Freedom of Information request reference number: 6983.1

Date of response: 23 November 2022

Request:

I am trying to track down the LFB de-briefing report into the London 7/7 bombings but have been unable to find it online and was hoping you could help steer to where I could view it?

I have seen it referenced in the London Assembly report of the 7 July Review committee (Page 38 point 2.75) but cannot locate the source document.

https://www.london.gov.uk/sites/default/files/gla_migrate_files_destination/archives/assembly-reports-7july-report.pdf

Is it available to view and if so, are you able to guide me to where I might find it?

Response:

Please find attached the London Fire Brigade de-brief report on the 7th July 2005 London Bombings.

I hope you find this information of use. Should you have any further questions please do let me know.

We have dealt with your request under the Freedom of Information Act 2000. For more information about this process please see the guidance we publish about making a request on our website

7 July Report

[temporary cover sheet]

October 2005

Executive Summary

On 7th July the London Fire Brigade deployed over 200 firefighters to four explosions in central London. Over 50 people lost their lives in the worst terrorist attack on the capital since the 1996 IRA bomb blast at Canary Wharf. It was a day the London Fire Brigade had come to expect and was prepared for. The planning over the years and the commitment of the service as a whole resulted in an effective and impressive fire and rescue response for London.

Fire appliances arrived at the scene of each explosion within minutes in good response times. At one point, at the height of the incident, it was confirmed that there were still 98 fire appliances available for mobilising to any other incidents in London.

Nine of the Brigade's ten fire rescue units were mobilised on the day with four going to Aldgate, four to Edgware Road and one to Kings Cross.

Multi-agency training exercises did prove a very useful foundation and on the day, all agencies worked well together, both at the scene and at the Strategic Coordination Centre.

There was excellent co-operation and willingness from staff to crew appliances and maintain operational readiness after the change of watch, remembering the times of the incidents and the end of watch time of 9am.

A particular success was the Rescue and Recovery Team trolley which worked extremely well at Russell Square and was used to ferry staff and equipment for 39 consecutive hours, covering a distance of some 280 miles.

Initial assessments carried out by Incident Commanders and the Multi Agency Initial Assessment Team at each scene quickly confirmed no threat of Chemical Biological Radiological or Nuclear contamination risk.

Crews worked alongside paramedics to assess people injured at each of the incidents, applying first aid and carrying out rescues using a range of equipment.

A range of equipment was made available to the Brigade by other fire and rescue services and outside companies (for example, heavy lifting equipment offered by Channel Rail Link). This generosity was also found at the incidents with stores offering food, water and supplies to crews and the public at the scene.

The London Fire and Emergency Planning Authority also has responsibility for coordinating the response of local authorities through the London Local Authority Coordination Centre (LLACC). The planning to ensure that local authority resources were coordinated and made available proved successful in ensuring emergency services and all those affected by the tragedy got the local authority support they needed.

The LLACC responded for the first time in support of London Local Authority Gold receiving 3000 calls in the first week and an additional 2000 calls during the remainder of the response. The Centre provided an effective link between London's 33 Local Authorities and Local Authority Gold.

Throughout the day we remained on standby ready to respond to further incidents, and were indeed called upon just two weeks later to the attempted bombings on the 21st July.

Report format

This report is set out in six main sections.

Section one is the incident time line for the key moments in the first hour.

Section two is the narrative description of how the events unfolded for the above.

Section three describes each incident and the actions taken by the crews and incident commanders.

Section four explains how the organisation coordinated the response at an operational level, managed resources across London and outlines the support given by other departments.

Section five is our analysis of our performance.

Section six describes our high level conclusions.

Contents

Incident timeline (first hour)

	A			**Aldgate**
		ER		**Edgware Road**
			KX	**King's Cross**
			TS	**Tavistock Square**

Time				Activity
0856	A			Metropolitan Police call the Brigade to a fire and explosion at Aldgate tube station
0857	A			Mobilisation message sent; to fire and explosion: F331, F322, FRU E216, FIU OK16 [St Botolph St].
0858		ER		The first call comes through to Brigade Control from a member of the public to a fire and explosion. The address given is not a tube station but a street on the other side of Edgware Road.
0858				All active control officers recalled to control room.
0900	A			First fire engines arrive at Aldgate (F331 & F332).
0900		ER		Mobilisation message sent; to fire and explosion: A211, A213, A261, FRU H276, FIU OK12 [Praed Street].
0900	A			Mobilisation message sent; to explosion: F241, F242, A281, FRU H316, FIU OK13, ADO F155 [Liverpool St. Stn].
0902			KX	First call received by Brigade to "Smoke issuing in a tunnel" at Kings Cross.
0902	A			Mobilisation message sent; to smoke in tunnel: F251, E331, ADO A28 [Aldgate Stn], F261 [Liverpool St Stn].
0904		ER		First fire engines arrive at Praed Street (A211 & A213).

