

Decision title

Joint Emergency Services Interoperability Principles - JESIP

Recommendation by

Deputy Assistant Commissioner Operational Resilience & Control

Decision Number

LFC-0468-D

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Summary

Report LFC-0468 provides details regarding the submission of the Joint Emergency Services Interoperability Principles - JESIP Policy for agreement prior to implementation.

Decision

That the London Fire Commissioner agrees the attached JESIP Policy for implementation.



Andy Roe
London Fire Commissioner

This decision was remotely signed
Date on Wednesday 03 February 2021

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LONDON FIRE BRIGADE

Report title

Joint Emergency Services Interoperability Principles - JESIP

Report to

Operational Resilience Departmental Management Board
Operations Delivery Directorate Board
Commissioners Board
London Fire Commissioner

Date

16 September 2020
16 December 2020
13 January 2021

Report by

Deputy Assistant Commissioner Operational Resilience & Control

Report number

LFC-0468

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Executive Summary

This covering note provides details regarding the submission of the Joint Emergency Services Interoperability Principles - JESIP Policy for agreement prior to implementation.

Recommended decision

That the London Fire Commissioner agrees the attached JESIP Policy for implementation.

Introduction and Background

1. Following several recommendations from the Grenfell Tower Inquiry regarding the JESIP doctrine, this new policy has been written to support the revised Policy Note 263 – Major Incident Procedure.
2. The Grenfell Tower Inquiry Phase 1 report makes a number of recommendations about the joint doctrine stating:
 - a. That the joint doctrine be amended to make it clear that each emergency service must communicate the declaration of a Major Incident to all other Cat 1 responders as soon as possible.
 - b. That the joint doctrine be amended to make it clear that on the declaration of a Major Incident clear lines of communication must be established as soon as possible between the Control rooms of the individual emergency services.
 - c. That the joint doctrine makes it clear that a single point of contact should be designated within each Control room to facilitate such communication.
 - d. That the joint doctrine be amended to make it clear that a METHANE message should be sent as soon as possible by the emergency services declaring a Major Incident.

3. The revised Policy Note 263 – Major Incident Procedure satisfies these recommendations and incorporates the JESIP doctrine when explaining the Brigade's procedures and actions during a major incident. This policy compliments Policy Note 263 – Major Incident Procedure by adding additional detail around the doctrine itself.
4. The policy is designed to provide guidance for all operational personnel, setting out a standard approach to multi-agency working at all incidents.
5. In order to align briefing methods with that of the Metropolitan Police Service and the London Ambulance Service, the 'IIMARCH' briefing tool has been adopted. This will aid interoperability and ensure a joined up approach to multi-agency briefing. The 'IIMARCH' briefing tool is already used by specialist officers when responding to a marauding terrorist incident.

Equality Impact

6. The London Fire Commissioner and decision takers are required to have due regard to the Public Sector Equality Duty (s149 of the Equality Act 2010) when exercising our functions and taking decisions.
7. It is important to note that consideration of the Public Sector Equality Duty is not a one-off task. The duty must be fulfilled before taking a decision, at the time of taking a decision, and after the decision has been taken.
8. The protected characteristics are: Age, Disability, Gender reassignment, Pregnancy and maternity, Marriage and civil partnership (but only in respect of the requirements to have due regard to the need to eliminate discrimination), Race (ethnic or national origins, colour or nationality), Religion or belief (including lack of belief), Sex, and Sexual orientation.
9. The Public Sector Equality Duty requires us, in the exercise of all LFC functions (i.e. everything the LFC does), to have due regard to the need to:
 - (a) Eliminate discrimination, harassment and victimisation and other prohibited conduct.
 - (b) Advance equality of opportunity between people who share a relevant protected characteristic and persons who do not share it.
 - (c) Foster good relations between people who share a relevant protected characteristic and persons who do not share it.
10. Having due regard to the need to advance equality of opportunity between persons who share a relevant protected characteristic and persons who do not share it involves having due regard, in particular, to the need to:
 - (a) remove or minimise disadvantages suffered by persons who share a relevant protected characteristic where those disadvantages are connected to that characteristic;
 - (b) take steps to meet the needs of persons who share a relevant protected characteristic that are different from the needs of persons who do not share it;
 - (c) encourage persons who share a relevant protected characteristic to participate in public life or in any other activity in which participation by such persons is disproportionately low.

11. The steps involved in meeting the needs of disabled persons that are different from the needs of persons who are not disabled include, in particular, steps to take account of disabled persons' disabilities.
12. Having due regard to the need to foster good relations between persons who share a relevant protected characteristic and persons who do not share it involves having due regard, in particular, to the need to—
 - (a) tackle prejudice, and
 - (b) promote understanding.
13. An Equality Impact Assessment (EIA) was undertaken on 21 August 2020. The impact assessment found the contents of the policy would have a neutral equalities impact.

Workforce Impact

14. The policy was submitted to representative bodies via Brigade Joint Committee for Health and Safety at Work (BJCHSW) on 10 November 2020. We are aware that the union are sighted on the policy, but we are progressing due to the length of consultation, but we are open to making amendments once the policy is heard at BJCHSW.

Finance comments

15. There is an estimated cost of £9k expected for training and it is envisaged that this cost will be contained within existing budgets.

