival guidance, the definition of 'persons reported' is extended so that those in residential high rise buildings who call 999 and are advised by a CRO to leave the building because they are directly affected by fire, heat or smoke will be recorded as 'persons reported' so far as is practicable. This will require Control to amend processes before PN 0790 goes live to enable them to accurately record these callers and inform the incident ground. The implementation of this aspect of the policy is therefore dependant on the required changes to Control's processes being made.
22. When Control are aware that the responsible person has adopted a stay put strategy, Control should make clear that the LFB advice to callers is that they should be safe to remain in their property, provided the caller is located in an area of their premise not directly affected by fire, heat or smoke. Unless there is information to the contrary, Control make the assumption that all high rise purpose built blocks of flats operate a stay put strategy. This guidance is referenced in the Local Government Group document - Fire Safety in purpose built blocks of flats published in 2011.

### **Finance comments**

23. This report recommends that a revised Fire Survival Guidance policy is approved. The report notes that an additional cost of £7k will be incurred to change the required forms, this cost along with the financial impact of any additional training, will be contained within existing budgets.

### **Workforce comments**

24. The draft policy was submitted for consultation with representative bodies at BJCHSW on 16 April 2020. Due to the pressure of representing the service during the Coronavirus outbreak FBU officials provided comments back to the BJCHSW on the 22 June 2020. Discussions continue with a view to reaching a satisfactory outcome in September.

### **Legal comments**

25. Under section 9 of the Policing and Crime Act 2017, the London Fire Commissioner (the "Commissioner") is established as a corporation sole with the Mayor appointing the occupant of that

office. Under section 327D of the GLA Act 1999, as amended by the Policing and Crime Act 2017, the Mayor may issue to the Commissioner specific or general directions as to the manner in which the holder of that office is to exercise his or her functions.

26. Section 1 of the Fire and Rescue Services Act 2004 states that the Commissioner is the fire and rescue authority for Greater London.
27. The statutory basis for the actions proposed in this report is provided by section 7 of the Fire and Rescue Services Act 2004, under which the Commissioner must secure the provision of personnel, services and equipment necessary to efficiently meet all normal requirements for firefighting, and must secure the provision of training for personnel.
28. The Commissioner's Scheme of Governance provides that matters pertaining to the Transformation Delivery Plan ( which includes recommendations flowing for the GTI ) and matters which have a significant impact on service delivery are reserved to the LFC. Any significant future changes to this policy will require further Commissioner's approval.
29. In approving this policy, the Commissioner must comply with:
  - The Human Rights Act 1998 and the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR). Article 2 ECHR encompasses both negative obligations (which prevent public authorities taking lives) and positive obligations (requiring public authorities to take certain steps to protect lives). Public authorities are expected to take reasonable steps to protect a person's life if they know – or ought to know – that they are facing real and immediate risk. The taking of 'reasonable steps' should not place an impossible or disproportionate burden on the authority. The Commissioner recognises that meeting the Article 2 obligations in the exceptional circumstances encompassed by this policy is likely to depend upon and require nuanced, informed, and robust decision making. Those decisions may involve consideration of the existence of saveable life and the extent of the risk presented to firefighters in achieving saveable life, and may require the decision maker to assess and strike a balance between the existence and extent of risk to members of the public and to firefighters. Those decisions may have to be taken rapidly and under pressure. Such decisions may properly be subject to scrutiny in subsequent legal proceedings. The Commissioner in adopting this policy has sought to identify and provide all assistance to those charged with this responsibility to equip them to reach Article 2 compliant decisions, which are capable of withstanding that scrutiny.
  - The Health and Safety at Work etc. Act 1974. Section 2 of the 1974 Act imposes a general duty on the employer to 'ensure, so far as is reasonably practicable, the health, safety and welfare at work of all of his employees.' This general duty extends (amongst other things) to the plant and systems of work, the provision of information, instruction, training and supervision and to the provision and maintenance of a working environment that is, so far as reasonably practicable, without risks to health and adequate as regards facilities and arrangements for welfare at work. Section 3 of the 1974 Act imposes a general duty to 'ensure, so far as is reasonably practicable, that persons not in his employment who may be affected thereby are not thereby exposed to risks to their health or safety.' In the exceptional circumstances encompassed by this policy, the Commissioner recognises that striking the correct balance between these two general duties is likely to depend upon and require nuanced, informed, and robust decision making. Those decisions may have to be taken rapidly and under pressure. Such decisions may properly be subject to scrutiny in subsequent legal proceedings. The Commissioner in adopting this policy has sought to identify and provide all assistance to those charged with this responsibility to equip them to reach decisions which strike a lawful balance between those competing duties and which are capable of withstanding that scrutiny.
  - When carrying out its functions, the Commissioner, as the fire and rescue authority for Greater London, is required to 'have regard to the Fire and Rescue National Framework prepared by the Secretary of State (Fire and Rescue Service Act 2004, section 21).

- Any relevant national guidance.
30. By direction dated 1 April 2018, the Mayor set out those matters, for which the Commissioner would require the prior approval of either the Mayor or the Deputy Mayor for Fire and Resilience (the "Deputy Mayor").
  31. Paragraph 3.1 of Part 3 of that direction requires the Commissioner to consult with the Deputy Mayor as far as practicable in the circumstances before a decision is taken on (inter alia) any "[c] decision that can be reasonably considered to be novel, contentious or repercussive in nature, irrespective of the monetary value of the decision involved (which may be nil)" and this decision should be considered to be repercussive in nature.

### Sustainability implications

32. 1. SDIA submitted recommends that the introduction of this policy has a neutral sustainability impact. An SDIA was completed in the past (17/04/2014) and the policy was marked as low risk in terms of sustainability.

### Equalities implications

33. The London Fire Commissioner and decision takers are required to have due regard to the Public Sector Equality Duty (s149 of the Equality Act 2010) when exercising our functions and taking decisions.
34. It is important to note that consideration of the Public Sector Equality Duty is not a one-off task. The duty must be fulfilled before taking a decision, at the time of taking a decision, and after the decision has been taken.
35. The protected characteristics are: Age, Disability, Gender reassignment, Pregnancy and maternity, Marriage and civil partnership (but only in respect of the requirements to have due regard to the need to eliminate discrimination), Race (ethnic or national origins, colour or nationality), Religion or belief (including lack of belief), Sex, and Sexual orientation.
36. The Public Sector Equality Duty requires us, in the exercise of all our functions (i.e. everything we do), to have due regard to the need to:
  - (a) Eliminate discrimination, harassment and victimisation and other prohibited conduct.
  - (b) Advance equality of opportunity between people who share a relevant protected characteristic and persons who do not share it.
  - (c) Foster good relations between people who share a relevant protected characteristic and persons who do not share it.
37. Having due regard to the need to advance equality of opportunity between persons who share a relevant protected characteristic and persons who do not share it involves having due regard, in particular, to the need to:
  - (a) Remove or minimise disadvantages suffered by persons who share a relevant protected characteristic where those disadvantages are connected to that characteristic;
  - (b) Take steps to meet the needs of persons who share a relevant protected characteristic that are different from the needs of persons who do not share it;
  - (c) Encourage persons who share a relevant protected characteristic to participate in public life or in any other activity in which participation by such persons is disproportionately low.



38. The steps involved in meeting the needs of disabled persons that are different from the needs of persons who are not disabled include steps to take account of disabled persons' disabilities.
39. Having due regard to the need to foster good relations between persons who share a relevant protected characteristic and persons who do not share it involves having due regard to the need to—
  - a. tackle prejudice, and
  - b. promote understanding.
40. An Equality Impact Assessment (EIA) is attached.
41. The EIA identified positive impacts particularly on certain groups of people. The provisions made in this policy are designed to increase the feasibility of the evacuation and rescue of people. This increase in feasibility applied to the protected characteristics of age; disability; pregnancy and maternity; and race. This was either based on assisting occupants with mobility issues and/or requiring assistance or the soft analysis indicating the likely demographic of a high-rise building. There was a neutral impact against other characteristics.
42. Consultation with representative continues to take place. Further consultation with Equalities Support Groups and the Inclusion Team will take place as part of ongoing review of the policy.