0904		KX	Mobilisation message sent; to smoke issuing in tunnel: A231, A272, A271, ADO A41 [Euston Sq], A242 [King's Cross].
0905	A		Major incident declared at Aldgate.
0905			Teleprinter message to all fire stations: Until further notice, no outside duties will be allowed.
0907	ER		Second call to Brigade Control identifies Edgware tube station on the Hammersmith and City line as scene of incident.
0907		KX	First fire engine arrives at Euston Square (A231).
0908	A		Mobilisation message sent to; major incident procedure: E351, F311, F312, F221, CU O201, BCU O200, DO E100, ADO E34, ADO F25, CS E164, PR E170, CDU A397, O20P [Aldgate Stn].
0910			Restricted attendance introduced on the following fire stations grounds: A27, A28, A30, A31, A32, A33, A34, A35, A36, F20, F21, F22, F23, F24, F25, F26, F27, F28, F29, F30, F31, F32, F33, F34, F35, F36, F37, F38, F39, F40, F41, F42, F43, F44, F45, F46.
0911		KX	More fire engines arrive at Euston Square (A271 & A272)
0913	ER		Mobilisation message sent; to fire and explosion: G331, G272, G271, FRU G386, FIU OK11 [Edgware Rd Stn].
0913		KX	First fire engine arrives at King's Cross (A242)
0916			F1 (SDO for mobilising) paged to be informed of major incident in progress and restricted attendance in operation. SDO informs Deputy Commissioner and Assistant Commissioners.
0918	ER		First fire engines arrive at Edgware Road (G272 & G271).

0919	KX		Further fire engines requested to scene.
0934	ER		Major incident declared at Edgware Road.
0936	KX		Make pumps 8 at King's Cross.
0947		TS	Brigade Control gets call from member of the public reporting explosion on a bus at Tavistock Square.
0950		TS	Mobilisation message sent; to expected explosion A311, A312, A244

The events of 7 July started for the London Fire Brigade at 8:56 with a call from the Metropolitan Police Incident Room to a fire and explosion at St Botolph Street, which is in close proximity to Aldgate station.

0857 – mobilisation message sent; to fire and explosion: Pumps F331, F322, FRU E216, FIU OK16.

In response, two fire engines were mobilised from F33 Whitechapel, together with a fire rescue unit (FRU) and a fire investigation unit (FIU). The duty incident liaison officer, urban search and rescue officer and the Resource Management Centre were also paged to inform them of the incident.

As the fire engines were mobilised to St Botolph Street, Brigade Control received three further calls; two for the explosion at Aldgate at 08:57 and 08:58, and one to the explosion at Edgware Road at 08:58. The call to King's Cross was to follow four minutes later.

09:00 – mobilisation message sent; to explosion: F241, F242, A281, FRU H316, FIU OK13, ADO F155

09:02 – mobilisation message sent; to smoke in tunnel: F251, E331, ADO A28, F261

In response to the two further calls to the Aldgate bomb, which were made by the control room at the London Ambulance Service and staff at London Underground, three responses were made. As Liverpool Street Station was identified as the location for the explosion, three fire engines, an FRU, an FIU and a senior officer were mobilised to the station, this being the pre-determined attendance for such an incident. The call from London Underground staff identified not just the involvement of the underground station, but also identified the tube tunnels on the Circle and Metropolitan lines between Aldgate and Liverpool Street. When underground tunnels are involved, our standard response is to mobilise fire engines to the underground stations either side of the incident. In this case, two fire engines and a senior officer were sent to Aldgate station, and an additional fire engine to Liverpool Street station.

09:00 – mobilisation message sent; to fire and explosion: A211, A213, A261, FRU H276, FIU OK12

The first call to the bomb at Edgware Road was from a member of the public at 08:58. They reported an explosion at the rear of an address in Praed Street, which is not the underground station, but a street on the other side of Edgware Road. It is at the rear of Praed Street that the underground lines surface to open air and residents in the street heard and felt the explosion. In response to this call, five appliances were mobilised: the fire engine and turntable ladder from A21 Paddington, a fire engine from A26 Knightsbridge, an FRU and an FIU. The other fire engine from A21 Paddington was not sent as it was attending another fire call, which turned out to be a false alarm.

09:00 first fire engines arrive at Aldgate (F331 & F332).

The first fire engines to reach Aldgate arrived within four minutes. These were the two fire engines from Whitechapel which were sent to the St Botolph Street address.

As the crews went around the one-way system, they saw a plume of smoke coming from the main station and pulled up outside. People were

coming out of the station – some dazed and shocked, others with varying injuries. After considering the issues of a CBRN attack, the officer-in-charge instructed his crew to administer first aid to the casualties coming out of the station, while he went with a member of LUL staff to assess the scene of the incident.

09:04– mobilisation message sent; to smoke issuing in tunnel: A231, A272, A271, A242, ADO A41

At 09:02 Brigade Control received the call from London Underground, reporting smoke issuing from the tunnels on the east bound Piccadilly line at King's Cross. Again, a 'split attendance' was made, with three fire engines and a senior officer sent to Euston Square and one fire engine sent to Kings Cross. Again, the first fire engines arrived within four minutes.

09:04 first fire engines arrive at Praed Street (A211 & A213)

As the appliances were being mobilised to King's Cross, the first appliance arrived at Praed Street and the crew stopped to investigate the cause of the call. At the same time, Brigade Control were taking the first call to identify Edgware Road station as the location of the bomb. This call was made by London Underground staff. Prompted by the mobilising system that this could be a duplicate of the Praed Street call, the control officer radioed A211 (the fire engine crew from Paddington who were investigating Praed Street). The crew radioed back that a separate response was required for Edgware Road. The control operator then mobilised three fire engines, an FRU and an FIU to Edgware Road station.