Legal comments

16. Under section 9 of the Policing and Crime Act 2017, the London Fire Commissioner (the "Commissioner") is established as a corporation sole with the Mayor appointing the occupant of that office. Under section 327D of the GLA Act 1999, as amended by the Policing and Crime Act 2017, the Mayor may issue to the Commissioner specific or general directions as to the manner in which the holder of that office is to exercise his or her functions.
17. Section 1 of the Fire and Rescue Services Act 2004 states that the Commissioner is the fire and rescue authority for Greater London.
18. This report seeks approval to implement the new "Joint Emergency Services Interoperability Principles- JESIP" Policy.
19. The statutory basis for the actions proposed in this report is provided by section 7 of the Fire and Rescue Services Act 2004, under which the Commissioner must secure the provision of personnel, services and equipment necessary to efficiently meet all normal requirements for firefighting.
20. Part 4 (Delegation to Officers) of the London Fire Commissioner's Scheme of Governance provides no delegation to officers to implement new policies, therefore the Commissioner's approval is required to implement a new policy.
21. In approving this policy, the Commissioner should bear the following matters in mind:
 - o As an employer, the Commissioner must comply with the Health and Safety at Work etc. Act 1974 (1974 Act).

Section 2 of the 1974 Act imposes a general duty on the employer to 'ensure, so as is reasonably practicable, the health, safety and welfare at work of all of his employees.' This general duty extends (amongst other things) to the plant and systems of work, the provision of information, instruction, training and supervision and to the provision and maintenance of a working environment that is, so far as reasonably practicable, without risks to health and adequate as regards facilities and arrangements for welfare at work.

- Section 3 of the 1974 Act imposes a general duty to 'ensure, so far as is reasonably practicable, that persons not in his employment who may be affected thereby are not thereby exposed to risks to their health or safety.'
 - When carrying out its functions, the Commissioner, as the fire and rescue authority for Greater London, is required to 'have regard to the Fire and Rescue National Framework prepared by the Secretary of State (Fire and Rescue Service Act 2004, section 21).
 - To consider, in developing its operational policies, any relevant national guidance or reports from the HMICFRS or findings of any relevant Inquest or Inquiry.
22. By direction dated 1 April 2018, the Mayor set out those matters, for which the Commissioner would require the prior approval of either the Mayor or the Deputy Mayor for Fire and Resilience (the "Deputy Mayor").
23. Paragraph 3.1 of Part 3 of that direction requires the Commissioner to consult with the Deputy Mayor as far as practicable in the circumstances before a decision is taken on (inter alia) any "[c] decision that can be reasonably considered to be novel, contentious or repercussive in nature, irrespective of the monetary value of the decision involved (which may be nil)".

List of Appendices

Appendix	Title	Protective Marking
1.	Joint Emergency Services Interoperability Principles - JESIP	Official
2.	Equality Impact Assessment	Official

Joint Emergency Services Interoperability Principles- JESIP

New policy number:
 Old instruction number:
 Issue date: **27 July 2020**
 Reviewed as current: **27 July 2020**
 Owner: **Head of Operational Resilience & Control**
 Responsible work team: **Operational Planning & Intelligence**

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1 Introduction

- 1.1 The Joint Emergency Services Interoperability Programme (JESIP) was primarily developed to improve and standardise the way the Police Service, Fire & Rescue Service and Ambulance Service in the UK, work together when responding to major multi-agency incidents.
- 1.2 Whilst Joint working between agencies is a daily occurrence, whenever we work together, and especially at major incidents, we need to ensure that we have the most coherent and effective joint response possible. Historical major incidents have identified the ineffectiveness of single agency working, this has led to a number of public inquiries and subsequent national learning.
- 1.3 The JESIP [Joint Doctrine: the interoperability framework](#) sets out a standard approach to multi-agency working, along with training and awareness products for responding agencies to train their staff.
- 1.4 Whilst the initial focus was on improving the response to major incidents, JESIP is scalable, so much so that the five joint working principles and models can be applied to any type of multi-agency incident.
- 1.5 The JESIP Joint Doctrine also forms the standard utilised during the creation of the Major Incident Procedure Manual produced by London Emergency Services Liaison Panel (LESLP) and incorporates legal responsibilities under the common framework set out in the Civil Contingencies Act 2004 that all Category 1 and 2 responders adhere to. (For further information on LESLP follow the link in Associated documents on page 20).

2 JESIP Aims and Objectives

2.1 JESIP Aim:

The overarching aim ensures that the blue light services are trained and exercised to work together as effectively as possible at all levels of command in response to all incidents up to and including major or complex incidents. This will also integrate rapidly developing terrorist related incidents in a collapsing timeframe, so that as many lives as possible can be saved. It will do this through developing joint working principles, sharing tools and establishing memorandum of understanding between the three blue light services.

2.2 JESIP has the following objectives:

- (a) To establish joint interoperability principles & ways of working (doctrine)
- (b) To develop greater understanding of roles, responsibilities and capabilities amongst tri-service responders
- (c) To improve communication, information sharing and mobilisation procedures between services including their control rooms
- (d) To implement training strategy for all levels of command
- (e) To implement a joint testing & exercising strategy for all levels of command to ensure lessons identified progress to learning and procedural change

2.3 Workstreams

The programme of work has been divided into four main workstreams supported by programme management, engagement and communications activities:

- Doctrine and Organisation
- Operational Communications
- Shared Situational Awareness
- Training and Exercising

An overview of each workstream is provided below, more details and updates can be found on the JESIP website.

A full list of all JESIP programme deliverables are listed in Appendix 1.

- a) Doctrine and Organisation The three blue light services are distinct organisations with policy, procedure and plans to underpin their operations. The fundamental requirement is for a well-understood set of principles to guide the conduct of joint operations at all levels of command resulting in effective joint command and control of major or complex incidents.
- b) Operational Communications This workstream is focussed on improving communication and information sharing between operational staff and between control rooms. This includes reviewing current training modules for radio use and incorporating specific elements into the JESIP training and awareness packages. This workstream will also seek to improve communications between the national coordination centres which operate when a major incident is declared.
- c) Shared Situational Awareness This workstream will focus on the early establishment of shared situational awareness (SSA) to improve initial blue light response. JESIP looks to establish how blue light services can share or adopt joint hazard assessment and joint decision making models. Much of the work in this area is linked to the doctrine & organisation workstream and will be delivered via the training strategy.
- d) Training and Exercising This workstream will focus on developing the content of JESIP training and awareness packages. It will be informed by the work undertaken in all other workstreams.