List of Appendices

Appendix	Title	Protective Marking
1.	Revised PN 0790 Fire Survival Guidance	
2.	Equality Impact Assessment	

# Fire survival guidance

New policy number: **790**  
 Old instruction number:  
 Issue date: **23 February 2012**  
 Reviewed as current: **xxxxxxx**  
 Owner: **Head of Operational Policy & Assurance and Control and Mobilising**  
 Responsible work team: **Incident Command Policy & Assurance and Control and Mobilising**

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Review date: **1 August 2021** Last amended date:



# 1 Introduction

- 1.1 The purpose of this policy is to explain what constitutes Fire Survival Guidance (FSG) and how Fire Survival Guidance calls are dealt with by the Brigade Control room (Control) and on the incident ground.
- 1.2 The policy provides guidance to ensure that:
- information is exchanged between Control and the incident ground in a timely, accurate and consistent manner.
  - an effective communication network is established and maintained between appropriate persons.
  - the response at the incident ground to multiple FSG calls is prioritised appropriately and that suitable action is taken if the number of FSG calls is likely to exceed Control's capacity to receive them.
  - FSG call information is properly recorded for use by incident commanders (IC) and retained to support analysis and investigation after the incident.

## 2 Fire Survival Guidance definition

- 2.1 Fire Survival Guidance is the advice and guidance given by control room officers (CROs) to persons who are directly affected by fire, heat or smoke and cannot leave their premises. See appendix A for actions in Control.

## 3 Other Definitions

- 3.1 For LFB operations to be effective, it is important that all personnel have a consistent and clear understanding of the following terms that are detailed below:
- **Responsible Person** - A specific term under fire safety law referring to a person (individual or a corporate entity) who has a measure of control over a premises.
  - **On Site representative** – This could be a concierge, caretaker, waker or fire watch, receptionist or another person designated to meet the LFB on arrival at a fire at the premises.
  - **Planned Evacuation** – A pre-determined strategy for a premises to secure the removal of persons in or around the premises to a place of safety. The responsibility for determining the strategy rests with the Responsible Person.
  - **Place of ultimate safety** – A place in which there is no immediate or future danger from fire e.g. outside the premises and beyond the hazard zone.
  - **Place of relative safety** – A place in which there is no immediate danger, but in which there might be future danger from fire. This may be within a staircase enclosure, adjacent corridor or area of the building that is protected from fire/smoke spread by fire resisting construction and doors. It must also have an alternative route to a place of ultimate safety if needed.
  - **"Stay put"** – A predetermined strategy of the responsible person for a building under which in the event of a fire elsewhere in the building the occupants should be safe to remain where they are unless they are directly affected by fire, heat or smoke. The strategy relies on the principle of compartmentation combined with other fire safety provisions.
  - **Emergency Evacuation** – The immediate and unplanned movement of people, assisted by LFB personnel or other emergency responders, away from actual or potential danger towards a place of relative or ultimate safety, using recognised or normal means of escape, in circumstances where:

- a planned evacuation strategy does not exist for the premises and the IC decides that an evacuation is necessary.
- the planned evacuation strategy has not taken place and the IC decides that an emergency evacuation is necessary.
- it is determined that the planned evacuation strategy, or a stay put strategy, is no longer tenable and/or is not working effectively.

It should be noted that both evacuation and emergency evacuation can be either full or partial i.e. they can be applied to the entire premises or just a part of it (e.g. a wing of a hospital).

- **Rescue** – The act of helping a person(s) who are threatened with immediate harm and require assistance to move away from danger towards a place of relative or ultimate safety.
- **Mass Rescue** – The act of helping a large number of people that are threatened with immediate harm and who require assistance to move away from the danger towards a place of relative or ultimate safety. This is likely to involve the deployment of a large number of LFB personnel and/or other responders.
- **Persons Reported** - A term used to describe a situation where it is reasonably suspected that people are trapped by fire, heat or smoke or by release of a hazardous substance. This would usually be, but is not limited to, an incident occurring inside a building. A declaration of 'Persons Reported' can be made by the IC or Control. For the purpose of this policy this will include as far as practicable those in residential high rise buildings who call 999 and are advised by a CRO to leave the building because they are directly affected by fire, heat or smoke.
- **Compartmentation** - A building design principle used in high rise and other buildings which is intended to inhibit rapid fire spread within the building from one area to another by dividing the building into a series of fire resistant compartments (or boxes) which form a barrier to fire and the products of combustion.
- **Vulnerable people** – Persons with a characteristic or condition that would impair their ability to leave a premises without assistance. It is not possible to be definitive about those who may need help to evacuate, but the persons most likely to be encountered during an incident include young children, the frail or elderly, persons with limited mobility and people who have:
  - visual or hearing impairments
  - significantly high body weight
  - cognitive or mental health issues
  - problems understanding instructions or advice provided to them

This policy recognises that the nature and extent of an individual vulnerable person's characteristic or condition may make it difficult for both Control officers and those attending an incident to reliably identify who is a vulnerable person.

Please also note that this description is specific to operational policy and that the LFB and other agencies define 'vulnerability' differently for other purposes e.g. safeguarding.

- **Bridgehead** - definition is contained in [policy number 0434 - sectorisation at incidents.pdf](#). The purpose of a Bridgehead is to enable an incident to be dealt with by establishing a control point with suitable resources and emergency provision in a safe area as close as practical to the risk area. In a residential high rise building it is normally located two floors below the fire floor.
- **Multiple Fire Survival Guidance (FSG) calls** - Three or more FSG calls from one building will be classed as multiple FSG calls.

## 4 FSG call management in Control

- 4.1 Responsibility rests with Control to determine the requirement to provide FSG to a caller and it is for Control to mobilise a FSG attendance in accordance with this policy and its appendices.
- 4.2 Control should gather as much of the following information as possible and relay this to the incident ground as far as practicable in the following order; (excluding any information below that forms part of the original mobilising message):
- Premises or Flat Number
  - Floor located on
  - Number of persons (recorded as adult, child and elderly)
  - Location within Premises
  - Conditions being experienced by the caller
  - Any vulnerable people (this is a tick box Y/N)
  - Additional information
  - Time received from Control (completed by the incident ground)
  - Time FSG call resolved (completed by the incident ground)
- 4.3 To ensure the effective transfer of FSG information the primary method of communication with Control is Airwave radio, using a channel nominated by Control if appropriate. If Airwave is not available, Control should contact the Incident Command Pump (ICP), designated FSG pump (FSGP) or Command Unit (CU) via their mobile phone line to pass FSG information.
- 4.4 CUs also have the ability to contact Control on a dedicated CU FSG phone line.
- 4.5 When a call is made to Control by someone other than the person being directly affected by fire, heat or smoke e.g. a Telecare provider, or a friend/relative who may be some distance from the incident and who has credible information, that information should be passed to the incident ground immediately.
- 4.6 All FSG calls will be treated as a 'Persons Reported'. Either the IC or Control can declare this, however only the IC of the incident ground can confirm that 'all persons accounted for'.

## 5 Callers requiring reassurance

- 5.1 A variety of incidents, especially those which are highly visible, can generate many calls to Control from persons who are anxious and uncertain about the situation and seeking advice or offering further information about the incident, such as the presence of smoke in a corridor.
- 5.2 When Control are aware that the responsible person has adopted a stay put strategy, Control should make clear that the LFB advice to callers is that they should be safe to remain in their property, provided the caller is located in an area of their premise not directly affected by fire, heat or smoke. Control should make the assumption that all high rise purpose built blocks of flats operate a stay put strategy, unless they are aware of evidence to the contrary. For example there are a number of high rise buildings identified on the mobilising system operating a temporary simultaneous evacuation strategy due to fire safety and/or cladding issues.
- 5.3 Where reasonably practicable, the IC should ensure that reassurance is offered to those expressing concern by the most expedient means possible. This could include the use of the property's intercom system or by sending firefighters to those that have expressed concern.