09:13 – mobilisation message sent; to fire and explosion: G331, G272, G271, FRU G386, FIU OK11

While the crews were confirming that the explosion was not to the rear of Praed Street, the senior officer from Paddington, who had been mobilised with the crews, made his way to Edgware Road Station, and was the first to arrive.

09:05 major incident declared at Aldgate

09:08 – mobilisation message sent; to fire and explosion: E351, F311, F312, F221, CU O201, BCU O200, DO E100, ADO E34, ADO F25, CS E164, PR E170

Back at Aldgate, the officer-in-charge had returned from his assessment of the incident, and in response to what he had seen, and the amount of resources required, he instigated the major incident procedure. When an incident is declared a major incident, a pre-determined level of support is mobilised to the incident. Eight fire engines, two FRUs and two FIUs had already been deployed in response to the Aldgate bomb, and to support the major incident declaration a further four fire engines, two command units – of which one was the Brigade command unit – and five senior officers were mobilised to Aldgate station.

Whilst responses were being made to the operational incidents, procedures to alert the organisation to potential high impact events had also been started. The Brigade's Resource Management Centre was alerted as part of the first call received to an explosion at 08:58. After only the second call, all active Brigade control staff were recalled to the control centre to staff emergency calls and mobilise resources. The assistant principal and principal control officers were also paged to attend the control room.

At 09:05, all fire stations were contacted to 'cancel all outside activities' which are any activity away from the station which is not an emergency and at 09:10 restricted attendances were introduced in and around the area of the incidents.

When restricted attendance is introduced, the senior divisional officer (SDO) responsible for Brigade mobilising is notified. When he was paged, the SDO was at a meeting in Southwark with the Deputy Commissioner, Roy Bishop and five of the Brigade's Assistant Commissioners. It was agreed that the Deputy Commissioner and Assistant Commissioner (Service Delivery) would return to Brigade headquarters to brief the Commissioner and other Directors.

09:07 first fire engines arrive at Euston Square

09:13 first fire engine arrives at Kings Cross

At the King's Cross incident, the initial response had arrived which was three fire engines at Euston Square Station and one at King's Cross station. The first crew arrived at King's Cross after being hampered by heavy traffic.

On arriving at King's Cross the crew were met by a member of London Underground Management. The initial information given was that there had been a number of power surges across the underground system. At this stage fire crews noticed members of the public hurrying up the escalators with faint blackening around their faces. After an initial assessment of the situation two additional appliances were ordered to provide additional resources to further investigate the incident.

The crews at Euston Square had reported that there was no incident, so they were ordered to proceed to King's Cross and rendezvous with the crews there.

09:18 first fire engines arrives at Edgware Road (G272 & G271)

09:34 major incident declared at Edgware Road

09:36 'make pumps 8' at Kings Cross

At Edgware Road station, the senior officer who had arrived from Praed Street, was making his assessment of the incident as the first fire engines arrived from G27 North Kensington. While the crews set up a casualty handling area and administered first aid a message was sent to Brigade Control that the police had confirmed it was a bomb explosion on the underground train in the station and that an unknown number of people were involved.

The urban search and rescue team were requested to attend the incident and recognising the scale of the incident and the resources required, the major incident procedure was initiated. Over at King's Cross, eight more fire engines were requested to assist at the incident.

At Brigade headquarters, it was agreed that our Gold Control would be activated and Assistant Commissioner (Operational Response) was ordered to manage it.

The time was now 09:40. Three bombs had exploded on underground trains in London and major incidents had been declared at two of them. Over two hundred firefighters, thirty five fire engines, five FRUs, twenty-

one senior officers and fourteen specialist appliances had been mobilised.

Seven minutes later, the Brigade received the call to a fire and explosion on a bus at Tavistock Square. Two fire engines and a hydraulic platform were mobilised to the scene.

Section three   Managing the incidents

Aldgate

1.   At 08:56 Brigade Control received a call from the Metropolitan Police Incident Room to a fire and explosion at Aldgate tube station. Crews from Whitechapel were sent immediately and arrived on the scene in four minutes. Further calls were received from the London Ambulance Control Room and London Underground staff to explosions at Liverpool Street station (which is in close proximity to Aldgate) and separate fire engines were sent there.

2.   On arrival at Aldgate, London Underground staff advised the officer-in-charge that they had heard an explosion on the Circle Line just out of the platform area. There were a significant number of injured and shocked members of the public in the station and so the fire crew were deployed to assist and provide first aid while the London Underground staff member took the officer-in-charge to the train. On assessing the situation and seeing the large number of casualties the decision was taken to initiate the major incident procedure.

3.   As more crews and appliances arrived and the severity of the situation became evident, all crews were made aware that it may be a terrorist attack, were advised of the potential for secondary devices and instructed to have their personal detection equipment on at all times. At this stage it could not be confirmed that the incident was free from CBRN (Chemical, Biological, Radiological or Nuclear) attack, so London Underground staff were asked to evacuate the local area to reduce the risk to other members of the public.

4.   Priorities were then agreed and crews allocated specific tasks. A casualty handling area was set up, and equipment dump was located on the platform. The crews were detailed to the train to assist with removing casualties and any rescue efforts needed.

