![London Fire Brigade logo: LFB / LONDON FIRE BRIGADE]

Fire Survival Guidance - Policy Number 0790 - Update

Report to	Date
Commissioner's Board London Fire Commissioner	10 March 2021

Report by	Report number
Assistant Commissioner, Operational Policy and Assurance Assistant Commissioner, Control and Mobilising	LFC-0502

Protective marking: **NOT PROTECTIVELY MARKED**

Publication status: Published in full

I agree the recommended decision below.

[signature]

Andy Roe
London Fire Commissioner

Date This decison was remotely signed on 29 March 2021

Summary

1. This report provides an update on policy PN 0790 Fire Survival Guidance (the policy). The policy underwent major revision in 2020 to address challenges relating to fire survival guidance that were identified during Phase 1 of the Grenfell Tower Inquiry (GTI). The revised policy was formally approved by the London Fire Commissioner (LFC) (decision number LFC-0390-D), noting that the implementation date was subject to training and that the policy was likely to be subject to further amendment.

2. The training programme on High Rise, Fire Survival Guidance (FSG) and the new Evacuation and Rescue from fires in Premises policy commenced in the late Summer 2020 and the FSG policy has continued to be reviewed and developed in response to learning identified through the Brigade's Grenfell Tower safety and learning review process to ensure that it will deliver the improvements recommended for the Brigade and for the London Community. There has been extensive consultation with the Fire Brigades Union (FBU) during the training and review process which has produced positive outcomes and as a consequence the further proposed amendments to the policy set out in this report are agreed. It is recommended that this policy now be implemented by the LFC with effect from 31st March 2021

3. This report describes:
    *   the background and rationale for the review of this policy following the Grenfell Tower Inquiry

- a summary of the key changes since July 2020 when the original updates to the policy were made
- the consultations undertaken
- the training and other outstanding dependencies that have now been completed; and
- future training.

Recommended decision

The London Fire Commissioner approves the latest updates to PN 0790 'Fire Survival Guidance' policy, provided as Appendix 1 and agrees that the policy should be implemented on 31 March 2021.

Background and rationale for revisions to PN 0790 following the Grenfell Tower Inquiry

1. The Grenfell Tower fire demonstrated the very high risk which can be created for members of the public and emergency responders when a building does not behave as fire safety requirements intend and the resulting fire far exceeds 'normal' expectations. The initial process of reviewing and amending PN 0790 began in the months following the Grenfell Tower fire.

2. This included focussing on the issues in PN 0790 initially highlighted by the Grenfell Tower Investigation and Review Team (GTIRT) which were subsequently supported by firefighter and Control officer evidence during phase 1 of the Grenfell Tower Inquiry.

3. A stakeholder group was formed between officers in Operational Policy & Assurance (OP&A) and Control to examine the challenges associated with managing fire survival guidance (FSG) calls. The changes to the policy have been informed by carrying out FSG exercises from 2018.

4. The revised policy seeks to address the challenges faced when dealing with multiple FSG calls by ensuring that all those personnel who could either receive an FSG call in Control or are liable to attend incidents which may involve FSG calls have a secure understanding of the procedures that underpin these activities. A definition of key terms will help to ensure more accurate communication and improved information recording and sharing, both before and during an incident.

5. A separate project for an IT solution has been started, expected delivery is quarter two 2021/22. Until that has been delivered with an improved data connectivity for Command Units, the revised PN 0790 describes the primary transfer of FSG information being the Airwave radio via voice messages between Control and the incident ground and associated forms.

6. The revised PN 0790 brings together Control and the incident ground response to FSG calls and is an OP&A and Control policy.

Key changes since July 2020

7. The further revised version of the policy, associated risk assessment and the equality impact assessment have been consulted on and agreed with the appropriate stakeholders including the FBU, OP & A colleagues and relevant Heads of Service.
8. The further improvements are;

   PN 0790

- Introduction of an aide memoire following feedback from the face to face training on the amended High Rise and Fire Survival Guidance (FSG) policies and the new Evacuation and Rescue from fires Premises policy.
- Changes to language including the use of 'Must' and 'Should'.
- Streamlining the pictorial flow charts demonstrating the FSG procedures in Appendix 2-5.
- Minor changes to content throughout the policy.
- A range of new FSG forms (appendix 8 of the policy) and ancillary equipment

Risk assessment

Since formal approval of the policy by the London Fire Commissioner (as referenced in the Summary above), the new OP & A risk assessment template with generic assumptions has been introduced and incorporated into the risk assessment. An enhanced categorisation of Group D – Members of the public, was identified and agreed. These focus on those members of the public with vulnerabilities which could put them at additional risk during an evacuation and/or rescue. It was identified that the two subgroups that would best fit the vulnerabilities identified are Group D1 – People whose mobility is impaired and Group D2 – People who have difficulty communicating or understanding instruction. This is reflected in the equality impact assessment. The policy now recognises the additional challenges those vulnerable groups may face that may require additional assistance and resources. The Risk Assessment of a policy involves a formal process of consideration which includes consultation with the FBU (usually through the Brigade Joint Committee on Health, Safety and Welfare (BJCHSW)), and the professional advice of the LFC Assistant Director of Health and Safety. The FBU have agreed, in BJCHSW, that they will engage on these policies for purposes of consultation outside the formal BJCHSW meeting structure. Accordingly, in this instance some of the recent amendments have been considered by the relevant parties outside of the formal BJCHSW process, the FBU have been consulted and have agreed to the changes. The Assistant Director of Health and Safety has reviewed the risk assessments and has confirmed that the hazards, risks, and risk control measures identified by the risk assessment are consistent with the activities and operational procedures.

Consultation

9. This policy has been subject to an ongoing consultation process throughout 2020 in order to ensure that it reflects the views, knowledge and understanding of all stakeholders. The FBU representatives have offered valuable contributions to the ongoing review of the policy, risk assessment and the EIA. These have led to minor amendments which have been agreed by the FBU and implemented

Training and next steps

10. The training strategy for this FSG policy and the High Rise and the Evacuation and Rescue from fires in Premises policy was agreed in the summer 2020, and a three-phase training package was initiated.

11. Phase 1 of the training comprised of the following:

    a. Computer Based Training (CBT) covering all three of the policies which required an 80% confidence level of all operational staff to complete, which was achieved in December 2020. Currently 91% of all operational staff have completed all four of the CBT packages, those members of staff who have not completed the training have been identified and a reminder has been sent to all area teams to be dealt with through local management.

    b. Level 1 officers (Lff–Stn'O) were to attend and complete a one-day training session covering all three policies which has now been attended and completed by 1324 officers (95%), this was achieved in February 2021. Those operational level 1 officers who were not available to undertake the training (approximately 70) have been identified and will be offered mop up sessions from June 2021 when COVID 19 restrictions have been eased. In the meantime, a

recorded version of the training will be made available to all staff via the LFB Big Learning portal and will need to be undertaken on an annual basis.

    c.   Level 2 and 3 officers (SC–AC) were to attend and complete a Guided Learning Experience covering all three policies which has now been completed with over 98% attendance and completion. The GLE is available online to all staff, those officers who were not available to undertake the training (approximately 10) have been given access to a recorded version of the GLE and have been invited to a mop up session in April 2021.

    d.   The delivery of the station based GLE is now progressing and it is anticipated that an 80% confidence level will be reached by the go live date of 31st March 2021.

12. Phase two of the training is in the planning stage, on course to go live in April 2021. This will include live exercising of the policy which will involve operational firefighters and Control. The exercises will be used to both validate the practicality of the policy and provide an assurance that the necessary understanding and skills has been embedded within the workforce for phase two. Phase two also provides the opportunity to develop the policy and our understanding of communications between the incident ground and Control, evacuation principles and the methods by which they are implemented.

13. The third phase will be a new 'Urban Firefighting and Rescue course', which will be undertaken by all operational staff every two to three years. This course is currently in the scoping and development phase.

14. Additionally, all Command Unit (CU) stations are receiving training on the procedures to undertake specific to them at a multiple FSG incident. This is also on track to deliver the training by the end of March 2021.

15. The training strategy for Control staff was agreed as a three-phase training package including enhanced training for supervisors. All relevant Control staff have completed the training and Control continue to undertake scenario-based training until go live of the policy PN790.

Finance comments

16. The proposal recommends that the London Fire Commissioner approves the updates to the Fire Survival Guidance Policy. Any training costs identified will be contained within the existing training contract.

Workforce comments

17. The reviewed policy has undergone further consultation with the FBU which has taken place since September 2020. A list of amendments was tabled over several meetings and several months. These have now been consulted on and the minor amendments made to the policy, this has led to the FBU agreeing the FSG reviewed policy, EIA and risk assessment.

Legal comments

18. Under section 9 of the Policing and Crime Act 2017, the London Fire Commissioner (the "Commissioner") is established as a corporation sole with the Mayor appointing the occupant of that office. Under section 327D of the GLA Act 1999, as amended by the Policing and Crime Act 2017, the Mayor may issue to the Commissioner specific or general directions as to the way the holder of that office is to exercise his or her functions.