## 6 Mobilising resources for FSG calls

- 6.1 FSG calls to any building type attracts an enhanced attendance, the following are mobilised to manage FSG information see [Policy number 0412 - mobilising policy.pdf](#) ;

- an additional CU
  - an additional SC (FSG Sector Commander)
  - one Pumping Appliance (designated as a support pump to the additional CU)
- 6.2 Three or more FSG calls received to any building, an enhanced FSG attendance is mobilised;
- an additional CU
  - an additional SC
  - one Pumping Appliance (designated as a support pump to the additional CU)
- 6.3 The resources in paragraph 6.1 to 6.2 do not count towards any additional attendance mobilised by Control, if the IC requests additional resources.
- 6.4 When responding, senior officers mobilised for FSG should be informed that they form part of the FSG attendance.

## **7 Communicating and Recording of FSG information**

7.1 The effective management of FSG relies on the timely and accurate sharing of information between:

- Control
- the ICP, FSGP, FSG CU or Bridgehead and;
- the IC

The flow of information between these locations should be 'two way' to ensure that, as far as reasonably practicable, everyone involved in responding to FSG information is able to maintain a shared, current and accurate understanding of the situation.

- 7.2 At an incident, all FSG information must be recorded on Control Information Forms that are carried on all front line appliances (i.e. Pump Ladders, Pumps, Fire Rescue Units, CUs and Aerial appliances). These forms enable information to be shared among key locations such as the CU and Bridgehead (or equivalent area of operations) at the incident and should be distributed as described in appendix H. Use of these forms helps to ensure that the information listed in paragraph 4.2 is recorded in a consistent manner to minimise the risk that any information is mislaid.
- 7.3 All CUs are required to carry a Casualty Information Poster (see appendix H) to record and collate multiple FSG information generated at the same incident which will be displayed on the designated CU. This poster can be used at any incident where persons may be trapped or missing and can be adapted for use at specific incidents by altering the headings to make them relevant to the prevailing situation.
- 7.4 All front line appliances and CUs are required to carry a Forward Information Board (FIB) with a Casualty Information Poster overlay (see appendix H) and these must be used to record FSG information at the Bridgehead (or other relevant area of operations).
- 7.5 It is important that FSG information is accurately recorded on these boards as they provide a reliable method to display FSG information in a structured format. In addition, if the Bridgehead (or other relevant area of operations) is repositioned, FSG and other key operational information will not be lost, such as would be the case if information is recorded on walls for example.

- 7.6 If personnel are passed mobile phones by members of the public on the incident ground to communicate with people within the building who may require FSG, the information from this call should be recorded on a Control Information Form and passed to the established point of contact on the incident ground for managing FSG information (i.e. the ICP, FSGP or the FSG CU ) who will record the details as 'persons reported' and manage the information in line with Appendix B-E.
- 7.7 The caller should then be advised by the operational member of staff to contact Control via 999 who will identify and coordinate the FSG call(s). The mobile phone should then be passed back to the member of the public.

## **8 The response to FSG calls**

- 8.1 Appliances en-route to incidents and the declared ICP must maintain a listening watch on their Airwave radio used for mobilising and general incident command (i.e. on FLON-OPS 2 or 4).
- 8.2 Control must contact the ICP or the appliance of the nominated officer in charge of the initial attendance as soon as a call is identified as a FSG call. Appendix A outlines the procedure.
- 8.3 Once individual FSG call information is received at the incident ground from Control, the IC or designated radio operator must confirm the information has been accurately received by repeating it back to Control. It must be recorded on a Control Information Form.
- 8.4 It is the responsibility of the IC to:
- a) Implement the appropriate FSG procedure(s) outlined in Appendices B-E.
  - b) Ensure that the response to FSG caller(s) is considered with regard to;
    - the level of risk posed by their reported location in relation to the fire
    - the travel distance of each caller to the point of relative or ultimate safety
    - the potential for rapid spread to locations remote from the compartment of origin
    - the vulnerability of the people involved, insofar as Control have been able to establish (as defined in section 3).
  - c) Allocate the available resources to ensure that every FSG call has resulted in a deployment to the reported location and the outcomes of crew deployments are recorded, unless it is confirmed that the caller and all those in the same specific location have self evacuated successfully.
  - d) Maintain contact with Control and share information regarding the progress and outcome of each FSG call received.
  - e) Share overall situational awareness with Control regarding the incident. Where it is apparent that Control is reaching capacity to manage the number of 999 calls and the duration of individual FSG calls, the IC's situational awareness may become impaired and this may be a factor in determining whether a full or partial evacuation of the premises is required.
- 8.5 Where the implementation of a mass rescue and/or emergency evacuation is required it will be important to prioritise, so far as reasonably practicable, those who are at the highest and most imminent risk.
- 8.6 As soon as reasonably practicable, the IC should designate an appliance and crew to undertake the role of FSGP if a CU has not yet arrived on scene or is not available (see Appendix C).



- 8.7 The FSGP provides a single point for FSG communications to Control which will assist in the continued flow and exchange of FSG information. The FSGP does not take the place of the ICP and the roles should be allocated to separate appliances.
- 8.8 The FSGP must ensure they are communicating with Control on the nominated FSG Airwave channel.
- 8.9 The FSGP must record the FSG information using a separate Control Information Form for each call. When managing multiple FSG calls, the FSGP crew must utilise their FIB with the Casualty Information Poster overlay to record this information in preparation to hand to the CU nominated as the FSG CU.
- 8.10 The primary method of passing FSG information from the FSGP to the Bridgehead (or other relevant area of operations) is handheld radio channel 3. Runners should be implemented as a contingency if radio communications cannot be established or maintained.

## **9 Evacuation and Operational tactics in Premises with a Stay Put Strategy**

- 9.1 In premises where 'stay put' is the Responsible Person's pre-determined strategy, it should be safe for the occupants to remain in their flat or part of building, provided they are not being directly affected by fire, heat or smoke and the spread of fire and smoke is being contained by compartmentation or other building safety features designed for this purpose. ICs should be aware that occupants may choose to leave their flats if they do not feel safe and they are free to do so.
- 9.2 Therefore, in the majority of incidents, ICs will use the relevant operational tactics and associated incident command procedures in order to resolve incidents where compartmentation appears to be effective and the firefighting facilities provided are working correctly.
- 9.3 In circumstances where the incident has exceeded what is anticipated in the building's fire risk assessment and there is a risk of fire, heat and/or smoke spread beyond the flat or floor of origin, the operational response to the incident may require changing to an emergency evacuation and/or mass rescue operation.
- 9.4 The factors that an IC should take into account when considering whether to implement an emergency evacuation and/or mass rescue operation may include - but may not be limited to whether;
- multiple FSG calls are being received
  - emergency or FSG calls are being received to the same building but from a location that is remote from the initial fire
  - where it becomes apparent that Brigade Control is reaching capacity to manage the number of 999 calls and duration of individual FSG calls, the IC's situational awareness may be impaired
  - large numbers of people are evacuating
  - there is rapid spread of fire or smoke, either externally or internally from one compartment and/or floor to another
  - fire and/or products of combustion spread to locations within the building remote from the original fire
  - fire is spreading via external cladding

- there are reports of deteriorating conditions internally
- where it is not possible to deliver sufficient extinguishing medium or, for other reasons, firefighting activity is not controlling or extinguishing the fire

This list is not exhaustive and other signs of the potential significant or substantial failure of compartmentation may be observed.