5.   Behind the train on which the explosion had occurred there was a second train. This train was not affected by the explosion, but had stopped when the power was turned off and crowded with approximately 600 commuters. It was agreed that the stopped train would be taken to Aldgate East station, and to assist with the evacuation of those passengers additional appliances were requested. The request to 'make pumps 10' was sent at 10:06 hrs.

6.   The first Silver meeting between emergency services was held in the street at around 10:00 hrs, and a more formal meeting took place at 10:30 on the Brigade Command Unit.

7.   By approximately 10.45 hrs all live casualties had been brought to the surface from the damaged train and the eastbound train which had been trapped in the tunnel was taken to Aldgate East and occupants were evacuated.

8.   Overall, and working closely with the London Ambulance Service, 9 trapped persons had been released, 10 seriously injured removed, 100 walking wounded removed and a further 500 assisted to ground level uninjured from the damaged train, as well as 600 uninjured commuters from the second train which had been stopped in the tunnel behind the damaged train.

9.   With all casualties removed and crews withdrawn from the train the area was declared a crime scene.

10.   At a subsequent Silver meeting it was agreed with the Metropolitan Police and British Transport Police that the Brigade equipment would be left in situ (as the area was a crime scene) and one appliance would be left at the scene as a precautionary measure while the police carried out their investigations.

Edgware Road

11. The first report of an incident at Edgware Road underground station was a call to an explosion at the rear of an address in Praed Street, which is where the underground lines surface to open air. Residents in the street had heard the explosion and felt the building shake and called the Brigade.

12. While the crews were investigating Praed Street, London Underground staff called the Brigade and identified the site of the explosion as being at Edgware Road Station on Cabbell Street. Brigade Control then contacted the crew to inform them of the possible link between the two calls and, given the distance between the two sites, a further set of fire appliances was mobilised to Edgware Road and the senior officer from Paddington, who was at Praed Street, made his way to Cabbell Street.

13. When the officer arrived, there were a large number of people standing around the front of the station and people sitting in the station entrance receiving treatment from ambulance staff for burns and other injuries. The officer made contact with the senior London Underground and ambulance staff on site as the fire engines from G27 North Kensington arrived. The arriving crews prepared their breathing apparatus, whilst the officer-in-charge gathered information from the other emergency services and London Underground staff on site.

14. Given the number of casualties and the resources required, a major incident was declared, and additional support appliances (three fire engines and a command unit) were mobilised to the incident.

15. It was important to establish whether the explosions involved CBRN, and while this assessment was being made the crews set-up a casualty handling area in the nearby Marks & Spencers (who had offered their help) and prepared an equipment dump ready for their descent to the train. There was a steady stream of people exiting the station with minor injuries, but most were calm.

16. Personal detection equipment and an assessment of the casualties quickly determined that CBRN was not present, and the crews made their way to the train.

17. The train that exploded was on the Circle line heading towards Paddington. It was about 80 metres from the platform and in the tunnel. A train travelling in the opposite direction on the Hammersmith & City line was also caught up in the explosion. Approximately 200 people were thought to be involved in the incident.

18. As the crews reached the trains more people were evacuating the trains through the end carriages. Inside the trains, ambulance staff were helping the more seriously injured. Paramedics requested more stretchers to help with the evacuation, and the Casualty Handling Unit, based at A21

Paddington, was ordered to the incident. Firefighters set-up lighting and helped with the release of the casualties.

19. Outside, a rendezvous point for the extra fire appliances was established and the area cleared for the quick arrival and departure of ambulances. The police were searching the area for possible secondary devices and those with less serious injuries were being treated in Marks and Spencer by ambulance staff; although later they moved to the Metropol Hotel, as a suspect package had been found.

20. Firefighters helped to release passengers and trapped people from both trains and assisted the paramedics with access. At 10:23, additional fire engines were ordered to enable crews to search the line between Paddington and Edgware Road in case people had exited the train from the opposite end.

21. A Silver meeting between all the agencies on site was held at 10:30 in an adjacent office building. During this meeting it was confirmed that all the live casualties had been released from the train and taken to hospital and that the area had been swept for potential secondary devices. The location of the cordons was also established.

22. When the last live casualties had been removed from the train the rescue operation ended. The site was handed over to police control as a crime scene and the Brigade's attendance was reduced to four fire engines and an FRU.

23. The Brigade concluded its active operations at the scene at 13:57, when the stop message was sent to Brigade Control. During the incident, 11 people with serious injuries were rescued from the train and a further 45 needed to be assisted from the train to the surface.

ngton to Edgware Road

King's Cross

24. At 09:02 hrs a call was received by Brigade Control from London Underground to smoke issuing in a tunnel and a split attendance was ordered, as usual in such circumstances.

25. Three fire engines (two from Clerkenwell and one from Euston) were mobilised to Euston Square and a fire engine from Soho was mobilised to King's Cross.

26. On arrival at King's Cross, the crew were met by a member of London Underground staff who informed them that there had been a number of power surges across the underground system. However when the crew moved down the stairs to the ticket hall they noticed members of the public hurrying up the escalators with faint blackening around their faces.

27. The officer-in-charge went to the London Underground control room to get more information. When leaving the control room he noticed that there were distressed members of the public leaving the station with extensive blackening around the mouth and nose. He also noticed some casualties with what appeared to be collision injuries such as bloodied noses and facial injuries.