19. Section 1 of the Fire and Rescue Services Act 2004 states that the Commissioner is the fire and rescue authority for Greater London.

20. The statutory basis for the actions proposed in this report is provided by section 7 of the Fire and Rescue Services Act 2004, under which the Commissioner must secure the provision of personnel, services and

equipment necessary to efficiently meet all normal requirements for firefighting, and must secure the provision of training for personnel.

21. In approving this policy, the Commissioner must comply with:

- The Human Rights Act 1998 and the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR). Article 2 ECHR encompasses both negative obligations (which prevent public authorities taking lives) and positive obligations (requiring public authorities to take certain steps to protect lives). Public authorities are expected to take reasonable steps to protect a person's life if they know – or ought to know – that they are facing real and immediate risk. The taking of 'reasonable steps' should not place an impossible or disproportionate burden on the authority. The Commissioner recognises that meeting the Article 2 obligations in the exceptional circumstances encompassed by this policy is likely to depend upon and require nuanced, informed, and robust decision making. Those decisions may involve consideration of the existence of saveable life and the extent of the risk presented to firefighters in achieving saveable life and may require the decision maker to assess and strike a balance between the existence and extent of risk to members of the public and to firefighters. Those decisions may have to be taken rapidly and under pressure. Such decisions may properly be subject to scrutiny in subsequent legal proceedings. The Commissioner in adopting this policy has sought to identify and provide all assistance to those charged with this responsibility to equip them to reach Article 2 compliant decisions, which are capable of withstanding that scrutiny.

- The Health and Safety at Work etc. Act 1974. Section 2 of the 1974 Act imposes a general duty on the employer to 'ensure, so far as is reasonably practicable, the health, safety and welfare at work of all of his employees.' This general duty extends (amongst other things) to the plant and systems of work, the provision of information, instruction, training and supervision and to the provision and maintenance of a working environment that is, so far as reasonably practicable, without risks to health and adequate as regards facilities and arrangements for welfare at work. Section 3 of the 1974 Act imposes a general duty to 'ensure, so far as is reasonably practicable, that persons not in his employment who may be affected thereby are not thereby exposed to risks to their health or safety.' In the exceptional circumstances encompassed by this policy, the Commissioner recognises that striking the correct balance between these two general duties is likely to depend upon and require nuanced, informed, and robust decision making. Those decisions may have to be taken rapidly and under pressure. Such decisions may properly be subject to scrutiny in subsequent legal proceedings. The Commissioner in adopting this policy has sought to identify and provide all assistance to those charged with this responsibility to equip them to reach decisions which strike a lawful balance between those competing duties and which are capable of withstanding that scrutiny.

- When carrying out its functions, the Commissioner, as the fire and rescue authority for Greater London, is required to 'have regard to the Fire and Rescue National Framework prepared by the Secretary of State (Fire and Rescue Service Act 2004, section 21).

- Any relevant national guidance.

22. By direction dated 1 April 2018, the Mayor set out those matters, for which the Commissioner would require the prior approval of either the Mayor or the Deputy Mayor for Fire and Resilience (the "Deputy Mayor").

23. Paragraph 3.1 of Part 3 of that direction requires the Commissioner to consult with the Deputy Mayor as far as practicable in the circumstances before a decision is taken on (inter alia) any "[c] decision that can

be reasonably considered to be novel, contentious or repercussive in nature, irrespective of the monetary value of the decision involved (which may be nil)". The Deputy Mayor, Fire and Resilience was consulted on the substantive changes made to this Policy in 2020 , and the plan to implement subject to training and ongoing review(LFC-0390-D)The current changes proposed are minor and for those reasons this decision is not considered to require consultation under the Directions however discussions in this regard will take place with the Deputy Mayor's Office .

Sustainability implications

24. SDIA submitted recommends that the introduction of this policy has a neutral sustainability impact. An SDIA was completed in the past (17/04/2014) and the policy was marked as low risk in terms of sustainability. There have been no substantive changes since that time that would alter the impact

Equalities implications

25. The London Fire Commissioner and decision takers are required to have due regard to the Public Sector Equality Duty (s149 of the Equality Act 2010) when exercising LFC functions and taking decisions.

26. It is important to note that consideration of the Public Sector Equality Duty is not a one-off task. The duty must be fulfilled before taking a decision, at the time of taking a decision, and after the decision has been taken.

27. The protected characteristics are: Age, Disability, Gender reassignment, Pregnancy and maternity, Marriage and civil partnership (but only in respect of the requirements to have due regard to the need to eliminate discrimination), Race (ethnic or national origins, colour or nationality), Religion or belief (including lack of belief), Sex, and Sexual orientation.

28. The Public Sector Equality Duty requires the LFC, in the exercise of all its functions (i.e. everything it does), to have due regard to the need to:

    (a) Eliminate discrimination, harassment and victimisation and other prohibited conduct.

    (b) Advance equality of opportunity between people who share a relevant protected characteristic and persons who do not share it.

    (c) Foster good relations between people who share a relevant protected characteristic and persons who do not share it.

29. Having due regard to the need to advance equality of opportunity between persons who share a relevant protected characteristic and persons who do not share it involves having due regard to the need to:

    (a) Remove or minimise disadvantages suffered by persons who share a relevant protected characteristic where those disadvantages are connected to that characteristic;

    (b) Take steps to meet the needs of persons who share a relevant protected characteristic that are different from the needs of persons who do not share it;

    (c) Encourage persons who share a relevant protected characteristic to participate in public life or in any other activity in which participation by such persons is disproportionately low.

30. The steps involved in meeting the needs of disabled persons that are different from the needs of persons who are not disabled include steps to take account of disabled persons' disabilities.

31. Having due regard to the need to foster good relations between persons who share a relevant protected characteristic and persons who do not share it involves having due regard to the need to:

a. tackle prejudice, and

b. promote understanding.

32. An Equality Impact Assessment (EIA) formed part of the decision making by the Commissioner when the substantive policy was approved in 2020. In the development of the policy the diverse needs of the London Community have been taken into account; there is no perceived negative impact on any one group and the policy provides for identifying potential challenges to evacuation or rescue arising from difficulties in mobility or communication in order that the need for additional assistance or resources can be addressed . The updated Equality Impact Assessment is attached as Appendix 2

List of Appendices

Appendix	Title	Protective Marking
1.	Revised PN 0790 Fire Survival Guidance	
2.	Equality Impact Assessment	

Fire survival guidance

New policy number: **PN790**
Old instruction number:
Issue date: **23 February 2012**
Reviewed as current: **19 February 2021**
Owner: **Assistant Commissioner, Operational Policy and Assurance**
Responsible work team: **Incident Command Policy**

Contents

Review date: **19 February 2024**   Last amended date:

Information on task or event

- Premises Number
- Floor located on
- Number of persons (recorded as adult, child and elderly)
- Location within Premises
- Conditions being experienced by the caller
- Any vulnerable people (this is a tick box Y/N)
- Additional information
- Time received from Control (completed by the incident ground)
- Time FSG call resolved (completed by the incident ground)

Information about Resources

- PDA.
- Exclusive FSG attendance.
- FSGP
- FSG CU
- Multiple FSG
- Second CU to Bridgehead (or equivalent area of operations)
- FSG Sector Commander
- FSG Coordinator

Information about Risk and Benefit.

- Is Control receiving Multiple FSG calls
- Prioritise rescue of FSG caller(s)
- Factors to consider when initiating an emergency evacuation and/or a mass rescue.

Gathering and thinking

Objectives

- Direct crews to persons in need of rescue using FSG information
- Manage FSG information from Control with timely updates back to Control
- Maintain situational awareness

Communicating

- Initial passing of FSG information on handheld radio channel 1
- Set up FSGP, dedicated Airwave radio channel to Control and use of Handheld fireground radio channel 3

Controlling

- FSG Sector Commander
- FSG Coordinator at Bridgehead

Plan.

- Implement appropriate FSG communications structure outlined in Appendix B-E
- Consider emergency evacuation and/ or mass rescue for following factors;

- Multiple emergency or fire survival guidance (FSG) calls are being received emergency or FSG calls are being received from a location that is remote from the initial scene of operations

- Control's capacity to handle FSG calls is liable to be reached i.e. the number of FSG calls being received is likely to exceed the number of control officer's available to handle them. This may impact on the IC maintaining situational awareness as Control can be an important source of information gathered from within the premises.

- Large numbers of people are evacuating

- There is rapid spread of fire or smoke, either externally or internally from one compartment and/or floor to another

- Fire and/or products of combustion spread to locations within the building remote from the original fire

- Fire is spreading via external cladding

- Reports of deteriorating conditions internally

- Firefighting activities have reached the limitations of the rising main i.e. three working jets

1   Introduction

1.1   The purpose of this policy is to explain what constitutes Fire Survival Guidance (FSG) and how Fire Survival Guidance calls are dealt with by Control and on the incident ground.