## 10 Multiple FSG calls

- 10.1 Three or more FSG calls from one building will be classed as multiple FSG calls.
- 10.2 When multiple FSG calls are being received, the IC should consider allocating the first CU in attendance to manage FSG calls instead of the command support function, as is normally the case, and maintain the ICP to carry out that function until a second CU arrives at the incident which can take on those responsibilities.
- 10.3 The CU from the FSG attendance described in paragraph 6.2 will take over as the single point of communication for FSG information. Appendix D outlines this procedure.
- 10.4 The multiple FSG call attendance provides sufficient resources to enable a CU crew to be deployed to a Bridgehead (or other relevant area of operations). Once Airwave communications from the Bridgehead (or other relevant area of operations) have been established, the two way sharing of information with Control can commence and should continue for the duration of the incident.
- 10.5 This link should be used to pass FSG and other caller information directly to that location and to ensure Control receive updates on the progress and outcomes of each call. Appendix E outlines this procedure.
- 10.6 The IC should give priority to appointing officers as FSG Sector Commander and FSG Coordinator. The FSG Sector Commander is an exclusive functional role and should not be given additional responsibilities.
- 10.7 If Control believe they reaching the limit of their capacity to handle further emergency calls or the Control OiC believes they will exceed their capacity shortly, they must inform the IC. If the IC believes that their situational awareness may be impaired because Control's capacity is exceeded, they should proceed in accordance with paragraph 9.4.
- 10.8 Any consideration as to the requirement for a emergency evacuation or mass rescue should be regularly reviewed.
- 10.9 Where the IC has decided to conduct an emergency evacuation and/or mass rescue, Control should take all reasonably practicable steps to re-contact callers who have previously been advised that it should be safe to stay put and those FSG callers who Control are no longer in communication with and update them with the latest guidance.

## 11 Role of FSG Sector Commander

- 11.1 The FSG Sector Commander is a functional role. On the incident ground they are responsible for creating an effective FSG communications structure as indicated in Appendix B-E which will enable;
- A principal point of contact to receive FSG information from Control notwithstanding the direct Airwave link (for multiple FSG calls) between the Bridgehead and Control
  - Prioritisation of FSG caller(s) rescue in line with the IC's plan

- FSG information to be effectively passed on to those responsible for search and rescue activities
  - FSG information to be collated and regular updates on the deployment, progress and outcomes of rescue activities sent to each FSG call are passed to the IC and Control
  - Maintain information-sharing with Control to ensure effective situational awareness, both in Control and at the incident
- 11.2 In the event of multiple FSG calls and the establishment of the Bridgehead FSG communications link, the FSG Sector Commander may nominate an officer to coordinate the FSG rescue activities. The FSG Coordinator will;
- Ensure that the CU crew and support pump are in place to assist in the passing of FSG information
  - Liaise with the FSG, Fire and Search sector commanders to ensure the effective coordination of rescues
  - Ensure timely progress updates are communicated to Control via the CU crew at the Bridgehead or other relevant area of operations. This must include regular updates on the deployment, progress and outcomes of rescue activities sent to each FSG call
- 11.3 The FSG Sector Commander, before they leave the incident, should ensure that all information regarding FSG calls is recorded and retained. This should be photographed and uploaded to CSS. Arrangements should be made for hard copies to be delivered to Incident Command Policy.

## **12 Post incident support and debriefing**

- 12.1 Control officers involved in a FSG call and those carrying out rescues on the incident ground may have experienced a traumatic incident. The Brigade's Counselling & Trauma services are available to provide any support that staff may need beyond that which officers can provide.
- 12.2 Staff may have evidence that could assist in any subsequent investigation or inquiry. Contemporaneous notes should be made by all personnel that were involved in the FSG process as soon as reasonably practicable after the incident. These notes can be used for internal performance review or as the basis for formal witness statements.

# Appendix A – Actions in Control

## 1 Context

- 1.1 This appendix details the actions Brigade Control will take when dealing with 999 caller(s) who require fire survival guidance. The appendix sets out the actions required to ensure effective management of these calls within the Control room and that effective communications between Brigade Control and the incident ground are established and maintained. This appendix should be read in conjunction with (*insert hyperlink for emergency evacuation/mass rescue when published*).
- 1.2 999 emergency fire calls can be generated for many reasons and within the context of a variety of scenarios. In certain circumstances people can be uncertain of their situation, for example as a result of being in a building with a rubbish chute on fire or where there is smoke in a communal stairwell. These callers may seek advice or reassurance but can also provide valuable information relating to the incident.
- 1.3 On every emergency call believed to be received from inside a building on fire, the CRO should advise the caller to 'Get out, stay out and close the doors behind you'. As far as practicable, those in residential high rise buildings who call 999 and are advised by a CRO to leave the building because they are directly affected by fire, heat or smoke will be recorded as 'persons reported' by Control and their information passed to the incident ground.
- 1.4 Callers in purpose built high rise residential or other buildings that operate a 'stay put' strategy, who should be advised that they should be safe to remain in their flat if they are not directly affected by fire, heat or smoke.

## 2 Management of a FSG call and Guidance to the Caller

- 2.1 Fire Survival Guidance is the advice and guidance given by CROs to persons who are directly affected by fire, heat or smoke and cannot leave their premises. It is a CROs responsibility to identify when a 999 emergency caller requires fire survival guidance.
- 2.2 The management of FSG calls often require complex multi tasking by CROs in what is a high stress situation, which can be significantly exacerbated if multiple FSG calls and/or a large volume of emergency calls are being received by the Control room.
- 2.3 Every FSG call is different and the management of each call will depend on circumstances facing the caller, including the premise type, the severity and proximity of the fire.
- 2.4 The CRO should cover a number of principles (Assess, Protect, Reassure, Reassess, Escape and Rescue) with the aim of attempting to keep the caller safer in a fire situation.

## 3 Assess

- 3.1 If a caller has indicated that they are directly affected by fire, heat or smoke the CRO should advise the caller to get out and stay out. If, for any reason, the caller indicates that they cannot do so the CRO should begin to provide fire survival guidance by following the procedure set out below while continuing to question the caller further to explore alternative means of escape.
- 3.2 It should be recognised that undertaking 'Assess' is not a simple process and callers can frequently disengage from the questioning. CROs should ask clear and relevant questions relating to the caller's circumstances and will attempt to gather the following information and relay this to the incident ground as and when the information becomes available;
  - Premises or flat number
  - Floor located on

- Number of persons inside (recorded as adult, child and elderly)
- Location of caller within premises
- Conditions being experienced by the caller i.e. smoke density

As the call continues, the CRO should attempt to obtain additional information such as;

- The location of fire and the callers proximity to it
- Identify any vulnerabilities that may prevent or hinder self evacuation or rescue
- Any additional information the caller may offer

3.3 As far as reasonably practicable, the CRO should attempt to identify and record any vulnerabilities that may hamper an individual's escape or evacuation from the premises. Examples can include but are not restricted to young children, the frail elderly, disabled persons and people who have:

- visual or hearing impairments
- significantly high body weight
- cognitive or mental health issues
- difficulty understanding instructions or advice provided to them for whatever reasons.

3.4 For FSG calls received from buildings containing multiple flats or rooms, the caller's flat number and floor should be used as a reference for passing information to the incident ground.

3.5 The mobilising system provides a time stamp when information is added and this must be provided to the incident ground.

*Example 1: "M2FS to CU2 - FSG Call at Flat 12 on 4th Floor, one adult in the bedroom at rear of flat, caller states smoke is becoming heavy and black - timed at 15:17hrs"*

*Example 2: "M2FS to FSG CU - FSG caller in Room 8 on 7th Floor, two adults. Caller believes fire is on 6th floor underneath their room, heavy smoke coming through floorboards. Timed at 02:23hrs"*

## **4 Protect**

4.1 During this phase, the CRO should offer the prescriptive FSG to protect the caller as provided in their training. The CRO should remain cognisant of the caller's circumstances in determining the most effective protect advice.

4.2 If the CRO believes the circumstances of the caller require it, protect guidance can commence at the beginning of a FSG call. This may mean that the assessment stage is delayed whilst the caller takes action to protect themselves from the effects of fire, heat or smoke.

4.3 The CRO should give clear and direct instructions to the caller and provide the caller with time to carry out these instructions.

## **5 Reassure**

- 5.1 Reassurance is important during the management of an FSG call and can help put the caller at ease. Reassurance can be used throughout the call.
- 5.2 Reassurance may calm the caller making it easier to communicate instructions and listen to guidance.
- 5.3 The CRO should attempt to provide only factual information to the caller (e.g. information received from the incident ground) and any reassurance provided should not lead the caller to develop a false sense of security. On occasions, it may be inappropriate to offer reassurance to the caller if the only reasonable course of action to save the caller's life is to attempt evacuation. When this occurs, the advice must be both clear and robust in its delivery, leaving the caller in no doubt as to the seriousness of their situation.