28. At 09:19 hrs the officer-in-charge ordered two additional appliances to provide additional resources to be able to commit crews to investigate the cause of the incident. The officer-in-charge, taking the role of incident commander then went back to ground level to liaise with the Police and London Ambulance Service to gather further information while his crew assisted with first aid.

29. At this stage no additional resources had arrived and it was now vital to gather more information to make a decision on an appropriate course of action. When returning to the control room the incident commander noticed that casualties were now completely covered in soot and having breathing difficulties. He briefed two firefighters to go to platform level (as far as safely possible given the atmosphere) to make an assessment of the situation. They liaised with a British Transport Police officer on the platform and reported back that there were multiple fatalities, critical injuries and casualties.

30. At 09:36 the incident commander then made pumps 8, and informed the London Ambulance Service and the Metropolitan Police of the situation, at this stage CBRN issues were also considered. Soon after, A241 arrived (this had also been delayed due to heavy traffic and the crew had walked the last 100 yards to the incident) and the sub officer from this appliance took over as incident commander.

31. Six firefighters went down to platform level with three remaining on the platform and three entering the tunnel. At the same time the incident commander met with the British Transport Police to get further information on the position of the train, details of the damage to the train

and the kind of injuries he had seen. Taking into account the length of the train the most serious casualties were 360 metres from the nearest point of access for firefighters entering via King's Cross Station.

32. An assistant divisional officer (at 9.56 hrs) arrived and took over as incident commander while the two crews from Soho concentrated on the extrication and removal of the numerous casualties found on the train. The crews were working in extremely difficult conditions; it was hot and very dark.

33. A251 Westminster, A271, A272 Clerkenwell, A231 Euston, A302 Islington, A431 Kentish Town and A411 West Hampstead arrived and these provided additional resources to remove casualties. The incident resulted in 13 live casualties ambulanced to hospital, 63 sent to hospital and approximately 200 walking wounded.

34. By 11.04 all live casualties had been removed from the train and all fire crews had withdrawn from the train apart from Fire Investigation Officers.

35. With all the live casualties removed, the police wanted to gain access to the train from the Russell Square end and at 11:21 hrs, the Rescue and Recovery Team (RART) were requested to attend with the motorised rescue trolley (see below).

36. Silver meetings were held at 10.30, 11.30, 12.30 and 14.17. Issues discussed included reports relating to CBRN, staff welfare, relief crews, ventilation and lighting provision the setting up of inner and outer cordons and information for the Resource Management Centre.

37. The stop message was sent to Brigade Control at 14.56.

Rescue and recovery team (RART)

38. The rescue and recovery team is a partnership working arrangement with the London Fire Brigade, British Transport Police and London Underground. The team was set up for the rescue and recovery of trains stuck between stations in tunnels.

39. One piece of equipment used by the team is a motorised rescue trolley. They are carried by both the British Transport Police and the Brigade and both groups of staff are trained in its use.

40. Initially intended for a single journey to get a rescue team to the train (who would then drive the train onto the nearest station), the trolley was used by the police for their investigations. Over the days that followed the bombs, the trolleys were used to ferry people and equipment to and from Russell Square station to the train which was approximately 700 metres along the track.

Tavistock Square

41.   At 09:47 hrs, Brigade Control received a call from a member of the public reporting an explosion on a bus at Tavistock Square and in response, they mobilised two fire engines and Soho's hydraulic platform (an appliance for assisting at heights).

42.   The hydraulic platform was the first appliance to arrive: it arrived from the south end of Tavistock Square and parked 100 metres from the bus. When the crew arrived they were met by the police and told that there had been an explosion on the bus and that the police suspected a secondary device. The crew could see straight away the number of injured people both on and off the bus.

43.   The walking wounded had already moved from the immediate area around the bus and moved through an arch where doctors from the nearby British Medical Association (BMA) were giving first aid and setting up a casualty handling area in the courtyard area of the BMA building.

44.   There was a need to move the casualties quickly from the scene in case of secondary devices, so the crew asked a member of the public if they could find anything that could be used as a stretcher. In the meantime, the crew used two long bus windows to carry two casualties from the street. A man then appeared with a table top and this was used to remove another two casualties to the courtyard.

45.   After the street had been cleared of injured people the crew boarded the bus. One woman was moved quickly to the table top and passed out of the bus. Two other people were still alive on the bus. The first person was partially trapped behind the back of the top floor which had been blown downwards by the blast and prevented easy access to him. He was freed by the crew and passed off the bus.

46.   The second person was trapped on the nearside of the bus by the upper floor and other debris. At this stage the fire engine from Holloway arrived and two of their firefighters assisted the Soho crew in lifting this last casualty from the bus to the casualty handling area.

47.   All crews continued to assist medical staff from the BMA building with different casualties, 15 of whom were seriously injured. A controlled explosion was carried out by the police and the Soho crew left the scene and arrived back at their station at approximately 14:00 hrs.

48.   Fire and rescue cover in London is provided on a pan-London basis. That is to say that the location of fire engines and other specialist appliances are determined by the way they support cover across London and not just their immediate vicinity. Crewing levels and vehicle availability is managed from a centralised Resource Management Centre which is also home to the Brigade's Gold Control room.