1.2   The policy provides guidance to ensure that:

- Information is exchanged between Control and the incident ground in a timely, accurate and consistent manner;
- an effective communication network is established and maintained between appropriate persons;
- the response at the incident ground to multiple FSG calls is prioritised appropriately and that suitable action is taken if the number of FSG calls is likely to exceed Control's capacity to receive them;
- FSG call information is properly recorded for use by incident commanders (IC) and retained to support analysis and investigation after the incident.

2   Fire survival guidance definition

2.1   Fire survival guidance is the advice and guidance given by control room officers (CROs) to persons who are directly affected by fire, heat or smoke and cannot leave their premises. See appendix 1 for actions in Control.

3   Other definitions

3.1   For LFB operations to be effective, it is important that all personnel have a consistent and clear understanding of the following terms that are detailed below:

Multiple fire survival guidance (FSG) calls - three or more FSG calls from one building will be classed as multiple FSG calls.

- **Planned evacuation** – A pre-determined strategy for a premises to secure the removal of persons in or around the premises to a place of safety. The responsibility for determining the strategy rests with the responsible person.

- **Emergency evacuation** – The immediate and unplanned movement of people, assisted by LFB personnel or other emergency responders, away from actual or potential danger towards a place of relative or ultimate safety, using recognised or normal means of escape, in circumstances where:
    - a planned evacuation strategy does not exist for the premises and the IC decides that an emergency evacuation is necessary.
    - the planned evacuation strategy has not taken place and the IC decides that an emergency evacuation is necessary.
    - it is determined that the planned evacuation strategy, or a stay put strategy, is no longer tenable and/or is not working effectively.

    It should be noted that both evacuation and emergency evacuation can be either full or partial such as a wing of a hospital or a floor or a number of floors in a high-rise residential premises.

- **Rescue** – The act of helping a person or persons who are threatened with immediate harm and require assistance to move away from danger towards a place of relative or ultimate safety.

- **Mass rescue** – The act of helping a large number of people that are threatened with immediate harm and who require assistance to move away from the danger towards a place of relative or ultimate safety.

- **Vulnerable people** – Anyone with a characteristic or condition that would impair their ability to leave a premises without assistance. It is not possible to be definitive about those who may need help to evacuate, but the persons most likely to be encountered during an incident include young children, the frail or elderly, persons with limited mobility, including pregnancy, maternity and people who have:
  – Visual or hearing impairments;
  – significantly high body weight;
  – cognitive or mental health issues;
  – problems understanding instructions or advice provided to them.

This policy recognises that the nature and extent of an individual vulnerable person's characteristic or condition may make it difficult for both Control officers and those attending an incident to reliably identify who is a vulnerable person.

Please also note that this description is specific to operational policy and that the LFB and other agencies define 'vulnerability' differently for other purposes e.g. safeguarding.

- **Responsible person** – A specific term under fire safety law referring to a person (individual or a corporate entity) who has a measure of control over a premises.

- **On site representative** – This could be a concierge, caretaker, waking or fire watch, receptionist or another person designated to meet the LFB on arrival at a fire at the premises.

- **Compartmentation** – A building design principle used in high rise and other buildings which is intended to inhibit rapid fire spread within the building from one area to another by dividing the building into a series of fire resistant compartments (or boxes) which form a barrier to fire and the products of combustion.

- "**Stay put"** – A predetermined strategy of the responsible person for a building under which in the event of a fire elsewhere in the building the occupants should be safe to remain where they are unless they are directly affected by fire, heat or smoke. The strategy relies on the principle of compartmentation combined with other fire safety provisions.

- **Place of ultimate safety** – A place in which there is no immediate further danger and no risk of fire, heat and/or smoke spreading to. e.g. outside the premises and beyond the hazard zone.

- **Place of relative safety** – A place in which there is no immediate danger, but in which there might be future danger from fire. This may be within a staircase enclosure, adjacent corridor or area of the building that is protected from fire/smoke spread by fire resisting construction and doors. It must also have an alternative route to a place of ultimate safety if needed.

- **Persons reported** – A term used to describe a situation where it is reasonably suspected that people are trapped by fire, heat or smoke or by release of a hazardous substance. This would usually be, but is not limited to, an incident occurring inside a building. A declaration of 'persons reported' can be made by the IC or Control. For the purpose of this policy this will include as far as practicable those in residential high-rise buildings who call 999 and are advised by a CRO to leave the building because they are directly affected by fire, heat or smoke.

- **Bridgehead** - definition is contained in [policy number 434](#) - sectorisation at incident. The purpose of a Bridgehead is to enable an incident to be dealt with by establishing a control point with suitable resources and emergency provision in a safe area as close as practical to the risk area. In a residential high rise building it is normally located two floors below the fire floor.

4   FSG call management in Control

4.1   Control Room Officers (CROs) are required to make a professional judgement based on extant policy, training and experience on when a caller requires FSG. Therefore, responsibility rests with Control to determine the requirement to provide FSG to a caller and it is for Control to mobilise a FSG attendance in accordance with this policy and its appendices.

4.2   Control should gather as much of the following information as possible and relay this to the incident ground as far as reasonably practicable in the following order; (excluding any information below that forms part of the original mobilising message):

- Premises or flat number.
- Floor located on.
- Number of persons (recorded as adult, child and elderly).
- Location within premises.
- Conditions being experienced by the caller.
- Vulnerabilities (See vulnerable people definition above)
- Additional information.
- Time received from Control (completed by the incident ground).
- Time FSG call resolved (completed by the incident ground).

4.3   To ensure the effective transfer of FSG information between Control and the incident ground the primary method of communication is Airwave radio, using a channel nominated by Control if appropriate. If Airwave is not available, Control should contact the Incident Command Pump (ICP), designated FSG pump (FSGP) or Command Unit (CU) via their mobile phone line to pass FSG information.

4.4   CUs also have the ability to contact Control on a dedicated CU FSG phone line.

4.5   When a call is made to Control by someone other than the person being directly affected by fire, heat or smoke e.g. a Telecare provider, or a friend/relative who may be some distance from the incident and who has credible information, that information should be passed to the incident ground immediately. Control should advise the caller that if they subsequently make contact with the person who is directly affected by fire, heat or smoke, they should tell them to dial 999 and speak to LFB Control who can provide FSG if required . The CRO should obtain the contact number of the person from the caller and then attempt to make contact with the person directly affected by fire, heat or smoke and provide FSG if required.

4.6   All FSG calls will be treated as a 'persons reported'. Either the IC or Control can declare this, however only the IC of the incident ground can confirm that 'all persons accounted for'.

5   Callers requiring reassurance

5.1   A variety of incidents, especially those which are highly visible, can generate many calls to Control from persons who are anxious and uncertain about the situation and seeking advice or offering further information about the incident, such as the presence of smoke in a corridor.

5.2   When Control are aware that the responsible person has adopted a stay put strategy, Control should make clear that the LFB advice to callers is that they should be safe to remain in their property, provided the caller is located in an area of their premise not directly affected by fire, heat or smoke. Unless there is information to the contrary (for instance, there are a number of high-rise buildings identified on the mobilising system operating a temporary simultaneous evacuation strategy due to fire safety and/or cladding issues), the LFB will assume that all high-rise purpose-built residential blocks of flats operate a stay put strategy[1].

5.3   The details of those that require reassurance should be passed to the incident ground via the FSG procedures outlined in appendices 2-5.

5.4   Where reasonably practicable, the IC should ensure that reassurance is offered to those expressing concern by the most expedient means possible. This could include the use of the property's intercom system or by sending firefighters to those that have expressed concern.

6   Mobilising resources for FSG calls

6.1   FSG calls to any building type attracts an enhanced attendance. The following resources are mobilised to manage FSG information see [Policy number 412](#) – mobilising policy:

- An additional CU;
- an additional SC (FSG sector commander);
- one pumping appliance (designated as a support pump to the additional CU).

6.2   Where there are three or more FSG calls received to any building, an enhanced FSG attendance is mobilised:

- An additional CU;
- an additional SC;
- one pumping appliance (designated as a support pump to the additional CU).

6.3   The resources in paragraph 6.1 to 6.2 do not count towards any additional attendance mobilised by Control, if the IC requests additional resources.

6.4   When responding, senior officers mobilised for FSG should be informed that they form part of the FSG attendance.

7   Communicating and recording of FSG information

7.1   The effective management of FSG relies on the timely and accurate sharing of information between:

- Control;
- the ICP, FSGP, FSG CU or Bridgehead and;
- the IC.

The flow of information between these locations should be 'two way' to ensure that, as far as reasonably practicable, everyone involved in responding to FSG information is able to maintain a shared, current and accurate understanding of the situation.