3 Principles of Joint working

- 3.1 The findings and lessons identified by public inquiries and inquests have highlighted cases where the emergency services could have worked better together and shown much greater levels of communication, co-operation and co-ordination.
- 3.2 Policies and procedures that promote joint working form the basis of the doctrine for responding services. Applying simple principles for joint working are particularly important in the early stages of an incident, when clear, robust decisions and actions need to be taken with minimum delay, in an often rapidly changing environment.
- 3.3 The principles listed below, will often, but not always, be followed in the order in which they are presented. Refer to the bibliography for more information about the JESIP Principles.

1. Co-Location

When commanders are co-located, they can perform the functions of command, control and coordination in person. They should meet as soon as possible, at a jointly agreed location at the scene that is known as the Forward Command Post (FCP). This allows commanders to establish jointly agreed objectives and a coordinated plan, resulting in more effective incident resolution. The benefits of co-location apply equally at all levels of command.

If there is any delay in commanders co-locating, interoperable communications should be used to begin establishing shared situational awareness.

The operational and tactical commanders of each service should be easily identifiable at an incident. This is usually achieved by wearing role specific tabards. There are exceptions, such as the Police in a public order environment and other specialist incidents where coloured epaulettes and helmet markings are used.

Although not all responders will have role specific tabards they should wear appropriate personal protective equipment (PPE) and have identification as a minimum.

2. Communication

Meaningful and effective communication between responders and responder agencies underpins effective joint working.

Sharing and understanding information aids the development of shared situational awareness, which underpins the best possible outcomes of an incident.

The following supports successful communication between responders and responder agencies, as such, incident commanders should:

- a) Exchange reliable and accurate information, such as critical information about hazards, risks and threats
- b) Ensure the information shared is free from acronyms, jargon and other potential sources of confusion
- c) Understand the responsibilities and capabilities of each of the responder agencies involved
- d) Clarify that information shared, including terminology and symbols, is understood and agreed by all involved in the response

Using terminology that either means different things to different people, or is simply not understood across different services is a potential barrier to interoperability.

Some of the terms used in the JESIP doctrine, are key to successful joint working and responders should understand them. Definitions and a short explanation can be found in Appendix 4.

3. Coordination

Coordination allows commanders to discuss use of resources and the activities of each responder agency, agreeing priorities and making joint decisions throughout the incident. Coordination underpins joint working by avoiding potential conflicts, preventing duplication of effort and minimising risk

For effective coordination, one agency generally needs to take a lead role. To decide who the lead agency should be, factors such as the phase of the incident, the need for specialist capabilities and investigation, during both the response and recovery phases should be considered. There is specific guidance for some types of incidents, highlighting which agency should take the lead role. The decision on who takes the lead role should be documented; it is important to note that the lead agency may change as the incident develops.

The lead agency should chair coordinating meetings and make sure they take place regularly and report back to the SCG where appropriate.

4. Joint Understanding of Risk

Different responder agencies may see, understand and treat risks differently.

Each agency should carry out their own 'dynamic risk assessments' but then share the results and contribute to the multi-agency risk assessment so that they can plan control measures and contingencies together more effectively.

By jointly understanding risks and the associated mitigating actions, organisations can promote the safety of responders and reduce the impact that risks may have on members of the public, infrastructure and the environment.

5. Shared Situational Awareness

'Shared situational awareness' is a common understanding of the circumstances, immediate consequences and implications of the emergency, along with an appreciation of the available capabilities and the priorities of the emergency services and responder agencies in attendance.

Achieving shared situational awareness is essential for effective interoperability. Establishing shared situational awareness is important for a common understanding at all levels of command, between incident commanders and between control rooms.

4 Early Stages of an Incident & Methane

- 4.1 In the early stages of an incident, responders of one service may arrive before the those of another, and as a result they may carry out tasks that are not normally their responsibility. If this happens, command and control arrangements for the relevant service should start as soon as the right personnel are in place in sufficient numbers.
- 4.2 In order to help all agencies gather initial information about an incident in a consistent manner, a common approach is recommended. The '[METHANE](#)' model brings structure and clarity to the initial stages of managing any multi-agency or major incident.

A major incident is defined as:

An event or situation with a range of serious consequences which requires special arrangements to be implemented by one or more emergency responder agency.

(Policy 263- Major Incident Procedure)

4.3 Declaring a 'major incident' triggers a predetermined strategic and tactical response from each emergency service and other responder agencies. It takes time for operational structures, resources and protocols to be put in place. Declaring that a major incident is in progress as soon as possible means these arrangements can be put in place as quickly as possible.

M	MAJOR INCIDENT	Has a major incident or standby been declared? (Yes / No - if no, then complete ETHANE message)
E	EXACT LOCATION	What is the exact location or geographical area of the incident?
T	TYPE OF INCIDENT	What kind of incident is it?
H	HAZARDS	What hazards or potential hazards can be identified?
A	ACCESS	What are the best routes for access and egress?
N	NUMBER OF CASUALTIES	How many casualties are there, and what condition are they in?
E	EMERGENCY SERVICES	Which and how many, emergency responder assets/personnel are required or are already on-scene?

5 IIMARCH Briefing Tool

5.1 Briefing IIMARCH

Once commanders have made decisions and decided on actions, information must be relayed in a structured way that can be easily understood by those who will carry out actions or support activities. Using IIMARCH headings as a guide, a brief can be prepared in appropriate detail.