49.   Fire engines, specialist appliances (such as the Fire Rescue Units and Command Units) and senior officers are mobilised to incidents from Brigade Control. Brigade Control is the call receiving centre for 999 calls to the fire brigade and has responsibility for sending the initial level of response to an incident; for sending support equipment and personnel; for providing relief crews at protracted incidents; and for relocating fire engines so that an even distribution of emergency cover is maintained.

50.   This section of the report explains how Brigade Control, Gold Control at the Resource Management Centre, the corporate management team at headquarters and various support departments worked together on the 7 July and beyond to ensure the best response to the bomb incidents, whilst maintaining emergency cover across London.

Brigade Control (999 call centre)

51.   Brigade Control were the first to be alerted to the bomb incidents with the call at 08:56 from the Metropolitan Police to a fire and explosion at Aldgate tube station. Soon after followed calls to Edgware Road and King's Cross.

52.   In response to a 999 call, the control operator sends a pre-determined level of response (the number and type of vehicles and staff) based on the description of the incident by the caller and the building or area in which it happens. The control operator can then increase this response if more information is received from further 999 calls or from the crews at the incident. On the 7 July, with reports of explosions at underground stations, a large number of appliances and staff were mobilised to the incidents and notified of their progress.

53.   With a number of calls coming into the control room, in quick succession and reporting explosions on the underground, all active control operators were immediately recalled to the control room. The principal and assistant principal control officers were also paged to notify them of the situation and to request their attendance in the control room.

54.   In the first few minutes of the incidents occurring, 25 fire engines, specialist vehicles and officers were mobilised to the three developing incidents. Alerted by the number and severity of the incidents, and their close proximity to each other, the control operators immediately put measures in place to ensure emergency cover could be sustained in the area and across London.

55. At 09:05 all fire stations were ordered to suspend any duties that would take place away from the station that weren't in response to an emergency. At 09:10, a restricted attendance was introduced in the areas immediately surrounding the locations of the three bombs. A restricted attendance ensures that a response can be sent to every incident, but at a slightly lower level than the usual pre-determined attendance; this doesn't prevent the crews attending those incidents from requesting additional resources when necessary.

56. The first of the 'stand-by' moves that day happened at 09:17. A stand-by move is where a fire engine from one station is moved to another station to ensure an even distribution of cover and quick response times. When ordered to stand-by, the fire engines travel at emergency response speeds, with blue lights and sirens.

57. At 09:39, all fire station staff not at the incidents were ordered to remain at their stations with their appliances in a state of readiness and at 12:14 a restricted attendance was introduced in all other areas of the Brigade. The restricted attendance was stood down at 16:00.

58. Throughout the day, Brigade Control staff took calls to the bombs and other incidents, mobilised fire engines and other appliances, took and passed radio messages between the incidents and Gold Control and managed stand-by resources across London. Control staff were also informing and liaising with the other emergency services, London Underground staff and rail operators, London Boroughs and support services.

Resource Management Centre and Brigade Gold Control

59. The Resource Management Centre (RMC) was formally established in June 2005 and bought together the role of three satellite offices, the Gold Control room and the fallback site for Brigade Control. The co-location of these three functions played an important part in the successful management of the incidents on the 7 July and thereafter.

60. The senior divisional officer who has responsibility for Brigade Control and the RMC was alerted to the bomb incidents by pager when the restricted attendance was introduced. After informing the Deputy Commissioner and Assistant Commissioners of the situation, he contacted RMC and instructed them to 'hot-up' the Gold Control room.

61. With agreement between the Deputy and Assistant Commissioners, the duty Assistant Commissioner mobilised to RMC to activate Gold Control.

62. The role of Gold Control is to take a strategic overview of the Brigade's response to large incidents, to act as a central information source and to be the primary decision making body. When incidents involve other agencies, their role also includes liaison with the Gold Coordination Group (a collaborative body of pan-London agencies).

63.   Gold Control would usually be staffed by nominated officers from the duty rota. On the day however, there were sufficient officers with the necessary skills and training at the RMC to form an impromptu team. Officers from the special operations group also mobilised to RMC to give support and advice to Gold Control on emergency plans for catastrophic incidents and a range of specialist procedures and equipment.

64.   One of the many sources supplying Gold Control with information was a Brigade Officer who was located at New Scotland Yard with the Metropolitan Police's anti-terrorism unit. This provided an important link between intelligence information and the Brigade's operational response. This link was however hampered by intermittent telecoms links in the Brigade.

Information Technology

65.   Extra IT support was provided on the day both at the Resource Management Centre and on the 7th floor at Brigade headquarters.

66.   Following TV broadcast of the incidents, the duty bridge engineer contacted Gold Control and asked if any IT assistance was required. Support was required and to ensure his prompt arrival, given the problems with public transport, a car was sent to collect him and he arrived at approximately 12:10.

67.   His main role was to liaise between Gold Control and the IT department, and where, possible, to undertake jobs himself.

68.   The Gold Control room is set up with the Command Planning System, Sky TV, Helitele and various computer systems and phones.

69.   Additional work carried out on the day included:

- Phone access levels being reconfigured which involved taking off bar points

- Providing additional Firenet phones and terminal server sessions as required.

- Relocation of the video conferencing system. This was moved from another section of the RMC and linked Gold Control with headquarters and Brigade Control.

- Providing a back up Command Planning System (CPS), as a contingency against failure of the main system.

- Providing additional printer mapping

- Assistance in the operation of the interactive display.