7.2   At an incident, all FSG information must be recorded on Control Information Forms that are carried on all front line appliances (i.e. Pump Ladders, Pumps, Fire Rescue Units, CUs and Aerial appliances).These forms enable information to be shared among key locations such as the CU

---

[1] Information about evacuation strategies and contingency plans for high-rise purpose-built blocks of flats is gathered by firefighters undertaking 7(2)(d) visits. (See PN 800). This information, once known, will be added to the mobilising system in order to keep assumptions about 'Stay Put' to a minimum.

and Bridgehead (or equivalent area of operations) and should be distributed as described in appendix 8. Use of these forms helps to ensure that the information listed in paragraph 4.2 is recorded in a consistent manner to minimise the risk that any information is mislaid.

7.3 All CUs are required to carry a Casualty Information Poster (see appendix 8) to record and collate multiple FSG information generated at the same incident which will be displayed on the designated CU. This poster can be used at any incident where persons may be trapped or missing and can be adapted for use at specific incidents by altering the headings to make them relevant to the prevailing situation.

7.4 All front-line appliances and CUs are required to carry a Forward Information Board (FIB) with a casualty information poster overlay (see appendix 8) and these must be used to record FSG information at the Bridgehead (or other relevant area of operations).

7.5 It is important that FSG information is accurately recorded on these boards as they provide a reliable method to display FSG information in a structured format. In addition, if the Bridgehead (or other relevant area of operations) is repositioned, FSG and other key operational information will not be lost, such as would be the case if information is recorded on walls for example.

7.6 If firefighters are passed mobile phones by members of the public on the incident ground to communicate with people within the building who may require FSG, the information from this call should be recorded on a Control information form and passed to the established point of contact on the incident ground for managing FSG information (i.e. the ICP, FSGP or the FSG CU) who will record the details as 'persons reported' and manage the information in line with Appendices 2 -5.

7.7 The caller should be advised by the firefighter to contact Control via 999 who are trained to identify, coordinate and deliver FSG. The mobile phone should then be passed back to the member of the public.

8 The response to FSG calls

8.1 Appliances en route to incidents and the declared ICP must maintain a listening watch on their Airwave radio used for mobilising and general incident command (i.e. on FLON-OPS 2 or 4).

8.2 Control must contact the ICP or the appliance of the nominated officer in charge of the initial attendance as soon as a call is identified as a FSG call. Appendix 1 outlines the procedure.

8.3 Once individual FSG call information is received at the incident ground from Control, the IC or designated radio operator must confirm the information has been accurately received by repeating it back to Control. It must be recorded on a Control information form.

8.4 It is the responsibility of the IC to:

(a) Implement the appropriate FSG procedure(s) outlined in Appendices 2 – 5.

(b) Ensure that the action taken in response to FSG calls is considered with regard to:

- The level of risk posed by their reported location in relation to the fire;
- the travel distance of each caller to the point of relative or ultimate safety;
- the potential for rapid spread to locations remote from the compartment of origin;
- the vulnerability of the people involved, insofar as Control have been able to establish (as defined in section 3).

(c) Allocate the available resources to ensure that every FSG call has resulted in a deployment to the reported location and the outcomes of crew deployments are recorded, unless it is

confirmed that the caller and all those in the same specific location have self-evacuated successfully.

(d) Maintain contact with Control and share information regarding the progress and outcome of each FSG call received.

(e) Share overall situational awareness with the Control Officer in Charge (OiC) regarding the incident. Where it is apparent that Control is reaching capacity to manage the number of 999 calls and the duration of individual FSG calls, the IC's situational awareness may become impaired and this may be a factor in determining whether a full or partial evacuation of the premises is required.

8.5 Where the implementation of a mass rescue and/or emergency evacuation is required it will be important to prioritise, so far as reasonably practicable, those who are at the highest and most imminent risk.

8.6 As soon as reasonably practicable, the IC should designate an appliance and crew to undertake the role of FSGP if a CU has not yet arrived on scene or is not available (see Appendix 3).

8.7 The FSGP provides a single point for FSG communications to Control which will assist in the continued flow and exchange of FSG information. The FSGP does not take the place of the ICP and the roles should be allocated to separate appliances.

8.8 The FSGP must ensure they are communicating with Control on the nominated FSG Airwave channel.

8.9 The FSGP must record the FSG information using a separate Control Information Form for each call. When managing multiple FSG calls, the FSGP crew must utilise their FIB with the Casualty Information Poster overlay to record this information in preparation to hand to the CU nominated as the FSG CU.

8.10 The primary method of passing FSG information from the FSGP to the Bridgehead (or other relevant area of operations) is handheld radio channel 3. Runners should be implemented as a contingency if radio communications cannot be established or maintained.

9 Evacuation and operational tactics in premises with a stay put strategy

9.1 In premises where 'stay put' is the responsible person's pre-determined strategy, it should be safe for the occupants to remain in their flat or part of building, provided they are not being directly affected by fire, heat or smoke and the spread of fire and smoke is being contained by compartmentation or other building safety features designed for this purpose. ICs should be aware that occupants may choose to leave their flats if they do not feel safe and they are free to do so.

9.2 Therefore, in the majority of incidents, ICs will use the relevant operational tactics and associated incident command procedures in order to resolve incidents where compartmentation appears to be effective and the firefighting facilities provided are working correctly.

9.3 In circumstances where the incident has exceeded what is anticipated in the building's fire risk assessment and there is a risk of fire, heat and/or smoke spread beyond the flat or floor of origin, the operational response to the incident may require changing to an emergency evacuation and/or mass rescue operation.

9.4 The factors that an IC should take into account when considering whether to implement an emergency evacuation and/or mass rescue operation may include - but may not be limited to whether:

- Multiple emergency calls (four or more 999 calls to the same address)
- multiple FSG calls (Three or more);

- FSG calls are being received from the same building but from a location that is remote from the initial fire;

- where it becomes apparent to the Control OiC that they are reaching capacity to manage the number of 999 calls and duration of individual FSG calls, the IC s situational awareness may be impaired;

- large numbers of people are evacuating;

- there is rapid spread of fire or smoke, either externally or internally from one compartment and/or floor to another;

- fire and/or products of combustion spread to locations within the premises remote from the original fire;

- fire is spreading via external cladding;

- reports of deteriorating conditions internally;

- where it is not possible to deliver sufficient extinguishing media or, for other reasons, firefighting activity is not controlling or extinguishing the fire.

This list is not exhaustive and other signs of the potential catastrophic failure of compartmentation may be observed.

10 Multiple FSG calls

10.1 Three or more FSG calls from one building will be classed as multiple FSG calls.

10.2 When multiple FSG calls are being received, the IC must consider allocating the first CU in attendance to manage FSG calls instead of the command support function, as is normally the case, and maintain the ICP to carry out that function until a second CU arrives at the incident which can take on those responsibilities.

10.3 The CU from the FSG attendance described in paragraph 6.2 must take over as the single point of communication for FSG information as soon as practicably possible. Appendix 4 outlines this procedure.

10.4 The multiple FSG call attendance provides sufficient resources to enable a CU crew to be deployed to the Bridgehead (or other relevant area of operations). Once Airwave communications from the Bridgehead (or other relevant area of operations) have been established, the two-way sharing of information with Control can commence and should continue for the duration of the incident.

10.5 This link should be used to pass FSG and other caller information directly to the Bridgehead (or other relevant area of operations) from Control. The CU crew at the Bridgehead must ensure that Control receive updates on the progress and outcomes of each FSG call. Appendix 5 outlines this procedure.

10.6 The IC should give priority to appointing officers as FSG sector commander and FSG coordinator. The FSG sector commander is an exclusive functional role and should not be given additional responsibilities.

10.7 If Control believe they are reaching the limit of their capacity to handle further emergency calls or the Control OiC believes they will exceed their capacity shortly, they must inform the IC.

10.8 Any consideration as to the requirement for an emergency evacuation or mass rescue must be regularly reviewed.

10.9 Where the IC has decided to conduct a full or partial emergency evacuation and/or mass rescue, Control should take all reasonably practicable steps to re-contact callers where previous advise has changed, such as changing from stay put to a simultaneous evacuation. Those FSG callers who Control are no longer in communication with should, where possible, be contacted and updated with the latest guidance.

11 Role of FSG sector commander

11.1 The FSG sector commander is a functional role. On the incident ground they are responsible for creating an effective FSG communications structure as indicated in Appendix 2 - 5 which will enable:

- A principal point of contact to receive FSG information from Control notwithstanding the direct airwave link (for multiple FSG calls) between the Bridgehead and Control.
- FSG information to be effectively passed on to those responsible for search and rescue activities.
- FSG information to be collated and regular updates on the deployment, progress and outcomes of rescue activities sent to each FSG call are passed to the IC and Control.
- Maintain information-sharing with Control to ensure effective situational awareness, both in Control and at the incident.

11.2 In the event of multiple FSG calls and the establishment of the Bridgehead FSG communications link, the FSG sector commander may nominate an officer to coordinate the FSG rescue activities. The FSG coordinator should:

- Ensure that the CU crew and support pump are in place to assist in the passing of FSG information.
- Liaise with the FSG, fire and search sector commanders to ensure the effective coordination of rescues.
- Ensure timely progress updates are communicated to Control via the CU crew at the Bridgehead or other relevant area of operations. This must include regular updates on the deployment, progress and outcomes of rescue activities sent to each FSG call.