## **6 Reassess**

- 6.1 The CRO should continue to assess the caller's physical conditions and environment to ensure that the incident ground are updated on any changes in conditions given on initial assessment can be updated if necessary.
- 6.2 Any change in the caller's circumstances should be recorded on the mobilising system.
- 6.3 During the FSG call, the CRO should remain alert to any cues (i.e. vocal inflection – raised voice, rapid speech or period(s) of silence) which may provide indications as to the possible progress of the fire and the effect of the fire, heat or smoke on the caller.

## **7 Escape**

- 7.1 Any changes in a callers physical conditions and environment may require the CRO to assist the caller to escape from their location.
- 7.2 All CRO's are able to provide advice and guidance to a caller escaping from a first floor of a building and how to break a window to provide fresh air and an potential escape route to the caller.

## **8 Rescue**

- 8.1 Once guidance has been given to the caller to protect them or if escape is not deemed possible the CRO may attempt to get the caller to focus on being rescued. If rescue is unlikely to happen, the IC must contact the Control OiC and discuss the requirement for clear and robust evacuation advice to provide to FSG callers.
- 8.2 CROs should attempt to update the caller on rescue efforts being made by firefighters and possible methods that firefighters could deploy at the incident such as fire escape hoods.

## **9 Mobilising Resources for FSG Calls**

- 9.1 A FSG call to any building type will attract an enhanced attendance as detailed in Section 6 of this policy.
- 9.2 Control should inform the ICP or CU that a FSG attendance has been mobilised so the IC is aware what additional resources are en route.

## **10 Recording and Communicating FSG Information in Control**

- 10.1 Control should record each FSG call on the mobilising system during the initial call and update the details, if required as the call progresses.
- 10.2 Control should use the mobilising system to display and record FSG information.

- 10.3 The Casualty Information Poster (see appendix H) is intended to display caller information to the Control FSG Coordinator and OiC of Control.
- 10.4 The primary method of communicating information from each FSG call to the incident ground must be via Airwave and the OiC in Control should, if required, nominate a dedicated Airwave channel to pass FSG information.
- 10.5 Communicating FSG information is a two way process. The incident ground is responsible for updating Control with deployments of firefighters and progress with reaching FSG callers. This information should be recorded on the mobilising system.

## **11 Recording of Calls during an incident where FSG is in progress**

- 11.1 Control should load the FSG layout on the mobilising system as soon as more than one FSG call is received.
- 11.2 Control may receive emergency calls from callers outside the premises or from friends and relatives indicating that there could be people in the building at risk. These should be classed as Persons Reported (PR) calls and details regarding the persons specific location, if known, should be passed to the incident ground.
- 11.3 It is likely that some callers, when told to leave the building will indicate that they cannot because they feel the conditions outside their current location are more hazardous and will not leave that location. If they are not directly affected by fire, heat or smoke, the call will not be classed as an FSG call however these callers may be provided with protect advice and reassurance if necessary and details of the caller's specific location should be passed to the incident ground. These calls will be recorded as Stay Put.
- 11.4 Control may also receive calls from callers in purpose built high rise residential buildings who are not being directly affected by fire, heat or smoke. These callers should be advised that it should be safe to remain in their flat unless information received from the incident ground indicates otherwise.
- 11.5 Callers advised that it should be safe to 'stay put' must also be informed that if conditions change and they become directly affected by fire, heat or smoke, they should redial 999.
- 11.6 Any call received from a resident in a premise, identified on the mobilising system as operating a simultaneous evacuation strategy, and who has not previously evacuated for any reason, should be instructed by Control to immediately evacuate unless they are prevented or are unable to do so. If unable to evacuate and if the caller is being directly affected by fire, heat or smoke, the call will be recorded as an FSG call and the caller advised in accordance with the guidance in this appendix.
- 11.7 Other emergency calls can be received from callers within the building responding to noises, sirens, a smell of burning or fire alarms sounding. These callers could also witness smoke in a communal area or stairwell and wish to report this to the Brigade. The information should be passed to the incident ground.

## **12 Multiple FSG Calls Received to a Fire in a Building**

- 12.1 Three FSG calls or more from one premise type or a number of premises within a building are classed as Multiple FSG calls and the OiC in Control should declare – 'Multiple FSG incident in progress' to all Control staff.
- 12.2 The control room should implement the role of the Control FSG Coordinator
- 12.3 The Control OiC should communicate with the IC to share situational awareness and share this with appropriate control room staff.

- 12.4 Situational awareness may also be enhanced through News channel, Met Police helicopter, establishment of tri service conference call and liaison with other agencies, BT and FRS control rooms.

## 13 Change in Operational Tactics

- 13.1 Any decision to implement an emergency evacuation or mass rescue should be made by the IC after liaison with Control. This decision should be verbally relayed and displayed to Control staff.
- 13.2 The incident ground should provide clear instructions to Control on safe evacuation routes, location of firefighters and the use of any protective equipment being deployed such as fire escape hoods, so that this can be communicated to callers.
- 13.3 In the event of emergency evacuation or a mass rescue being initiated, Control should attempt to re-contact any callers who have been advised that it should be safe to stay put and those FSG callers who Control are no longer in communication with.
- 13.4 In the absence of any other direction from the incident ground on which persons should be contacted first, Control should attempt to re-contact callers in the order the calls were received. This will however be challenging in the event of an incident generating a high volume of FSG calls over a sustained period of time. The ability to re-contact callers may be severely inhibited in cases when large numbers of calls are still being received by Control, impacting on the resources available to attempt to re-contact previous callers.
- 13.5 Decisions in regard to the prioritisation and allocation of resources are the responsibility of the OiC in Control. This may mean taking a decision not to re-contact callers based on the operating conditions in the Control room, including the extent to which there are outstanding calls waiting to be answered. Some of these outstanding calls could be from repeat callers. To support the decision making process, decisions will be recorded on the incident log in Control to ensure the rationale and context of the decisions taken by the OiC in Control are appropriately recorded.
- 13.5 When calling back callers and the caller does not answer, the CRO should attempt to leave a message containing the advice and the time the message was left. *Example: This is London Fire Brigade Control calling you at [time] The conditions in your building have deteriorated ... [insert relevant advice] ...*
- 13.6 Following any decision to commence an emergency evacuation or mass rescue, any information gathered by the CRO regarding a caller's location as they attempt to evacuate should be recorded and passed to the incident ground.

## 14 Resilience and Contingency Arrangements During Multiple FSG Calls

- 14.1 Control has contingency (mutual aid) arrangements for periods of spike and spate conditions including high volumes of FSG calls. Contingency arrangements should be implemented when Control's capacity to answer emergency calls is reached through establishing communications with BT. When receiving multiple FSG calls, contact should also be established with other emergency services control rooms. This will be particularly required if the incident is visible to large numbers of the public, as this often results in additional duplicate calls from concerned members of the public not directly affected by the incident, with the potential to overflow to other services emergency control rooms.



- 14.2 The Control OIC should determine when capacity is being reached or is likely to be reached in the near future - predominantly based on call volume and the nature of the calls being received. This information should be communicated to the incident ground immediately as this may impact on the IC's situational awareness leading to a change of operational tactics.
- 14.4 Call handling support arrangements with North West Fire Control, Staffordshire and West Midlands Fire Control may be activated. The Control OIC in liaison with BT may implement call filter arrangements and emergency calls from LFB may be answered in other emergency service control rooms. However, even when these arrangements are in operation, all communication to the incident ground will come via Control. Supporting Control rooms do not communicate directly with the incident ground.
- 14.5 The use of the risk critical communications link (NTG20) between Fire Control rooms will be established by the Control OIC as soon as it is identified that other Fire Control rooms are answering calls on behalf of LFB. This link provides the ability to share situational awareness between Control rooms. Airwave (ESTG 5) can be used to communicate with other London based emergency control rooms. Updates should be provided under the guidance of the Control OIC to all other Control rooms at no less than 20 minute intervals and any change in guidance being provided by LFB Control should be communicated immediately.
- 14.6 When Control is operating at capacity the Control OIC should consider advising CRO's dealing with FSG calls, to only provide protect advice or the latest evacuation advice and not remain on the call, however it remains the responsibility of the CRO to use their professional judgement, based on their engagement with the FSG Caller, to decide if they should remain on the FSG call.
- 14.7 Before advising CRO's not to remain on the line with FSG callers after protect advice or the latest evacuation advice has been given, the Control OIC should consider:
- Number and size of the incidents within the LFB area
  - Requesting support from the media to assist to reduce call volume
  - The volume of emergency calls waiting to report the incident who are in a place of ultimate safety.
- 14.7 Supervisory staff in Control should remain available to assist CROs in the management of FSG calls if necessary and should not attempt to assist with reducing call volume to the detriment of their ability to command the Control room.