5.2 IIMARCH (*Information, Intent, Method, Administration, Risk Assessment, Communications and Humanitarian Issues*) is not the only structured briefing format available. However, it is widely used by emergency responders. See Appendix 5 for further breakdown.

When using IIMARCH to prepare a briefing it is helpful to consider the following:

- Brevity is important - if it is not relevant, leave it out
- Communicate using unambiguous language free from jargon and in terms people will understand
- Check that others understand and explain if necessary
- Consider whether an agreed information assessment tool or framework has been used

5.3 IIMARCH accessible digital notepad and all other JESIP content is contained within the JESIP app for smart phones, a link can be found on pg. 20 in associated documents.

IIMARCH

I

INFORMATION

What, where, when, how, how many, so what, what might?
Timeline and history (if applicable), key facts reported using M/ETHANE

I

INTENT

Why are we here, what are we trying to achieve?
Strategic aim and objectives, joint working strategy

M

METHOD

How are we going to do it?
Command, control and co-ordination arrangements, tactical and operational policy and plans, contingency plans

A

ADMINISTRATION

What is required for effective, efficient and safe implementation?
Identification of commanders, tasking, timing, decision logs, equipment, dress code, PPE, welfare, food, logistics

R

RISK ASSESSMENT

What are the relevant risks, and what measures are required to mitigate them?
To reflect the JESIP principle of Joint Understanding of Risk and using the ERICPD hierarchy for risk control as appropriate

C

COMMUNICATIONS

How are we going to initiate and maintain communications with all partners and interested parties?
Other means of communication, understanding of inter-agency communications, information assessment, media handling and joint media strategy

H

HUMANITARIAN ISSUES

What humanitarian assistance and human rights issues arise or may arise from this event and the response to it?
Requirement for humanitarian assistance, information sharing and disclosure, potential impacts on individuals' human rights


6 Control Rooms

- 6.1 Control rooms play a vital role in managing the early stages of a multi-agency incident. There cannot be a co-ordinated multi-agency response or effective communication if control rooms do not deliver a swift and joint approach to handling them.
- 6.2 Specific control room guidance in the interoperability framework builds consistency into the procedures and working practices of emergency service control rooms.
- 6.3 This guidance sets out how control rooms, working together, start the principles for joint working. It also sets out what responders can expect from their respective control rooms when attending a multi-agency incident.
- 6.4 The control room guidance is divided into three sections, which align to the principles for joint working:
 - a) Communication
 - b) Shared situational awareness and joint understanding of risk
 - c) Co-ordination and co-location
- 6.5 As with the principles for joint working, they do not have to be followed in the order in which they are presented.
- 6.6 Control rooms generally operate from separate fixed locations and therefore cannot feasibly co-locate. They can, however, help in co-locating responders and commanders by jointly agreeing the initial multi-agency rendezvous points.
- 6.7 All control staff should familiarise themselves with the 5x supporting principles for control room operators, policies, procedures and any other arrangements for using interoperable voice communications

7 Joint Decision Model

- 7.1 Decision making in incident management follows a general pattern of:
 - (a) Working out what's going on (situation),
 - (b) Establishing what you need to achieve (direction)
 - (c) Deciding what to do about it (action), all informed by a statement and understanding of overarching values and purpose.
- 7.2 One of the difficulties facing commanders from different responder agencies is how to bring together the available information, reconcile potentially differing priorities and then make effective decisions together.

The Joint Decision Model (JDM), shown below, was developed to resolve this issue.



- 7.3 Responder agencies may use various supporting processes and sources to provide commanders with information, including information on any planned intentions, to commanders. This supports joint decision making.
- 7.4 All joint decisions, and the rationale behind them, should be recorded in a 'joint decision log'. When using the joint decision model, the first priority is to gather and assess information and intelligence.
- 7.5 Responders should work together to build shared situational awareness, recognising that this requires continuous effort as the situation, and responders' understanding, will change over time.

- 7.6 Understanding the risks is vital in establishing shared situational awareness, as it enables responders to answer the three fundamental questions of 'what, so what and what might?'
- 7.7 Once shared situation awareness is established, the preferred 'end state' should be agreed as the central part of a joint working strategy. A working strategy should set out what a team is trying to achieve, and how they are going to achieve it.
- 7.8 If a strategic coordinating group is convened, they will agree and share the joint strategy for the multi-agency response. The strategic command teams from each agency should then review and amend their single-agency strategy to be consistent with the joint strategy and support them in achieving the jointly defined end state, or overarching aim.
- 7.9 A detailed and well-practiced understanding of the joint decision model will help commanders to think clearly and in an ordered way when under stress. The joint decision model can be used for both 'rapid onset' and 'rising tide' emergencies.