70.   At headquarters, the Deputy Commissioner identified the need to set up an information point for non-operational issues and it was decided to use the Commissioner's conference room. IT were contacted to provide additional facilities, including land lines and laptop access to the Command Planning System for Special Operations Group.

71.   Four new handsets were tested and installed in the conference room and updated files were provided for the laptops which ensured they worked well. As well as the above, video conferencing was also set up between headquarters, Brigade Control and Gold Control.

72.   Since the incident, the IT department have produced an action plan to look at the above issues and put in a number of planned improvements to ensure that the necessary facilities will be available should they be needed in future.

Equipment and resources

73. The senior operational officer attached to the Procurement department was one of the first to be informed of the incidents, because he is also one of the Brigade's incident liaison officers. Recognising the demand on resources that might be required, the senior procurement staff were immediately gathered. The Brigade's vehicle fleet and personal protective equipment are both supplied through external supplies contracts, as are a number of bulk supplies that are needed for major incidents. The procurement staff, working in liaison with Gold Control, assembled a requirement list of both imminent and longer term requirements and set about securing them from the various suppliers.

74. Additional fire appliances, lighting, generators, breathing apparatus, extraction equipment and personal protection equipment were all sourced, together with a range of equipment to restock existing fire appliances. Further equipment was also located, but wasn't required during the incidents.

75. The Brigade received excellent support from its contractual suppliers and was also offered resources from non-contracted organisations. Food, water and accommodation were offered to the Brigade as was heavy lifting equipment and plant hire facilities. The generosity and co-operation of outside organisations was also mirrored at the sites of the incidents, with offers of food, water and buildings for shelter.

76. Gold Control were also in contact with the surrounding fire and rescue services and under pre-existing arrangements, offers and requests for additional resources were made. With all of the Brigade's available fire rescue units being involved at the bomb incidents, additional capacity was made available to London from Royal Berkshire, Surrey Essex and Kent to ensure adequate and appropriate cover was maintained.

77. Further fire engines and a fire rescue unit were also made available at Southwark fire station, where the vehicles usually used for training were re-stowed and ready to be crewed by fully operational crews who were attending a training course that day. However these vehicles and crews weren't required, as operational cover was maintained throughout London.

Corporate Management team

78. There is no formally agreed meeting point at Brigade headquarters now that Brigade Control and Gold Control have been relocated off-site. On the day, it became necessary to establish such a location for the coordination of non-operational information, liaison with the ODPM and to maintain an overview of the operational activity.

79. The Directors' role in gathering and distributing information back into the organisation was well received. This was aided by video conferencing between headquarters, Brigade Control and Gold Control. However, staff

within headquarters and within other areas would have liked to be kept further informed of actions on the day.

80. While a lot of work was undertaken by the IT department on the day, further work is needed to agree on what hardware and software is needed if this coordination and liaison role is required at headquarters in the future.

Media and Press relations

81. The press office was notified of the first incident by internal teleprinter, but it was near-instantaneous enquiries from the media that alerted the department. Being unable to contact Brigade Control in the first few minutes, as they were responding to operational needs, it was difficult for the team to establish what was going on.

82. It is usual at large incidents for a senior officer at the scene to be designated for press liaison work. On this day however, it was decided that the press liaison officer would go to the press office. From there, the press liaison officer was able to monitor the radio traffic and keep the press team informed of activities at the various locations. Updates were posted on the internet in an area of the website reserved for journalists and media companies.

83. At 10:00 hrs, the Head of Communications met with the Commissioner and Directors to share information. It was also agreed at this time that the Head of Communications would attend the Gold Communications Group meeting at New Scotland Yard.

84. It was agreed early on that the Metropolitan Police would lead on communication issues during the day and they jointly agreed communications protocols which the Brigade's press team duly followed. The Head of Communications and the press team continued throughout the day, working with the press, providing spokespeople for radio and television broadcasts and supporting the police with the joint press conferences.

85. As with the operational areas of the Brigade, the communications team had worked with the other services at multi-agency training exercises, which proved a useful and realistic foundation for actual events.

The Gold Coordination Group (GCG)

86. With the increased threat of terrorism since 2001, the London Catastrophic Incident Command and Control Protocol was introduced to supplement and enhance the existing Command and Control arrangements laid down in the London Emergency Services Liaison Panel (LESLP) Major Incident Procedure Manual, to meet the challenges of incidents of such magnitude.

87. A noticeable enhancement under the Catastrophic Incident Command and Control Protocol is the immediate and pre-agreed attendance of specific key organisations and stakeholders to the Strategic Coordination Centre (SCC) following the formal declaration of a catastrophic incident

88. Whilst the events of the 7 July were horrific and caused a large loss of life and disruption to the Capital, the emergency status remained at 'major incident'. Nonetheless, the SSC was activated.

89. The first meeting was held at 10:30 hrs at the SCC's primary location (the location is nominated by the Police Gold and primary and fallback locations have been pre-agreed).

90. The primary role of the Gold Coordinating Group is to set strategic aims for the incident and to coordinate the responding organisations. The Group is chaired by the Police Gold and the GCG meetings involve those organisations and stakeholders necessary to address the incident priorities at the time. The functional groups within GCG (known as cells, which include, for example transport, utilities, police etc) are located within the SCC and house Gold support staff along with their communication and administrative facilities.