## **15 The Fire Survival Guidance Coordinator at Control**

- 15.1 The OIC in Control should nominate an FSG Coordinator to manage communications between Control and the incident ground during multiple FSG calls.
- 15.2 The Control FSG Coordinator is responsible for establishing a single direct line of communication from the Control room to the incident ground to pass FSG and/or persons reported information via the designated airwave channel.
- 15.3 The Control FSG Coordinator should also receive updates on operational progress and/or change of tactics at the incident and will update the mobilising system with this information.
- 15.4 The Casualty Information Poster should be updated by the Control FSG Coordinator and if required the nearest Station Commander to Control should be mobilised to assist with this role.
- 15.5 The Control FSG Coordinator has the responsibility for sharing information to the Control OIC to enhance their shared situational awareness. They should analyse intelligence to provide a common operating picture within Control.




## Appendix B - Initial FSG procedure using an ICP

- a) When Control start to receive FSG calls they must pass FSG information to the ICP at the scene. The ICP must record FSG information on the control information form before passing it onto the IC who will relay that information to the Bridgehead (or other relevant area of operations) for rescue crews to be deployed. This would be on channel 1 of the handheld radio.
- b) The following image demonstrates this in a residential high rise premises with relevant and basic high rise sectorisation. However this level of command and control may not have been implemented at the very early stages of an incident;




## Appendix C - The role of the FSGP

- a) The IC should at the earliest opportunity designate a FSGP from existing resources if an FSG CU is not available on the incident ground and if FSG calls have not been resolved. The appliance commander of the FSGP and Control should coordinate the switch of Airwave radio channel to the channel designated by Control.
- b) The appliance commander of the FSGP will be responsible for;
- recording FSG information on Control Information Form(s).
  - communicating with the Bridgehead (or other relevant area of operations) initially using fireground radio channel 1 to pass FSG information and receive updates on the progress of rescue crews.
  - Ensuring a communications link on fireground radio channel 3 is established at the Bridgehead (or other relevant area of operations) either using existing resources at the Bridgehead (or other relevant area of operations) or briefing a crew member of the FSGP for that role.
  - If not already in use at the Bridgehead (or other relevant area of operations), a FIB with the Casualty Information Poster overlay should be used to record FSG information.
  - Populating the FSGP FIB with individual FSG caller information and ensuring that information is recorded on the FIB at the Bridgehead (or other relevant area of operations).
  - Ensuring a runner is available to take FSG information to a Bridgehead (or other relevant area of operations) if handheld radio communications are compromised.
  - The FSGP will regularly update Control on the progress of rescue crews.
- c) The following image demonstrates this in a residential high rise premises;



## Appendix D – Setting up of the FSG CU

- a) The FSG CU or if the IC decides, the first CU in attendance, should be designated as the FSG CU. If not already completed the FSG CU will coordinate with Control the switch of Airwave radio channel to one designated by Control.
- b) Following the guidance of the CU team leader and preferably utilising the FSGP crew (appendix B) to assist on the FSG CU they must;
  - Transfer existing FSG information from the ICP or FSGP to the FSG CU.
  - Record additional FSG caller information on Control Information Form(s).
  - Update the Casualty Information Poster with relevant FSG information.
  - Maintain communications with the Bridgehead (or other relevant area of operations) on fireground radio channel 3.
  - Ensure the (FSGP) FIB is continually updated with FSG information in anticipation of the additional FSG CU (for multiple FSGs) attendance.
- c) The image below outlines the FSG communications structure once a FSG CU is in place;



## Appendix E - Setting up of the Bridgehead Command Unit Team

- a) When in attendance the second CU mobilised to manage FSG information must go to the FSG CU for a briefing by either the FSG Sector Commander (if in place) or the FSG CU team leader. They must have with them the following minimum equipment to establish themselves at the Bridgehead (or other equivalent area of operations);
  - 2 Airwave radios
  - FSG Pack (laptop, Control Information Forms, pens, plastic wallets (to contain Control Information Forms))
  - FIBs, additional FIB Casualty Information Poster overlays and fire ground radios.
- b) After the second FSG CU crew have received a briefing, which must include the information on the prepared FIB and the ICs declared tactics, they should proceed to the Bridgehead (or other relevant area of operations) with;
  - the FSG Bridgehead equipment (detailed above),
  - the FSG support crew (with tripod and FIB adaptor)

- a prepared FIB with up to date casualty information on the number and detail of FSG caller information.
  - a copy of all completed Control Information Forms.
- c) This crew (second CU and support pump) must ensure they are in a safe location and, if possible, away from the dynamic area of BA deployments where they will not be disrupted by the ongoing firefighting tactics.
- d) Once all equipment has been setup at the Bridgehead (or other relevant area of operations) and the FSG crew have reconciled FSG information passed to the Bridgehead (or other relevant area of operations), they must contact Control using Airwave radio on the channel designated by Control and make them aware that they will now be the point of contact to receive further FSG information.
- e) Once the second FSG CU are established at the Bridgehead, the initial FSG CU must maintain a listening watch and update the Control Information Form(s) and Casualty Information Poster(s) as appropriate. This will provide;
- resilience in maintaining a record of all FSG information separate to the Bridgehead (or other relevant area of operations) CU, should that be compromised
  - situational awareness for the FSG Sector Commander to update the IC on the progress of rescue crews deployed to FSG callers.


- f) At the Bridgehead (or other relevant area of operations), FSG information must be recorded on a Control Information Form, a copy must then be placed inside a plastic see-through wallet. The wallet enables FSG information to be tracked as it will be clipped to the BA tally of a crew member undertaking the rescue and placed within the BA board (see photo below). If that crew is unsuccessful in carrying out the rescue, the FSG information in the wallet can be immediately tasked to another crew.



- g) The wallet must be given to the Sector Commander Fire (in charge of the Bridgehead or other relevant area of operations) or delegated officer which may include Sector Commander Search as appropriate to the command structure in place at the Bridgehead (or other relevant area of operations). This officer is responsible for the relevant BA crew being tasked by the ECO in line with the FSG information.
- h) The BA crew are then responsible for carrying out the task and reporting back to the ECO in relation to the success of their task or otherwise so that other crews can be tasked again if necessary. Information gathered from the BA crews must be passed back to the FSG CU crew at the Bridgehead or equivalent area of operations so Control and the IC can be updated.
- i) The Bridgehead (or other relevant area of operations) CU crew must update Control directly on progress via the Airwave radio channel designated by Control to pass and receive FSG information.
- j) The FSG Sector Commander must make contact with Control using their personal Airwave radio via the Airwave radio channel designated by Control to pass and receive FSG information to maintain situational awareness with Control including updates on the incident command tactics of the IC as well as briefing the IC on progress of FSG calls and the considerations of the FSG Coordinator (Control) on the capacity at Control to maintain FSG advice to callers.
- k) At the conclusion of this procedure all forms and associated material that could be used for investigations should be sent to incident command policy as per PN 0828 recording decisions at incidents.



l) The image below outlines the FSG communications structure once the additional CU for multiple FSG calls is in place;