12 Post incident support and debriefing

12.1 All those involved in an incident that involves FSG callers may have experienced a traumatic incident. The Brigade's Counselling & Trauma services are available to provide any support that staff may need beyond that which officers can provide.

12.2 Staff may have evidence that could assist in any subsequent investigation or inquiry. Contemporaneous notes should be made by all personnel that were involved in the FSG process as soon as reasonably practicable after the incident. These notes can be used for internal performance review or as the basis for formal witness statements.

12.3   All information regarding FSG calls at Control and the incident ground must be recorded and retained. Where possible this should be photographed and uploaded to CSS. Arrangements should be made for hard copies to be delivered to Incident Command Policy.

Appendix 1 – Actions in Control

1 Context

1.1 This appendix details the actions Control should take when dealing with 999 caller(s) who require fire survival guidance. The appendix sets out the actions required to ensure effective management of these calls within the Control room and that effective communications between Control and the incident ground are established and maintained. This appendix should be read in conjunction with (*insert hyperlink for emergency evacuation/mass rescue when published*).

1.2 999 emergency fire calls can be generated for many reasons and within the context of a variety of scenarios. In certain circumstances people can be uncertain of their situation, for example as a result of being in a building with a rubbish chute on fire or where there is smoke in a communal stairwell. These callers may seek advice or reassurance but can also provide valuable information relating to the incident.

1.3 On every emergency call believed to be received from inside a building on fire, the CRO should advise the caller to 'Get out, stay out and close the doors behind you' (the exception to this are premises with a stay put strategy, see 1.4 below).

1.4 Callers in purpose built high rise residential or other buildings that operate a 'stay put' strategy, are advised that they should be safe to remain in their flat if they are not directly affected by fire, heat or smoke. As far as practicable, those in residential high-rise buildings who call 999 and are advised by a CRO to leave the building because they are directly affected by fire, heat or smoke should be recorded as persons reported by Control and their information passed to the incident ground.

2 Management of a FSG call and guidance to the caller

2.1 Fire Survival Guidance is the advice and guidance given by CROs to persons who are directly affected by fire, heat or smoke and cannot leave their premises. It is a CRO's responsibility to identify when a 999 emergency caller requires fire survival guidance.

2.2 The management of FSG calls often require complex multi-tasking by CROs in what a high stress situation is, which can be significantly exacerbated if multiple FSG calls and/or a large volume of emergency calls are being received by the Control room.

2.3 Every FSG call is different and the management of each call will depend on circumstances facing the caller, including the premise type, the severity and proximity of the fire.

2.4 The CRO should cover a number of principles (Assess, Protect, Reassure, Reassess, Escape and Rescue) with the aim of attempting to keep the caller safer in a fire situation.

3 Assess

3.1 If a caller has indicated that they are directly affected by fire, heat or smoke the CRO should advise the caller to get out and stay out. If, for any reason, the caller indicates that they cannot do so the CRO should begin to provide fire survival guidance by following the procedure set out below while continuing to question the caller further to explore alternative means of escape.

3.2 It should be recognised that undertaking 'Assess' is not a simple process and callers can frequently disengage from the questioning. CROs should ask clear and relevant questions relating to the caller's circumstances and should attempt to gather the following information and relay this to the incident ground as and when the information becomes available:

- Premises or flat number.
- Floor located on.
- Number of persons inside (recorded as adult, child and elderly).
- Location of caller within premises.
- Conditions being experienced by the caller i.e. smoke density.

As the call continues, the CRO should attempt to obtain additional information such as:

- The location of fire and the caller's proximity to it.
- Identify any vulnerabilities that may prevent or hinder self-evacuation or rescue.
- Any additional information the caller may offer.

3.3   As far as reasonably practicable, the CRO should attempt to identify and record any vulnerabilities that may hamper an individual's escape or evacuation from the premises. Examples can include but are not restricted to young children, the frail elderly, persons with limited mobility, including pregnancy or maternity and people who have:

- Visual or hearing impairments;
- significantly high body weight;
- cognitive or mental health issues;
- difficulty understanding instructions or advice provided to them for whatever reasons.

3.4   For FSG calls received from buildings containing multiple flats or rooms, the caller's flat number and floor should be used as a reference for passing information to the incident ground.

3.5   The mobilising system provides a time stamp when information is added, and this must be provided to the incident ground.

Example 1: "M2FS to CU2 - FSG Call at Flat 12 on 4th Floor, one adult in the bedroom at rear of flat, caller states smoke is becoming heavy and black - timed at 15:17hrs"

Example 2: "M2FS to FSG CU - FSG caller in Room 8 on 7th Floor, two adults. Caller believes fire is on 6th floor underneath their room, heavy smoke coming through floorboards. Timed at 02:23hrs"

4   Protect

4.1   During this phase, the CRO should offer the prescriptive FSG to protect the caller as provided in their training. The CRO should remain cognisant of the caller's circumstances in determining the most effective protect advice.

4.2   If the CRO believes the circumstances of the caller require it, protect guidance can commence at the beginning of a FSG call. This may mean that the assessment stage is delayed whilst the caller takes action to protect themselves from the effects of fire, heat or smoke.

4.3   The CRO should give clear and direct instructions to the caller and provide the caller with time to carry out these instructions.

5 Reassure

5.1 Reassurance is important during the management of an FSG call and can help put the caller at ease. Reassurance can be used throughout the call.

5.2 Reassurance may calm the caller making it easier to communicate instructions and listen to guidance.

5.3 The CRO should attempt to provide only factual information to the caller (e.g. information received from the incident ground) and any reassurance provided should not lead the caller to develop a false sense of security. On occasions, it may be inappropriate to offer reassurance to the caller if the only reasonable course of action to save the caller's life is to attempt evacuation. When this occurs, the advice must be both clear and robust in its delivery, leaving the caller in no doubt as to the seriousness of their situation.

6 Reassess

6.1 The CRO should continue to assess the caller's physical conditions and environment to ensure that the incident ground is updated on any changes in conditions given on initial assessment which can be updated if necessary.

6.2 Any change in the caller's circumstances should be recorded on the mobilising system.

6.3 During the FSG call, the CRO should remain alert to any cues (i.e. vocal inflection – raised voice, rapid speech or period(s) of silence) which may provide indications as to the possible progress of the fire and the effect of the fire, heat or smoke on the caller.

7 Escape

7.1 Any changes in a caller's physical conditions and environment may require the CRO to assist the caller to escape from their location.

7.2 All CRO's are able to provide advice and guidance to a caller escaping from a building which includes how to break a window and create a potential escape route for the caller.

8 Rescue

8.1 Once guidance has been given to the caller to protect them, if escape is not deemed possible the CRO may attempt to get the caller to focus on being rescued. If rescue is unlikely to happen, the IC must contact the Control OiC and discuss the requirement for clear and robust evacuation advice to provide to FSG callers.

8.2 CROs should attempt to update the caller on rescue efforts being made by firefighters and possible methods that firefighters could deploy at the incident such as fire escape hoods.

9 Mobilising resources for FSG Calls

9.1 A FSG call to any building type will attract an enhanced attendance as detailed in Section 6 of this policy.

9.2 Control should inform the ICP or CU that a FSG attendance has been mobilised so the IC is aware what additional resources are en route.

10 Recording and communicating FSG information in Control

10.1 Control should record each FSG call on the mobilising system during the initial call and update the details, if required as the call progresses.

10.2 Control should use the mobilising system to display and record FSG information.

10.3 The Casualty Information Poster (see appendix 8) is intended to display caller information to the Control FSG Coordinator and OiC of Control.

10.4 The primary method of communicating information from each FSG call to the incident ground must be via Airwave and the OiC in Control should, if required, nominate a dedicated Airwave channel to pass FSG information.

10.5 Communicating FSG information is a two-way process. The incident ground is responsible for updating Control with deployments of firefighters and progress with reaching FSG callers. This information should be recorded on the mobilising system.

11 Recording of calls during an incident where FSG is in progress

11.1 Control should load the FSG layout on the mobilising system as soon as more than one FSG call is received.

11.2 Control may receive emergency calls from callers outside the premises or from friends and relatives indicating that there could be people in the building at risk. These should be classed as Persons Reported (PR) calls and details regarding the persons specific location, if known, should be passed to the incident ground.

11.3 It is likely that some callers, when told to leave the building will indicate that they cannot because they feel the conditions outside their current location are more hazardous and will not leave that location. If they are not directly affected by fire, heat or smoke, the call will not be classed as an FSG call however these callers may be provided with protect advice and reassurance if necessary and details of the caller's specific location should be passed to the incident ground. These calls will be recorded as Stay Put.

11.4 Control may also receive calls from callers in purpose built high rise residential buildings who are not being directly affected by fire, heat or smoke. These callers should be advised that it should be safe to remain in their flat unless information received from the incident ground indicates otherwise.