APPENDIX 1 – JESIP Deliverables Summary

<p>Doctrine & Organisation</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Complete the revision of ERR Chapter 4 and embed the into doctrine and training materials 2. Gain commitment from blue lights to ensure interoperability is referenced in future doctrine and training materials (MoU) 3. Conduct interoperability capability assessment 4. Develop generic Joint Operating Principles (JOPs) for Interoperability 5. Produce a JESIP kitemark / framework to assure future doctrine against interoperability requirements (Tri-Service National Quality Assurance Methodology and Framework) 6. Establishing a Tri-Service Governance Board to sustain interoperability and implement future interoperability priorities 7. Strategy for capturing and sharing lessons learnt 	<p>Operational Communications</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 8. Review and revise national tri-service Airwave doctrine and guidance – produce a simple aide memoir 9. Progress Airwave training modules 10. Develop a regular standard Airwave test for incident commanders 11. Develop tri-service Airwave training for Tactical Advisors 12. Progress a tri-service common call sign structure 13. Carry out a tri-service Command and Control review 14. Develop a tri-services mobilisation MoU between national coordination centres for improved deployment communication
<p>Shared Situational Awareness</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 15. Develop Shared Situational Awareness Framework 16. Establish Joint Dynamic Hazard/Risk model 17. Agree and implement Joint Decision Making Model 18. Develop guidance for multi-agency information and intelligence sharing 19. Establish easier identification of on-scene commanders for Police 	<p>Training & Exercising</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 20. Develop multi agency on-scene command course 21. Develop multi agency tactical command course (Silver) 22. Undertake baseline analysis to identify training opportunities 23. Embed agreed terminology through training (Lexicon and map symbology) 24. Review Inter-agency Liaison Course 25. Develop an Interoperability Awareness package for all responders 26. Develop training package for control room staff regarding role, responsibilities and capabilities of other services 27. Establish a Joint Exercising Programme across services

Appendix 2 – Key point summary

Information on task or event

Gather Info & Intelligence-

- METHANE Report
- What is happening?
- What are the impacts
- What are the risks?
- What might happen?
- What is being done about it?

Information about resources

- Are all the required multi-agency responders present?
- Are all available LFB resources that can support the incident ordered and en-route?
- Have you spoken to other blue-light commanders?

Information about risk and benefit

Assess Risks-

- Build and maintain a common understanding of the full range of risks.
- Have all the risks been reviewed and fully understood so appropriate control measures be put in place?

Gathering and thinking

Objectives

Working Together, Saving Lives & Reducing Harm & JESIP Principles –

- Co-Locate
- Communications
- Co-ordinate
- Joint Understanding of Risk
- Shared Situational Awareness

Plan

- Early recognition that an Incident will need a multi-agency response for full resolution, so joint working arrangements can be agreed & put in place
- All initial information gathered and collated on a Methane report to assist Control, responder agencies and the IC on the decision of a possible declaration of a Major or Multi-Agency Incident
- At the earliest convenience, all multi-agency commanders to co-locate at an agreed Forward Control Post, to establish jointly agreed objectives and a coordinated plan and ensure what overarching values and priorities will inform and guide this?
- Ensure all potential options are identified & considered when planning the joint response, which take into account- Suitability/ Feasibility/ Acceptability, of the desired outcome
- Regular revision of agreed actions and outcomes to ensure correct direction and risk assessments are still viable

Communicating

Early co-locating of commanders to convey the joint understanding of risks & shared situational awareness, in a clear & concise manner to all parties, to avoid ineffectual activities being implemented which can result in failing to achieve priorities and objectives

Controlling

- Correct and early use of the Joint Decision Model by all commanders
- Sharing of results of each agencies risk assessments and then contribution to the multi-agency risk assessment.
- Where chosen plans are time-critical, clearly agree a procedure for communicating the decision to defer, abort or initiate a specific task

Appendix 3 – SOP Standard operating procedures

Standard Operating Procedure



Joint Emergency Services Interoperability Principles



Hazards



The hazards listed below are generic hazards for all command scenarios at incidents. Once the JESIP Framework is understood and the principles are followed, multi-agency incident resolution will become clearer with the overarching objectives delivered in a safe and controlled manner.

Limited or lack of initial accurate information:

When working together with other agencies it is imperative that full information is gathered and passed through to control, which will enable other responder agencies to be notified of the incident, so joint working arrangements can be agreed and put into place.

Inaccurate/ ineffective situational awareness

If an incident commander is unable to obtain and maintain their situational awareness this will affect the ability of commanders to assess risks and impact, use of resources, the activities of each responder agency, agreeing priorities and making joint decisions throughout the incident including:

Ineffective co-ordination & command:

Ineffective co-ordination and command of an incident amplifies the potential impact of the hazards present, or escalation of the incident, which could result in harm to employees and the public and damage or loss of property or the environment, this also fuels loss of public confidence, which can have detrimental effects over future incidents.

Limited communication:

Information should be presented to ensure that the detail, level and content supports incident commanders, personnel and other emergency responders without overwhelming or overloading them. The information should be clear, concise and readily understood by all, not limited to in-house acronyms. The exchange of information is key in ensuring a full appreciation of the situation and the circumstances of the incident or emergency.



Control Measures

SHARED SITUATIONAL AWARENESS

In the initial stages, pass information between emergency responders and Control Rooms using the METHANE mnemonic. METHANE is now the recognised common model for passing incident information between services and their control rooms.

COP (COMMON OPERATING PICTURE)

A common operating picture is a single point of reference for those involved, and supports joint decision-making. Answering the questions below helps develop a common operating picture and helps establish shared situational awareness:

- What? - What has happened, what is happening now and what is being done about it?
- So what? - What might the implications and wider impacts be?
- What might happen in the future?

CO-LOCATE

When commanders are co-located, they can perform the functions of command, control and co-ordination face-to-face. They should meet as early as possible, at a jointly agreed location at the scene that is known as the Forward Command Post (FCP). This allows them to establish jointly agreed objectives and a co-ordinated plan, resulting in more effective incident resolution. The benefits of co-location apply equally at all levels of command.

COMMUNICATION

Misinformation or a breakdown in communication can lead to unsafe systems of work, and uncoordinated or ineffectual activities being implemented, resulting in failing to achieve priorities and objectives. It can also lead to inefficient use of resources in the operational plan.