## **Appendix F - Role of the FSG Support Pump crew**

- a) The FSG Support Pump is mobilised when Control confirm that multiple FSG calls are in progress. The appliance will be notified that their role is that of FSG Support Pump.
- b) When in attendance and after the appliance commander has booked in with the CU they should make themselves available at the FSG CU for a briefing from the FSG CU team leader or FSG Sector Commander if in place. They will require their FIB with the casualty information overlay, tripod and adaptor.
- c) The role of the FSG Support Pump crew is to provide a physical communications link between the Bridgehead (or other relevant area of operations) and the second CU crew positioned in a safe location and if possible away from the dynamic area of BA deployments where they will not be disrupted by the ongoing firefighting tactics.
- d) The FSG Support Pump crew under the direction of their OiC must take FSG information, recorded on the Control Information Form(s) and physically pass them to the Sector Commander Fire or delegated officer at the Bridgehead (or other relevant area of operations) ensuring the content of the form(s) are understood and rescue crews are briefed. They must provide the second FSG CU crew at the Bridgehead (or other relevant area of operations) with information on the progress of rescue activities, in order that Control can be updated to maintain their situational awareness.
- e) The FSG Support Pump crew must provide updates back from the Bridgehead (or other relevant area of operations) to the second CU crew who must update Control on the Airwave radio on the progress of rescue crews deployed to FSG callers.
- f) The FSG Support Pump crew should not be used for any other tasks during the incident and can be identified by a Command Support surcoat; red/white yoke with yellow lower body marked FSG Support.

## Appendix G - Examples of messages

### Message from Control

E271 from M2FS priority, fire survival guidance call information.

E271 from M2FS fire survival guidance call in flat 9 floor 3, 2 persons within flat, no mobility issues reported, fire outside front door on the 3<sup>rd</sup> floor, with smoke entering the flat. The 2 people are in the rear bedroom and have been advised to make themselves known at the window.

The current time is recorded on the Control FSG information form within the box "*Time call passed by Control:*"

This message is then repeated by E271 back to Control.

### Message from the incident ground.

M2FS from E271 from Sub O Yates at Larnar House, a block of flats of twenty floors, twenty-five metres by ten metres. A four roomed flat on the third floor seventy-five percent damaged by fire. Two adult males rescued by BA crews via internal staircase by London Fire Brigade crews. Forty-five millimetre jet, one hose reel, jet, breathing apparatus, thermal imaging camera, mobile data terminal, Fire Survival Guidance, all persons accounted for.

## Appendix H – Forms used for FSG caller information

**Control Information Form** - carried on all appliances, FRUs and CUs. Each form has three copies to allow annotation and distribution at the incident. Any other relevant information gathered by Control or requested from the incident ground must also be recorded on this form. The top (white) copy of the form must be taken to the Bridgehead (or other relevant area of operations) to provide resilience for handheld radio communications. The forms are completed in **BLOCK CAPITALS**.

When a CU team is in position at a bridgehead (or other relevant area of operations) they must ensure that the white copy is folded into the transparent wallet and handed to a member of the FSG Support Pump crew who must ensure it is clipped on a BA tally of the allocated search and rescue crew.

The other two copies (yellow and blue) are kept together as a record of the FSG call and also to record the progress of the rescue crews sent to the FSG caller(s). This information is also used to inform the FSG sector commander and the second CU team at the Bridgehead (or other relevant area of operations) when updating Control on progress via the Airwave radio.

**Casualty Information Poster** - All CUs carry these posters. They must be readily available and best practice dictates one is permanently placed on the back of a reversible white board. All FSG information from a control information form must be copied onto the poster and updated accordingly.

**Forward Information Board (FIB) with the casualty information overlay** - carried on all appliances and FRUs. Each FIB board has a casualty information overlay for FSG information that mirrors the casualty information poster carried on CUs. At multiple FSG calls and if the FSG CU is not in attendance the FSGP must complete this before handing to the FSG CU in addition to the control information form(s). The FIB will be used as the single point at a Bridgehead (or other relevant area of operations) to record and update FSG information. This is to ensure that if a Bridgehead (or other relevant area of operations) is relocated FSG information is not lost.

# Appendix H continued

White copy BH  
 Yellow copy BH  
 Blue copy FSGP/CU



## Control Information

Please fill out in BLOCK CAPITAL LETTERS

Premise number:	Floor:
Number of persons within location:	
Location within premises and access point:	
Condition within premises (heavy smoke/fire etc):	
Vulnerable people    Yes <input type="checkbox"/> No <input type="checkbox"/>	

Additional information:

Time received from Control:

Time FSG call resolved:

FOLD HERE

# Appendix H continued

<b>CASUALTY INFORMATION</b>		<b>LFB</b>			
Premise or flat number	Floor	Number of persons	Location within premises and access point		
				1	
				2	
				3	
				4	
				5	
				6	
				7	
				8	
				9	
				10	
Conditions being experienced by the caller (heavy smoke/fire etc)	Vulnerable people	Additional information	Time received from Control (completed by inc ground)	Time FSG call resolved (completed by inc ground)	FSG/PR

# Appendix I-Key point summary- Fire survival guidance

## Information on task or event

Premises Number  
 Floor located on  
 Number of persons (recorded as adult, child and elderly)  
 Location within Premises  
 Conditions being experienced by the caller  
 Any vulnerable people (this is a tick box Y/N)  
 Additional information  
 Time received from Control (completed by the incident ground)  
 Time FSG call resolved (completed by the incident ground)

## Information about Resources

- PDA.
- Exclusive FSG attendance.
- FSGP
- FSG CU
- Multiple FSG
- Second CU to Bridgehead (or equivalent area of operations)
- FSG Sector Commander
- FSG Coordinator

## Information about Risk and Benefit.

- Is Control receiving Multiple FSG calls
- Prioritise rescue of FSG caller(s)
- Factors to consider to initiate emergency evacuation and / or a mass rescue.

## Gathering and thinking

### Objectives

- Direct crews to persons in need of rescue using FSG information
- Manage FSG information from Control with timely updates back to Control
- Maintain situational awareness

### Communicating

- Initial passing of FSG information on hand held radio channel 1
- Set up FSGP, dedicated Airwave radio channel to Control and use of Hand held fireground radio channel 3

### Controlling

- FSG Sector Commander  
 FSG Coordinator at Bridgehead

### Plan.

- Implement appropriate FSG communications structure outlined in Appendix B-E
- Consider emergency evacuation and/ or mass rescue for following factors;
  - multiple emergency or fire survival guidance (FSG) calls are being received
  - emergency or FSG calls are being received from a location that is remote from the initial scene of operations
  - Control's capacity to handle FSG calls is liable to be reached i.e. the number of FSG calls being received is likely to exceed the number of control officer's available to handle them. This may impact on the IC maintaining situational awareness as Control can be an important source of information gathered from within the premises.
  - large numbers of people are evacuating
  - there is rapid spread of fire or smoke, either externally or internally from one compartment and/or floor to another
  - fire and/or products of combustion spread to locations within the building remote from the original fire
  - fire is spreading via external cladding
  - reports of deteriorating conditions internally
  - fire fighting activities have reached the limitations of the rising main i.e. three working jets

## Document history

### Assessments

An equality, sustainability or health, safety and welfare impact assessment and/or a risk assessment was last completed on:

EIA	14/04/2020	SDIA	17/04/2014	HSWIA	17/4/2020	RA	27/07/2020
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### Audit trail

Listed below is a brief audit trail, detailing amendments made to this policy/procedure.

Page/para nos.	Brief description of change	Date
Page 1	Changed owner from Head of Operational Procedures to Head of Operational Assurance.	24/10/2012
Throughout	The word premise has been replaced by premises throughout.	16/05/2013
Throughout	Attendance to FSG calls has been simplified to one single mobilisation action. Mobilisation will be attribute driven. Clarity provided across varying sections. The reader should consider the whole document to understand the changes in context.	17/04/2014
Page 2 & 10	Key point summary removed from page 2 and KPS flowchart added as appendix 4.	08/09/2014
Page 11	'Subjects list' template updated.	09/12/2014
Throughout	Extensive changes following OP&A and Control policy and procedure review, identified issues through the Grenfell Tower Investigation and Review team and phase 1 outcomes of the Grenfell Tower inquiry.	27.07.20

### Subject list

You can find this policy under the following subjects.