11.5 Callers advised that it should be safe to 'stay put' must also be informed that if conditions change and they become directly affected by fire, heat or smoke, they should redial 999.

11.6 Any call received from a resident in a premise, identified on the mobilising system as operating a simultaneous evacuation strategy, and who has not previously evacuated for any reason, should be instructed by Control to immediately evacuate unless they are prevented or are unable to do so. If unable to evacuate and if the caller is being directly affected by fire, heat or smoke, the call will be recorded as an FSG call and the caller advised in accordance with the guidance in this appendix.

11.7 Other emergency calls can be received from callers within the building responding to noises, sirens, a smell of burning or fire alarms sounding. These callers could also witness smoke in a communal area or stairwell and wish to report this to the Brigade. The information should be passed to the incident ground.

12 Multiple FSG calls received to a fire in a building

12.1 Three FSG calls or more from one premises type or a number of premises within a building are classed as Multiple FSG calls and the OiC in Control should declare – 'Multiple FSG incident in progress' to all Control staff.

12.2 The control room should implement the role of the Control FSG Coordinator

12.3 The Control OiC should communicate with the IC to share situational awareness and share this with appropriate control room staff.

12.4 Situational awareness may also be enhanced through News channel, Met Police helicopter, establishment of tri service conference call and liaison with other agencies, BT and FRS control rooms.

13 Change in operational tactics

13.1 Any decision to implement an emergency evacuation or mass rescue should be made by the IC after liaison with Control. This decision should be verbally relayed and displayed to Control staff.

13.2 The IC should provide clear instructions to Control on safe evacuation routes, location of firefighters and the use of any protective equipment being deployed such as fire escape hoods, so that this can be communicated to callers.

13.3 In the event of an emergency evacuation and/or a mass rescue being initiated, Control should attempt to re-contact any callers who have been advised that it should be safe to stay put and those FSG callers who Control are no longer in communication with.

13.4 In the absence of any other direction from the incident ground on which persons should be contacted first, Control should attempt to re-contact callers in the order the calls were received. This will however be challenging in the event of an incident generating a high volume of FSG calls over a sustained period. The ability to re-contact callers may be severely inhibited in cases when large numbers of calls are still being received by Control, impacting on the resources available to attempt to re-contact previous callers.

13.5 Decisions regarding the prioritisation and allocation of resources are the responsibility of the OiC in Control. This may mean taking a decision not to re-contact callers based on the operating conditions in the Control room, including the extent to which there are outstanding calls waiting to be answered. Some of these outstanding calls could be from repeat callers. To support the decision-making process, decisions will be recorded on the incident log in Control to ensure the rationale and context of the decisions taken by the OiC in Control are appropriately recorded.

13.5 When there is no response to a call back, the CRO should attempt to leave a message containing the advice and the time the message was left. *Example: This is London Fire Brigade Control calling you at [time] The conditions in your building have deteriorated ... [insert relevant advice] ...*

13.6 Following any decision to commence an emergency evacuation or mass rescue, any information gathered by the CRO regarding a caller's location as they attempt to evacuate should be recorded and passed to the incident ground.

14 Resilience and contingency arrangements during multiple FSG calls

14.1 Control has contingency (mutual aid) arrangements for periods of spike and spate conditions including high volumes of FSG calls. Contingency arrangements should be implemented when Control's capacity to answer emergency calls is reached through establishing communications with BT. When receiving multiple FSG calls, contact should also be established with other emergency services control rooms. This will be particularly required if the incident is visible to large numbers of the public, as this often results in additional duplicate calls from concerned

members of the public not directly affected by the incident, with the potential to overflow to other services emergency control rooms.

14.2 The Control OIC should determine when capacity is being reached or is likely to be reached in the near future - predominantly based on call volume and the nature of the calls being received. This information should be communicated to the incident ground immediately as this may impact on the IC's situational awareness leading to a change of operational tactics.

14.4 Call handling support arrangements with North West Fire Control, Staffordshire and West Midlands Fire Control may be activated. The Control OiC in liaison with BT may implement call filter arrangements and emergency calls to LFB may be answered in other emergency service control rooms. However, even when these arrangements are in operation, all communication to the incident ground will come via Control. Supporting Control rooms do not communicate directly with the incident ground.

14.5 The use of the risk critical communications link (NTG20) between Fire Control rooms will be established by the Control OiC as soon as it is identified that other Fire Control rooms are answering calls on behalf of LFB. This link provides the ability to share situational awareness between Control rooms. Airwave (ESTG 5) can be used to communicate with other London based emergency control rooms. Updates should be provided under the guidance of the Control OiC to all other Control rooms at no less than 20-minute intervals and any change in guidance being provided by LFB Control should be communicated immediately.

14.6 When Control is operating at capacity the Control OiC should consider advising CRO's dealing with FSG calls to only provide protect advice or the latest evacuation advice and not remain on the call, to enable the CROs to respond to further incoming 999 calls. Those incoming calls may not be related to the incident or from 999 callers outside of the building. Before advising CRO's not to remain on the line with FSG callers after protect advice or the latest evacuation advice has been given, the Control OiC should consider:

- Number and size of the incidents within the LFB area.
- Requesting support from the media to assist to reduce call volume.
- The volume of emergency calls being received from people not in the building but who are in a place of ultimate safety.

14.7 Therefore, it remains for the CRO to determine, based on their engagement with an FSG caller to decide if they should remain on the FSG call e.g. a FSG caller who has vulnerabilities.

14.8 Supervisory staff in Control should remain available to assist CROs in the management of FSG calls if necessary and should not answer the phone to 999 calls in an attempt to assist with reducing call volume to the detriment of their ability to command the Control room.

15 The Fire Survival Guidance co-ordinator at Control

15.1 The OiC in Control should nominate an FSG Coordinator to manage communications between Control and the incident ground during multiple FSG calls.

15.2 The Control FSG coordinator is responsible for establishing a single direct line of communication from the Control room to the incident ground to pass FSG and/or persons reported information via the designated airwave channel.

15.3 The Control FSG coordinator should also receive updates on operational progress and/or change of tactics at the incident and should update the mobilising system with this information.

15.4 The Casualty Information Poster should be updated by the Control FSG coordinator and if required the nearest Station Commander to Control should be mobilised to assist with this role.

15.5 The Control FSG coordinator has the responsibility for sharing information with the Control OiC to enhance their shared situational awareness. They should analyse intelligence to provide a common operating picture within Control.

Appendix 2 – Initial FSG procedure using an ICP

(a) When Control start to receive FSG calls they must pass FSG information to the ICP at the scene. The ICP must record FSG information on the control information form before passing it onto the IC who will relay that information to the Bridgehead (or other relevant area of operations) for rescue crews to be deployed. This should be on channel 1 of the handheld radio.

(b) The following image demonstrates this in a residential high-rise premises with relevant and basic high rise sectorisation. However, this level of command and control may not have been implemented at the very early stages of an incident.

Appendix 3 – The role of the FSGP

(a)   The IC should at the earliest opportunity designate a FSGP from existing resources if an FSG CU is not available on the incident ground and if FSG calls have not been resolved. The appliance commander of the FSGP and Control should coordinate the switch of Airwave radio channel to the channel designated by Control.

(b)   The appliance commander of the FSGP will be responsible for:

- recording FSG information on Control Information Form(s).

- communicating with the Bridgehead (or other relevant area of operations) initially using fireground radio channel 1 to pass FSG information and receive updates on the progress of rescue crews.

- Ensuring a communications link on fireground radio channel 3 is established at the Bridgehead (or other relevant area of operations) either using existing resources at the Bridgehead (or other relevant area of operations) or briefing a crew member of the FSGP for that role.

- If not already in use at the Bridgehead (or other relevant area of operations), a FIB with the Casualty Information Poster overlay should be used to record FSG information.

- Populating the FSGP FIB with individual FSG caller information and ensuring that information is recorded on the FIB at the Bridgehead (or other relevant area of operations).

- Ensuring a runner is available to take FSG information to a Bridgehead (or other relevant area of operations) if handheld radio communications are compromised.

- The FSGP must regularly update Control on the progress of rescue crews.

(c)   The following image demonstrates this in a residential high-rise premises:

Appendix 4 – Setting up of the FSG CU

(a) The FSG CU or if the IC decides, the first CU in attendance, should be designated as the FSG CU. If not already completed the FSG CU must coordinate with Control the switch of Airwave radio channel to one designated by Control.

(b) Following the guidance of the CU team leader and preferably utilising the FSGP crew (appendix 2) to assist on the FSG CU the FSGP crew must:

- Transfer existing FSG information from the ICP or FSGP to the FSG CU.
- Record additional FSG caller information on Control Information Form(s).
- Update the Casualty Information Poster with relevant FSG information.
- Maintain communications with the Bridgehead (or other relevant area of operations) on fireground radio channel 3.
- Ensure the (FSGP) FIB is continually updated with FSG information in anticipation of the additional FSG CU (for multiple FSGs) attendance.