In addition, there is a risk of misunderstanding when an incident requires a multi-agency response, which may lead to a delayed or inappropriate response. This may be due to issues such as technical challenges or the use of varying terminology between agencies. Issues include:

- Words, terms, phrases, symbols or graphics with different meanings or context
- Words, phrases, symbols or graphics with no meaning in other organisations

JOINT UNDERSTANDING OF RISK

Different responder agencies may see, understand and treat risks differently. Each agency should carry out their own 'dynamic risk assessments' but then share the results and contribute to the multi-agency risk assessment so that they can plan control measures and contingencies together more effectively.

Appendix 4 - Definitions

Definition of Terms Used - Glossary

A glossary of terms used within the Joint Doctrine Edition Two.

Aim	A short, precise and measurable statement of the desired end state which an effort or activity is intended to bring about.
Capability	A demonstrable ability to respond to and recover from a particular threat or hazard.
Command	The exercise of vested authority, that is associated with a role or rank within an organisation, to give direction in order to achieve defined objectives. Command is carried out by those who have been given authority (through role or rank) over others, for a specific operation or incident, to make decisions and give direction in order to achieve jointly defined and agreed objectives. Personnel who provide subject matter expertise or advice do so in support of the Operations or Tactical Commander and as part of the Command Support Team.
Commander	Personnel who, by function or rank, are charged with ensuring the readiness of their teams, forces or organisations to discharge their stated duties and obligations.
Control	The application of authority, combined with the capability to manage resources, in order to achieve defined objectives. Control is defined as the authority and capability of an organisation to direct the actions of its own personnel. While one emergency service cannot exercise command over another, it may be appropriate for service commanders to grant the authority to exercise control of their organisation's personnel or assets to a co-ordinating group or commander of the designated lead service for a specific task.
Co-ordination	The integration of multi-agency efforts and available capabilities, which may be interdependent, in order to achieve defined objectives. Co-ordination occurs at one or more of three ascending levels Operational, Tactical and Strategic, with national level co-ordination in the most serious of emergencies.
Emergency	An event, situation or incident which threatens serious damage to human welfare in a place in the UK, the environment of a place in the UK, or the security of the UK or of a place in the UK.
Responder agencies	Term used in this guidance to describe any organisation required to plan and prepare a response to an emergency or provide support to those who do.
Emergency responder agencies	'Emergency responder agency' describes all category one and two responders as defined in the Civil Contingencies Act (2004) and associated guidance.
Joint organisational learning	In the context of the national arrangements initiated through JESIP designed to capture lessons from exercises or operations that are relevant to joint working. This includes the process of effecting and embedding change in organisations and behaviours in response to those lessons. Learning is the process of developing knowledge, skills, attitudes and behaviours. It is therefore essential that lessons identified about joint working, from event or exercise debriefs or other mechanisms, should be captured, assessed, shared and

	acted upon jointly in order to promote continuous improvement but also to confirm good practice where it is identified.
Joint working	A number of organisations working together on a course, or courses of action, to achieve agreed emergency response objectives. The public expects that the emergency services will work together, particularly in the initial response emergency, in order to preserve life and reduce harm. Individual police, fire and rescue or ambulance service priorities should not override the degree of multiagency co-operation required to efficiently and effectively work together. The aim is to use the available resources to the best collective effect to achieve the jointly agreed Objectives for a successful response. It is essential that the activities of one responder service do not impede or detract from the efficiency of another.
Major Incident	<p>An event or situation with a range of serious consequences which requires special arrangements to be implemented by one or more emergency responder agency.</p> <p><i>Notes</i></p> <p><i>"Emergency responder agency" describes all category one and two responders as defined in the Civil Contingencies Act (2004) and associated guidance.</i></p> <p><i>A major incident is beyond the scope of business-as-usual operations, and is likely to involve serious harm, damage, disruption or risk to human life or welfare, essential services, the environment or national security.</i></p> <p><i>A major incident may involve a single-agency response, although it is more likely to require a multi-agency response, which may be in the form of multi-agency support to a lead responder.</i></p> <p><i>The severity of the consequences associated with a major incident are likely to constrain or complicate the ability of responders to resource and manage the incident, although a major incident is unlikely to affect all responders equally.</i></p> <p><i>The decision to declare a major incident will always be a judgement made in a specific local and operational context, and there are no precise and universal thresholds or triggers. Where LRFs and responders have explored these criteria in the local context and ahead of time, decision makers will be better informed and more confident in making that judgement.</i></p>
Means	The resources and capabilities available to realise defined objectives.
National Inter-agency Liaison Officers (NILO)	A trained and qualified fire brigade officer or ambulance officer who can advise and support Incident Commanders and a wide range of partners on the operational capacity and capability of their own organisation.
Objectives	A list of steps, phases or tasks that have to be completed in order to achieve the overarching aim.
Personal Data	Data which relates to a living individual or group who can be identified from the data and includes any expression of opinion about the individual and any indications of intentions in respect of the individual (The Data Protection Act 2018 which is subject to the General Data Protection Regulations GDPR).
Plan	A statement or elaboration of what an individual, organisation or group will do in

	the event of specified circumstances.
Policy	A statement of factors that bear on ways and means by which strategic objectives can be achieved.
Procedure	A set of actions that is the official or accepted way of doing something, in relation to the Joint Doctrine 2 nd edition, this also refers to all standing and joint operating procedures or other equivalent documents.
Rapid onset emergency	An emergency which develops quickly and usually with immediate effects, thereby limiting the time available to consider response options.
Rising tide emergency	An event or situation with a lead in time of days, weeks or even months e.g. health pandemic, flooding or pop concert, the final impact of which may not be apparent early on.
Sensitive personal data	Personal data consisting of information as to (including but not exclusively): race/ethnic origin, religious beliefs, physical or mental health and commission or alleged commission of any offence (The Data Protection Act 2018).
Strategy	A high level statement of the desired end state and the ways and means of achieving it.
Task	A defined piece of work, typically of limited time duration, that is allocated to a specific individual or group.
Ways	The articulation of relevant options and constraints that apply to the attainment of defined objectives