Control room	Fire survival guidance (FSG)
Firefighter emergency	Flowchart - Key Point Summary (KPS)
Incident command / management	Incident management
Mobile Data Terminals (MDT)	

### Freedom of Information Act exemptions

This policy/procedure has been securely marked due to:

<b>Considered by:</b> (responsible work team)	<b>FOIA exemption</b>	<b>Security marking classification</b>



## Standard Equality Impact Assessment Form

### Question 1: Which Team, Department, or Project Board is responsible for carrying out the Standard Equality Impact Assessment?

Name	<i>Incident Command policy (OP&amp;A)</i>
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### Question 2: Lead assessor's contact details

Name	<i>Julian Spooner</i>	Mobile No	07810850655
Job title	Group Commander	Extension	
Department	OP&A	Email	julian.spooner@london-fire.gov.uk

### Question 3: Title of / policy (please include the policy number) / project / report / proposed change / initiative / decision

PN 0790 Fire Survival Guidance
--------------------------------

### Question 4: Is the work...

New		A complete redesign	
A small change or policy review		Other (e.g. reviewed as current)	Policy reviewed and amended to provide new guidance and procedures regarding responding to incidents that involve multiple fire survival guidance calls.

### Question 5: Briefly outline the aim and the purpose of the work

Aim	Amend PN0790 to provide guidance on operational procedure(s) when responding to incidents that involve fire survival guidance calls.
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Purpose	Provide policy and procedural guidance for operational staff.
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### Question 6: Has an EIA been conducted previously? (please tick)

Yes	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	No	<input type="checkbox"/>
If yes, attach a copy. If no, state the reason.	An EIA was completed for the existing PN0790		

Question 7: Who is it intended to benefit / Who does the change affect?					
Staff	X	Wider public	X	Service users	
Other (please state)					

### Initial Equality Impact Assessment – Screening Stage

Complete the table below to see whether you need to complete a full Equality Impact Assessment.

Only positive impacts identified: <b>No full EIA required</b>	Only neutral impacts identified <b>No full EIA required</b>	One or more adverse impacts identified <b>Full EIA required</b>
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Question 8: Identifying the impacts	
Consider the relevance of the policy / project / decision on each group below and describe any impacts identified.	
<b>NB: Some characteristics may attract multiple impacts e.g. age: positive impact on older people, adverse impact on younger people.</b>	
Protected Characteristic	Level of Impact ( Positive impact, neutral impact, adverse impact)
<b>Age</b> (younger, older or particular age group)	<b>Positive Impact – the provisions made in this policy are designed to increase the feasibility of rescue of persons in age groups where their age (children) mobility or ability to self evacuate are likely to be hindered.</b>
<b>Disability</b> (physical, sensory, mental health, learning disability, long term illness, hidden)	<b>Positive impact - the provisions made in this policy are designed to increase the feasibility of rescue of persons in groups where ability to self evacuate are more challenging as a result of disability.</b>
<b>Gender reassignment</b> (someone proposing to/undergoing/ undergone a transition from one gender to another)	<b>Negligible</b>
<b>Marriage / Civil Partnership</b> (married as well as same-sex couples)	<b>Negligible</b>
<b>Pregnancy and Maternity</b>	<b>Positive impact – the provisions made in this policy are designed to increase the feasibility of rescue of persons in groups where their mobility or ability to self evacuate are likely to be hindered as a result of pregnancy or maternity.</b>
<b>Race</b> (including nationality, colour, national and/or ethnic origins)	<b>Negligible</b>
<b>Religion or Belief</b> (people of any religion, or no religion, or people who follow a particular belief (not political))	<b>Negligible</b>

<b>Sex</b> (men and women)	<b>Negligible</b>
Sexual Orientation (straight, bi, gay and lesbian people)	<b>Negligible</b>
Are there any other groups this work may affect? i.e. carers, non-binary people, people with learning difficulties, neurodiverse people, people with dyslexia, ADHD, care leavers, ex-offenders, people living in areas of disadvantage, homeless people, people on low income / poverty?	<b>Positive impact - the changes made to the provisions in this policy are designed to increase the feasibility of rescue of persons in groups where their mobility or ability to self evacuate are likely to be hindered, whether this is due to mobility issues or cognitive impairment.</b>

**Question 9: Has your assessment been able to demonstrate the following?**

<b>Positive impact</b>	<p>The changes to existing policy will have a positive impact on a number of protected characteristics including age, disability, pregnancy and maternity and race.</p> <p>There may be occasions when multiple FSG calls have been received when an Incident Commander or person with delegated responsibility (Fire sector commander) could be required to consider the rescue of FSG callers due to their age, disability, poor mobility, illness or the proximity and effects of fire, heat or smoke.</p> <p>These rescues should be considered as part of a wider rescue strategy outlined in PN 0633 High Rise procedures (section 5- Emergency Evacuation and Mass Rescue) as the time taken to complete these rescues could be significantly longer and technically complex than clearing effected floors of persons involved or other FSG caller(s) as the use of additional equipment such as stretchers may be required.</p> <p>Further work is required to assess the various risks associated with the rescue of different groups, particularly where there may be complexities, and to identify any appropriate control measures to address those. Any required amendments will be made to this and associated policies before implementation.</p>
<b>Neutral impact</b>	None
<b>Adverse impact</b>	<b>None</b>
Any other comments	<b>None</b>

**Question 10: Meeting the [Public Sector Equality Duty](#) under s149 Equality Act 2010**

How have you considered whether this project / policy / decision does the following:

1. Eliminates unlawful discrimination, harassment and victimisation
2. Advances equality of opportunity between different groups, and
3. Fosters good relations between different groups.

What we must do under law	Provide a description or summary of how this will be achieved
Eliminate discrimination	<b><i>No discriminatory impacts have been identified</i></b>
Advance equality of opportunity	<b><i>The changes to this policy have been made to improve existing fire survival guidance procedures a result of the review of the Grenfell Tower fire. The changes will positively impact protected characteristic groups who may be more at risk of fire; who may be more significantly impacted by fire; or whose mobility inhibits evacuation in the event of a fire in a high rise building. The changes to the policy and procedures are designed to mitigate the disadvantages these groups face in relation to fire.</i></b>
Foster good relations	<b>Fostering good relations between people who share a protected characteristic and people who do not share it is part of the Equality Act 2010 and PSED. Clear published policies which demonstrate consideration of all the London community is one of the means by which this can be done. .</b>

**Question 11: What data has been used to inform the Impact Assessment? (E.g. GLA Datastore, Census Data, Staff Monitoring Data, Staff Survey Data, Local Borough Population Demographics).**

Data Source	How it has been used

**Question 13: How have you ensured your policy, project or proposal uses inclusive**

language that doesn't unintentionally discriminate against certain groups? Yes

Question 12: Have you consulted with staff, LFB support groups, trade unions, public / service users, and / or others to help assess for impacts? (please tick)	
Yes	X
If yes, who was involved and how were they involved? If not, why not?	
Who?	FSG stakeholder group and Legal. At point of formal consultation this will be Trade Unions
How?	FSG stakeholder group meetings at point of formal consultation this will be through the Brigade Joint Council for Health Safety and Welfare.
If no consultation, why not?	
Tools used to assess inclusive language e.g. <a href="#">gender bias screening tools</a> , Stonewall toolkit on inclusive policies, speaking with Inclusion Team, <a href="#">Comms Style Guide</a> , <a href="#">Policy 0370: Writing Policies and Procedures</a> .	<b>Outcome</b>
<i>PN370 – policies and procedures guidance</i>	<b><i>Consistent language</i></b>
<i>Consultation with the LFB Inclusion team</i>	<b><i>Agreed</i></b>

For guidance and support, please contact the Inclusion Team (Second Floor, Union Street, or email [safertogether@london-fire.gov.uk](mailto:safertogether@london-fire.gov.uk)) or a relevant Equality Support Group