(c) The image below outlines the FSG communications structure once a FSG CU is in place;

Appendix 5 – Setting up of the bridgehead command unit team

(a)   When in attendance the second CU mobilised to manage FSG information must go to the FSG CU for a briefing by either the FSG Sector Commander (if in place) or the FSG CU team leader. They must have with them the following minimum equipment to establish themselves at the Bridgehead (or other equivalent area of operations):

- 2 Airwave radios.

- FSG Pack (laptop, Control Information Forms, pens, plastic wallets (to contain Control Information Forms)).

- FIBs, additional FIB Casualty Information Poster overlays and fire ground radios.

(b)   After the second FSG CU crew have received a briefing, which must include the information on the prepared FIB and the ICs declared tactics, they should proceed to the Bridgehead (or other relevant area of operations) with:

- The FSG Bridgehead equipment (detailed above);

- the FSG support crew (with tripod and FIB adaptor);

- a prepared FIB with up to date casualty information on the number and detail of FSG caller information;

- a copy of all completed Control Information Forms.

(c)   This crew (second CU and support pump) must ensure they are in a safe location and, if possible, away from the dynamic area of BA deployments where they will not be disrupted by the ongoing firefighting tactics.

(d)   Once all equipment has been setup at the Bridgehead (or other relevant area of operations) and the FSG crew have reconciled FSG information passed to the Bridgehead (or other relevant area of operations), they must contact Control using Airwave radio on the channel designated by Control and make them aware that they will now be the point of contact to receive further FSG information.

(e)   Once the second FSG CU is established at the Bridgehead, the initial FSG CU must maintain a listening watch and update the Control Information Form(s) and Casualty Information Poster(s) as appropriate. This will provide:

- Resilience in maintaining a record of all FSG information separate to the Bridgehead (or other relevant area of operations) CU, should that be compromised;

- situational awareness for the FSG Sector Commander to update the IC on the progress of rescue crews deployed to FSG callers.

(f)   At the Bridgehead (or other relevant area of operations), FSG information must be recorded on a Control Information Form. A copy must then be placed inside a plastic see-through wallet. The wallet enables FSG information to be tracked as it will be clipped to the BA tally of a crew member undertaking the rescue and placed within the BA board (see photo below). If that crew is unsuccessful in carrying out the rescue, the FSG information in the wallet can be immediately tasked to another crew.

(g)   The wallet must be given to the Sector Commander Fire (in charge of the Bridgehead or other relevant area of operations) or delegated officer which may include Sector Commander Search as appropriate to the command structure in place at the Bridgehead (or other relevant area of operations). This officer is responsible for the relevant BA crew being tasked by the ECO in line with the FSG information.

(h)   The BA crew are then responsible for carrying out the task and reporting back to the ECO in relation to the success of their task or otherwise so that other crews can be tasked again if necessary. Information gathered from the BA crews must be passed back to the FSG CU crew at the Bridgehead or equivalent area of operations so Control and the IC can be updated.

(i)   The Bridgehead (or other relevant area of operations) CU crew must update Control directly on progress via the Airwave radio channel designated by Control to pass and receive FSG information.

(j)   The FSG Sector Commander must make contact with Control using their personal Airwave radio via the Airwave radio channel designated by Control to pass and receive FSG information to maintain situational awareness with Control including updates on the incident command tactics of the IC as well as briefing the IC on progress of FSG calls and the considerations of the FSG Coordinator (Control) on the capacity at Control to maintain FSG advice to callers.

(k)   At the conclusion of this procedure all forms and associated material that could be used for investigations should be sent to the incident command policy team within Operational Policy and Assurance (OPA) as per PN 0828 recording decisions at incidents.

(l)   The image below outlines the FSG communications structure once the additional CU for multiple FSG calls is in place;

FSG

18
16
14
12
10
8
6
4
2
G

SEARCH SECTOR

FIRE SECTOR

BRIDGEHEAD

LOBBY SECTOR

Fire Sector Commander

Search Sector Commander

Lobby Sector Commander

CU(FSG) BH & Search Co-ordinator & FSGP

FSG Info

CU(FSG-CU) & FSG SC & FSGP

ICV

IC

LFB
LONDON FIRE BRIGADE

- **Control pass all FSG Info direct to CU(FSG) at the BH.**
- **Search Coordinator briefed and begins to liaise directly with the CU(FSG) Crew at the BH.**

FSG info for situational awareness	<---->
FSG info	<---->
Command info	<---->

Appendix 6 - Role of the FSG support crew

(a) The FSG Support Pump must be mobilised when Control confirm that multiple FSG calls are in progress. The appliance must be notified that their role is that of FSG Support Pump.

(b) When in attendance and after the appliance commander has booked in with the CU, they should make themselves available at the FSG CU for a briefing from the FSG CU team leader or FSG Sector Commander if in place. They will require their FIB with the casualty information overlay, tripod and adaptor.

(c) The role of the FSG Support Pump crew is to provide a physical communications link between the Bridgehead (or other relevant area of operations) and the second CU crew positioned in a safe location and if possible away from the dynamic area of BA deployments where they will not be disrupted by the ongoing firefighting tactics.

(d) The FSG Support Pump crew under the direction of their OiC should physically pass the FSG information, recorded on the Control Information Form(s) to the Sector Commander Fire or delegated officer at the Bridgehead (or other relevant area of operations) ensuring the content of the form(s) are understood and rescue crews are briefed. They must provide the second FSG CU crew at the Bridgehead (or other relevant area of operations) with information on the progress of rescue activities, in order that Control can be updated to maintain their situational awareness.

(e) The FSG Support Pump crew must provide updates back from the Bridgehead (or other relevant area of operations) to the second CU crew who must update Control on the Airwave radio on the progress of rescue crews deployed to FSG callers.

(f) The FSG Support Pump crew should not be used for any other tasks during the incident and can be identified by a Command Support surcoat; red/white yoke with yellow lower body marked FSG Support.

Appendix 7 – Examples of messages

Message from Control

E271 from M2FS priority, fire survival guidance call information.

E271 from M2FS fire survival guidance call in flat 9 floor 3, 2 persons within flat, no mobility issues reported, fire outside front door on the 3rd floor, with smoke entering the flat. The 2 people are in the rear bedroom and have been advised to makes themselves known at the window.

The current time is recorded on the Control FSG information form within the box "*Time call passed by Control:*"

This message is then repeated by E271 back to Control.

Message from the incident ground.

M2FS from E271 from Sub O Yates at Larner House, a block of flats of twenty floors, twenty-five metres by ten metres. A four roomed flat on the third-floor seventy-five percent damaged by fire. Two adult males rescued by BA crews via internal staircase by London Fire Brigade crews. Forty-five-millimetre jet, one hose reel, jet, breathing apparatus, thermal imaging camera, mobile data terminal, Fire Survival Guidance, all persons accounted for.

Appendix 8 – Forms used for FSG caller information

Control Information Form - carried on all appliances, FRUs and CUs. Each form has three copies to allow annotation and distribution at the incident. Any other relevant information gathered by Control or requested from the incident ground must also be recorded on this form. The top (white) copy of the form must be taken to the Bridgehead (or other relevant area of operations) to provide resilience for handheld radio communications. The forms are completed in **BLOCK CAPITALS**.

When a CU team is in position at a bridgehead (or other relevant area of operations) they must ensure that the white copy is folded into the transparent wallet and handed to a member of the FSG Support Pump crew who must ensure it is clipped on a BA tally of the allocated search and rescue crew.

The other two copies (yellow and blue) are kept together as a record of the FSG call and to record the progress of the rescue crews sent to the FSG caller(s). This information is also used to inform the FSG sector commander and the second CU team at the Bridgehead (or other relevant area of operations) when updating Control on progress via the Airwave radio.

Casualty Information Poster - All CUs carry these posters. They must be readily available and best practice dictates one is permanently placed on the back of a reversible white board. All FSG information from a control information form must be copied onto the poster and updated accordingly.

Forward Information Board (FIB) with the casualty information overlay - carried on all appliances and FRUs. Each FIB board has a casualty information overlay for FSG information that mirrors the casualty information poster carried on CUs. At multiple FSG calls and if the FSG CU is not in attendance the FSGP must complete this before handing to the FSG CU in addition to the control information form(s). The FIB will be used as the single point at a Bridgehead (or other relevant area of operations) to record and update FSG information. This is to ensure that if a Bridgehead (or other relevant area of operations) is relocated FSG information is not lost.

Additional information:

Time recived from Control:

Time FSG call resolved:

FOLD HERE

LFB LONDON FIRE BRIGADE

White copy BH
Yellow copy BH
Blue copy FSGP/CU

Control Information

Please fill out in BLOCK CAPITAL LETTERS

Premise number:

Floor:

Number of persons within location:

Location within premises and access point:

Condition within premises (heavy smoke/fire etc):

Vulnerable people   Yes   No

CASUALTY INFORMATION LFB

	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
Premise or flat number										
Floor										
Number of persons										
Location within premises and access point										
Conditions being experienced by the caller (heavey smoke/fire etc)										
Vulnerable people										
Additional information										
Time received from Control (completed by inc ground)										
Time FSG call resolved (completed by inc ground)										
FSG/PR										

Document history

Assessments

An equality, sustainability or health, safety and welfare impact assessment and/or a risk assessment was last completed on:

EIA	14/04/2020	SDIA	17/04/2014	HSWIA	17/04/2020	RA	27/07/2020

Audit trail

Listed below is a brief audit trail, detailing amendments made to this policy/procedure.