Appendix 5 – IIMARCH Tool guidance

<i>Element</i>	<i>Key questions</i>	<i>Considerations</i>
INFORMATION	<p>What, where, when, how?</p> <p>So what?</p> <p>What might?</p> <p>How many?</p>	<p>Timeline and history (if applicable)</p> <p>Key facts reported using METHANE:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Major Incident (declared or not?) Exact Location Type of Incident Hazards Access Number of casualties Emergency services
INTENT	<p>Why are we here?</p> <p>What are we trying to achieve?</p>	<p>Strategic aim and objectives</p> <p>Joint working strategy</p>
METHOD	<p>How are we going to do it?</p>	<p>Command, control and coordination arrangements</p> <p>Tactical and operational policy and plans</p> <p>Contingency plans</p>
ADMINISTRATION	<p>What is required for effective, efficient and safe implementation?</p>	<p>Identification of commanders</p> <p>Tasking</p> <p>Timing</p> <p>Decision logs</p> <p>Equipment</p> <p>Dress code & PPE</p> <p>Welfare, food and logistics</p>
RISK ASSESSMENT	<p>What are the relevant risks?</p> <p>What measures are required to mitigate them?</p>	<p>To reflect the JESIP principle - joint understanding of risk</p> <p>Using the ERICPD hierarchy for risk control as appropriate</p> <p>Decision controls</p>
COMMUNICATIONS	<p>How are we going to initiate and maintain communications with all partners and interested parties?</p>	<p>Radio Call signs</p> <p>Other means of communication</p> <p>Understanding of interagency communications</p> <p>Information assessment</p> <p>Dealing with the media, develop a joint media strategy and plan</p>
HUMANITARIAN ISSUES	<p>What humanitarian assistance and human rights issues arise or may arise from this event and the response to it?</p>	<p>Requirement for humanitarian assistance</p> <p>Information sharing and disclosure</p> <p>Potential impacts on individuals' human rights</p>

Document history

Assessments

An equality, sustainability or health, safety and welfare impact assessment and/or a risk assessment was last completed on:

EIA	15/10/20	SDIA	15/10/20	HSWIA	16/10/20	RA	
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Audit trail

Listed below is a brief audit trail, detailing amendments made to this policy/procedure.

Page/para nos.	Brief description of change	Date

Subject list/ associated documents

You can find this policy under the following subjects and noted within the following documents.

LESLP Version 10.1	https://www.london.gov.uk/sites/default/files/leslp_mi_procedure_manual_2019_version_10.1.pdf
PN 0263	Major Incident policy
JESIP Joint Doctrine	JESIP Joint Doctrine Edition 2
Link to JESIP App download	https://www.jesip.org.uk/download-android

Freedom of Information Act exemptions

This policy/procedure has been securely marked due to:

Considered by: (responsible work team)	FOIA exemption	Security marking classification

Standard Equality Impact Assessment Form

Question 1: Which Team, Department, or Project Board is responsible for carrying out the Standard Equality Impact Assessment?

Name	Operational Resilience and Special Operations Group
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Question 2: Lead assessor's contact details

Name	Chanel Hendricks Lynch	Mobile No	07979119391
Job title	Sub Officer	Extension	31128
Department	SOG	Email	Chanel.hendrickslynch@london-fire.gov.uk

Question 3: Title of / policy (please include the policy number) / project / report / proposed change / initiative / decision

JESIP- Joint Emergency Services Interoperability Principles

Question 4: Is the work...

New	A new Policy to incorporate the JESIP National Framework for use within the London Fire Brigade.	A complete redesign	
A small change or policy review		Other (e.g. reviewed as current)	

Question 5: Briefly outline the aim and the purpose of the work

Aim	To educate all staff on the National JESIP Framework
Purpose	To ensure that all operational members of staff are not only aware of the Framework but utilise it at all incidents that have joint response and responsibility to effect a safe solution.

Question 6: Has an EIA been conducted previously? (please tick)

Yes		No	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
If yes, attach a copy. If no, state the reason.	No, new policy.		

Question 7: Who is it intended to benefit / Who does the change affect?				
Staff	X	Wider public		Service users
Other (please state)				

Initial Equality Impact Assessment – Screening Stage

Complete the table below to see whether you need to complete a full Equality Impact Assessment.

Question 8: Identifying the impacts	
<p>Consider the relevance of the policy / project / decision on each group below and describe any impacts identified.</p> <p>NB: Some characteristics may attract multiple impacts e.g. age: positive impact on older people, adverse impact on younger people.</p>	
Protected Characteristic	Level of Impact (Positive impact, neutral impact, adverse impact)
Age (younger, older or particular age group)	<i>Neutral - This policy will be applied equally to all employees regardless of their age and there will be a neutral impact on this group.</i>
Disability (physical, sensory, mental health, learning disability, long term illness, hidden)	<i>Neutral – Operational staff who have a disability and are fit to carry out full duties will be able to use current support arrangements to meet the standards of this policy. We have taken steps to ensure a neutral impact on staff with learning needs or dyslexia who need to access this policy, through the use of clear headings, flow charts and coloured diagrams where appropriate (e.g. the METHANE model).</i>
Gender reassignment (someone proposing to/undergoing/ undergone a transition from one gender to another)	<i>Neutral - This policy will be applied equally to all employees regardless of their gender identity or reassignment and we do not anticipate any impact on transgender staff. We will ensure that language is inclusive when communicating about the implementation of the policy and avoid unnecessarily gendered terms to ensure staff identifying outside of a binary gender are not excluded.</i>
Marriage / Civil Partnership (married as well as same-sex couples)	<i>Neutral - This policy will apply equally to all partner agency members we engage with regardless of their marital or civil partner status, there will be a neutral impact on this group.</i>
Pregnancy and Maternity	<i>Neutral - This is an operational policy, as such, those who are pregnant should not be on full operational duties and not affected.</i>
Race (including nationality, colour, national and/or ethnic origins)	<i>Neutral - Around 15.41% of the workforce are BAME, which is an underrepresentation when compared to the wider London population demographic of 40.1%. The policy itself will not have a disproportionate impact on BAME staff.</i>
Religion or Belief (people of any religion, or no religion, or people who follow a particular belief (not political))	<i>Neutral – There is no impact on any religions, beliefs or cultures as a result of this policy.</i>