Page/para nos.	Brief description of change	Date
Page 1	Changed owner from Head of Operational Procedures to Head of Operational Assurance.	24/10/2012
Throughout	The word premise has been replaced by premises throughout.	16/05/2013
Throughout	Attendance to FSG calls has been simplified to one single mobilisation action. Mobilisation will be attribute driven. Clarity provided across varying sections. The reader should consider the whole document to understand the changes in context.	17/04/2014
Page 2 & 10	Key point summary removed from page 2 and KPS flowchart added as appendix 4.	08/09/2014
Page 11	'Subjects list' template updated.	09/12/2014
Page 2 Page 4 Page 10	This policy has been reviewed as current with changes made to team and department names to reflect the abolition of the London Fire and Emergency Planning Authority, now replaced with the London Fire Commissioner. All FSG calls to be deemed 'Persons Reported'. The IC still to establish when all persons are accounted for. Removal of line referring to IC's responsibility to send 'Persons Reported'. Key Point Summary: Removal of IC's responsibility to declare 'Persons Reported'. Replaced with 'All FSG incidents deemed 'Persons Reported'.	16/11/2018
Throughout	Amended to reflect Role to Rank terminology.	04/11/2019
Throughout	This policy has been reviewed as current with extensive changes made following Operational Policy & Assurance and Control policy and procedure review, identified issues through the Grenfell Tower Investigation and Review team and phase 1 outcomes of the Grenfell Tower inquiry. Please re-read to familiarise yourself with the content.	19/02/2021

Subject list

You can find this policy under the following subjects.

Freedom of Information Act exemptions

This policy/procedure has been securely marked due to:

Considered by: (responsible work team)	FOIA exemption	Security marking classification

Standard Equality Impact Assessment Form

Question 1: Which Team, Department, or Project Board is responsible for carrying out the Standard Equality Impact Assessment?	
Name	*Incident command policy (OP&A)*

Question 2: Lead assessor's contact details			
Name	*Julian Spooner*	Mobile No	07810850655
Job title	Group Commander	Extension	
Department	OP&A	Email	julian.spooner@london-fire.gov.uk

Question 3: Title of / policy (please include the policy number) / project / report / proposed change / initiative / decision	
PN 0790 Fire Survival Guidance	

Question 4: Is the work...			
New		A complete redesign	
A small change or policy review		Other (e.g. reviewed as current)	Policy reviewed and amended to provide new guidance and procedures regarding responding to incidents that involve multiple fire survival guidance calls.

Question 5: Briefly outline the aim and the purpose of the work	
Aim	Amend PN0790 to provide new guidance on operational procedure(s) when responding to incidents that involve fire survival guidance calls.
Purpose	Provide policy and procedural guidance for operational staff.

Question 6: Has an EIA been conducted previously? (please tick)			
Yes	X	No	
If yes, attach a copy. If no, state the reason.	An EIA was completed for the existing PN0790		

Question 7: Who is it intended to benefit / Who does the change affect?					
Staff	**X**	Wider public	**X**	Service users	
Other (please state)					

Initial Equality Impact Assessment – Screening Stage

Complete the table below to see whether you need to complete a full Equality Impact Assessment.

Only positive impacts identified: **No full EIA required**	Only neutral impacts identified **No full EIA required**	One or more adverse impacts identified **Full EIA required**

Question 8: Identifying the impacts
Consider the relevance of the policy / project / decision on each group below and describe any impacts identified. **NB: Some characteristics may attract multiple impacts e.g. age: positive impact on older people, adverse impact on younger people.**

Protected Characteristic	Level of Impact (Positive impact, neutral impact, adverse impact)
Age (younger, older or particular age group)	**Positive impact** – the provisions made in this policy are designed to increase the feasibility of the rescue of persons in age groups where because of their age, their mobility or ability to self-evacuate are likely to be hindered.
Disability (physical, sensory, mental health, learning disability, long term illness, hidden)	**Positive impact** - the provisions made in this policy are designed to increase the feasibility of rescue of persons in groups where ability to self-evacuate are more challenging as a result of disability.
Gender reassignment (someone proposing to/undergoing/ undergone a transition from one gender to another)	**Neutral impact**
Marriage / Civil Partnership (married as well as same-sex couples)	**Neutral impact**
Pregnancy and Maternity	**Positive impact** - the provisions made in this policy are designed to increase the feasibility of rescue of persons in groups where ability to self-evacuate are more challenging which may be the case in pregnancy or carrying babies
Race (including nationality, colour, national and/or ethnic origins)	**Positive impact** – the provisions made in this policy are designed to increase the feasibility of rescue of persons in groups where the ability to self-evacuate is more

	challenging. This may arise in circumstances where there are difficulties in understanding instruction or advice , such as where English is not spoken fluently (which may be linked to nationality or ethnicity). The introduction of a pictogram, and the possibility that Fire Fighters may speak multiple languages may also assist. Although not addressed specifically by this policy, these resources are part of the LFC provision
Religion or Belief (people of any religion, or no religion, or people who follow a particular belief (not political)	**Neutral impact**
Sex (men and women)	**Neutral impact**
Sexual Orientation (straight, bi, gay and lesbian people)	**Neutral impact**
Are there any other groups this work may affect? i.e. carers, non-binary people, people with learning difficulties, neurodiverse people, people with dyslexia, ADHD, care leavers, ex-offenders, people living in areas of disadvantage, homeless people, people on low income / poverty?	**Positive impact** - the changes made to the provisions in this policy are designed to increase the feasibility of rescue of persons in groups where their mobility or ability to self-evacuate are likely to be hindered, whether this is due to mobility issues or cognitive impairment.

Question 9: Has your assessment been able to demonstrate the following?

Positive impact	The changes to existing policy will have a positive impact on a number of protected characteristics ; the policy provides that the CRO obtain information regarding individual circumstances and this be relayed to the incident ground.
Neutral impact	The changes to the reviewed policy have a neutral impact on the following groups; • Gender Reassignment • Marriage/Civil Partnership • Race • Religion or Belief • Sex • Sexual Orientation
Adverse impact	None
Any other comments	None

Question 10: Meeting the Public Sector Equality Duty under s149 Equality Act 2010

How have you considered whether this project / policy / decision does the following:

1. Eliminates unlawful discrimination, harassment and victimisation
2. Advances equality of opportunity between different groups, and
3. Fosters good relations between different groups.

What we must do under law	Provide a description or summary of how this will be achieved
Eliminate discrimination	No discriminatory impacts have been identified
Advance equality of opportunity	The changes to this policy have been made to improve existing fire survival guidance procedures as a result of the review of the Grenfell Tower fire. The changes will positively impact protected characteristic groups since it provides for identifying particular challenges or vulnerabilities which would hinder self-evacuation or rescue. The changes to the policy and procedures are designed to mitigate the disadvantages these groups face in relation to fire.
Foster good relations	Fostering good relations between people who share a protected characteristic and people who do not share it is part of the Equality Act 2010 and PSED. Clear published policies which demonstrate consideration of all the London community is one of the means by which this can be done.

Question 11: What data has been used to inform the Impact Assessment? (E.g. GLA Datastore, Census Data, Staff Monitoring Data, Staff Survey Data, Local Borough Population Demographics).	
Data Source	How it has been used
	None was required

Question 12: Have you consulted with staff, LFB support groups, trade unions, public / service users, and / or others to help assess for impacts? (please tick)			
Yes	X	No	
If yes, who was involved and how were they involved? If not , why not?			
Who?	FSG stakeholder group and the FBU have been fully consulted on the EIA, risk assessment and policy.		
How?	FSG stakeholder group meetings have been held through the Brigade Joint Council for Health Safety and Welfare. There have also been several consultation meetings with the FBU.		
If no consultation, why not?			
Question 13: How have you ensured your policy, project or proposal uses inclusive language that doesn't unintentionally discriminate against certain groups? Yes			
Tools used to assess inclusive language e.g. gender bias screening tools, Stonewall toolkit on inclusive policies, speaking with Inclusion Team, Comms Style Guide, Policy 0370: Writing Policies and Procedures.		**Outcome**	
PN370 – policies and procedures guidance		***Consistent language***	

Consultation with the LFB Inclusion team	***Agreed***

For guidance and support, please contact the Inclusion Team (Second Floor, Union Street, or email <u>safertogether@london-fire.gov.uk</u>) or a relevant Equality Support Group (LINK TO ESG PAGE ON INCLUSION PAGES – HOTWIRE)