Sex (men and women)	<i>Neutral - The policy will be applied equally to all employees regardless of their sex. There is a lack of representation of women in the brigade which is centred mainly in the operational staff group. The language is inclusive throughout the JESIP Framework and this policy will also ensure not to exclude any groups, including the use of unnecessarily gendered language.</i>
Sexual Orientation (straight, bi, gay and lesbian people)	<i>Neutral – A person’s sexual orientation does not affect their ability to meet the standards of this policy and likewise, the policy does not adversely affect people based on this characteristic.</i>
Are there any other groups this work may affect? i.e. carers, non-binary people, people with learning difficulties, neurodiverse people, people with dyslexia, ADHD, care leavers, ex-offenders, people living in areas of disadvantage, homeless people, people on low income / poverty?	<i>None/ Neutral</i>

Question 9: Has your assessment been able to demonstrate the following?

Positive impact	
Neutral impact	We envisage this policy will have no detriment to the protected characteristics, but will positively assist ALL operational staff and staff within Control to ensure that all have the same learning exposure by way of this policy being incorporated across the board.
Adverse impact	
Any other comments	

Question 10: Meeting the Public Sector Equality Duty under s149 Equality Act 2010

How have you considered whether this project / policy / decision does the following:	
<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Eliminates unlawful discrimination, harassment and victimisation 2. Advances equality of opportunity between different groups, and 3. Fosters good relations between different groups. 	
What we must do under law	Provide a description or summary of how this will be achieved
Eliminate discrimination	<i>The National Guidance Framework from which this policy is derived, is an inclusive document which ensures that all staff within the Tri-services are given the same level of documented respect and gender neutral language used all times, which historically has not always been the case.</i>

Advance equality of opportunity	<i>The initiation of the Major Incident Procedure does not, as far as data is available, relate to an area with known inequalities, although it must be noted that one of the four previous initiations was for the Grenfell Tower fire, which disproportionately affected BAME communities in London. Effective collaboration between emergency services personnel will positively impact those affected by a major incident, and this policy aims to enhance this.</i>
Foster good relations	<i>Bringing the LFB in line with other tri-services responders, on the incident ground and at LFB Control ensures we are working collectively in a team with the same understanding and joint objectives.</i>

Question 11: What data has been used to inform the Impact Assessment? (E.g. GLA Datastore, Census Data, Staff Monitoring Data, Staff Survey Data, Local Borough Population Demographics).

Data Source	How it has been used
2011 Census data on ethnicity	To compare representation of LFB workforce to London population data.

Question 12: Have you consulted with staff, LFB support groups, trade unions, public / service users, and / or others to help assess for impacts? (please tick)

Yes	<input type="checkbox"/>	Y	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	No	<input type="checkbox"/>
If yes, who was involved and how were they involved? If not, why not?					
Who?	Shilla Patel / Abby Crawford				
How?	Tele-meeting to discuss requirements and impact process				
If no consultation,					
Workforce data	General workforce diversity monitoring to assess impact, including promotion data.				

Question 13: How have you ensured your policy, project or proposal uses inclusive language that doesn't unintentionally discriminate against certain groups?	
Tools used to assess inclusive language e.g. <u>gender bias screening tools</u> , Stonewall toolkit on inclusive policies, speaking with Inclusion Team, <u>Comms Style Guide</u> , <u>Policy 0370: Writing Policies and Procedures</u> .	Outcome
- <i>Speaking with Inclusion team</i> - <i>Policy 0370</i>	<i>Guidance utilised but overall framework is at National level and thoroughly checked to ensure protection of characteristics.</i>

Full Equality Impact Assessment Form

If you have identified **any** potential or actual adverse impacts, you must complete a full equality impact assessment form.

A full assessment helps you to decide what steps need to be taken to mitigate or justify the adverse impacts you have identified.



For guidance and support, please contact the Inclusion Team (Second Floor, Union Street, or email safertogether@london-fire.gov.uk) or a relevant Equality Support Group (list available [here](#))

Full EIA Form and Action Plan

Lead person responsible:	
Date the Action Plan will be reviewed:	

Protected Characteristic Group	What impact did you identify (positive, neutral, adverse)?	Do you plan to mitigate or justify this impact?	How will you mitigate or justify the impact? Outline the steps that will be taken	Who will be responsible?	When will this be reviewed?
Age					
Disability					
Gender reassignment					
Marriage / Civil Partnership					
Pregnancy and Maternity					
Race					
Religion or Belief					
Sex					
Sexual Orientation					
Other group e.g. carers, non-binary people, people with learning difficulties, neurodiverse people, people with dyslexia, ADHD, care leavers, ex-offenders, people living in areas of disadvantage, homeless people, people on low income / poverty.					

Document Control

Signed (lead for EIA / action plan)		Date	
Sign off by Inclusion Team	<i>Abby Crawford</i>	Date	19/10/20
Stored by	Inclusion Team		
Links			

Dates for action plan to be reviewed	Comments