91. An Assistant Commissioner was designated as the London Fire Brigade Gold, to represent the Brigade's response to the incidents. Further meetings were held throughout the day and following days.

London Local Authority Coordination Centre (LLACC)

92. One of the representatives at the Gold Coordination Group at the SCC is the Local Authority Gold. In establishing the GCG, it was recognised that it was impractical to have all 33 London boroughs represented on the group and the Association of London Government in agreement with the boroughs formed the Gold Resolution which enabled one Chief Executive from a single borough to represent each and every borough at the GCG.

93. To assist the Local Authority Gold Chief Executive, and to ensure that they are adequately informed of the situation in each Borough and that any decisions from the GCG are acted upon in the appropriate Borough, it was agreed that a central coordination centre would be established whenever the SCC is operational.

94. The Brigade has extensive experience of working with the boroughs on emergency planning issues and, given that the boroughs themselves would be running their own borough emergency control centres (BECC) it seemed appropriate the Brigade should operate the central coordination centre for them. This centre, which is known as the London Local Authority Coordination Centre (LLACC) went live on the 11 May 2005, and is run by the Brigade.

95. Staff in the Brigade's Emergency Planning department, who are also the core of the team who run the LLACC, were monitoring the unfolding

events on Sky news and had been in contact with the Brigade's special operations group. They had also been in contact with a number of the boroughs and those in the vicinity of the bombs had already opened their emergency control centres. At 10:05 hrs the team were advised of the GCG meeting (scheduled for 10:30 hrs) and in response started to set up the LLACC so that it was operational, but not yet officially active.

96.   As with many other Strategic Coordination roles, the LLACC would be activated in response to a catastrophic incident, but again it was decided that it would play an important role in coordinating issues for the four bombings.

97.   The LLACC was officially activated at 12:48 hrs when all boroughs were advised to open their own BECCs. At 12:50 a member of the team went to the SCC to set up communication and IT links for the Local Authority Gold.

98.   The LLACC staff assisted the Local Authority Gold throughout the day by preparing updates, collating information from the boroughs and passing information and decisions back from the GCG. As well as providing support during incidents, the boroughs have an important role in recovery after incidents, because of this, the LLACC remained open and active until 1 August. During this time they provided the interface between Family Liaison officers and local authorities both inside and outside London; collated information from boroughs on expenditure incurred for use by the Recovery Group; advised the pan-London approach to floral tributes, donations and condolence books; and distributed the Metropolitan Police community cohesion updates.

99.   During the operational period of the LLACC, they handled over 10,000 telephone calls and emails.

Advisory and Counselling

100.   The Head of the Advisory and Counselling Service (ACS) was informed of the incidents by a member of the ACS team who had obtained their information on the BBC website. The immediate response was to notify the rest of the ACS team and await further information. Once the significance of the events became clear, it became a major critical incident for the ACS. ACS implemented their standard post-critical incident contact procedure which involved cancelling all non-urgent meetings and evaluating what resources were available over the next couple of weeks.

101.   The Head of ACS took overall control of the response, with individual staff counsellors taking responsibility for each of the incidents. Decisions were made to keep the office open until 20:00 hrs on the 7 and 8 July and to open the office over the weekend from 20:00 hrs until 07.00 hrs. This time was spent contacting the RMC and incident commanders in acquiring more information about the incidents, the role of operational personnel at the incidents, who were the first and second attendees etc.

102. The administrative aspect was mainly completed by the 12 July, and telephone or written contact was made with over 300 personnel by the 15 July, which met the targets within the ACS procedures. The administrative process was made harder for the ACS staff because of some inaccurate personnel records and their inability to be able to contact the RMC early on in the process to gather information.

103. It should be noted that from the 7 July to the 15 July all normal business was set aside to meet the response needed. ACS having better access to MOBIS or other mechanisms for acquiring information about incidents (who was attending, in charge etc) would assist the staff in carrying out the detailed administrative work needed to support the counselling work for these incidents.

Section five   Key points about our performance

This section of the report identifies the main findings following the London bombings on 7 July. These findings are drawn from operational debriefs, personal interviews with staff involved at the incidents, senior managers and the organisation's support departments.

Resources

Fire Rescue Units

kp 1.   Nine of the Brigade's ten Fire Rescue Units (FRUs) were available on the morning of 7 July (F446 was not available for deployment due to lack of qualified crew). Four were mobilised to Aldgate, four to Edgware Road and one to King's Cross.

kp 2.   Two additional FRUs were made available within the Brigade. One was 'spare' from the Brigade's suppliers, the other was a training appliance at Southwark training centre, but it wasn't equipped with a radio and would need to have been mobilised with another fire appliance to maintain communication.

kp 3.   Additional FRUs were available from neighbouring fire and rescue services. There is a need to consider how other brigades provide FRU capability (for example, in London the specialist equipment is carried on a single, purpose built, appliance. In other brigades the equipment is carried across two normal appliances). When FRUs are requested from other brigades, we need to establish what their response is to an incident (e.g. road traffic accidents) and request that level of capacity (that is, not necessarily to ask for an FRU, but to ask for the capacity to respond to an RTA).

kp 4.   FRUs are not all equipped with the same set of equipment (for example, they don't all carry gas detection equipment). On the day, this had an affect on how they were mobilised as some PDAs (the predetermined attendance sent to an incident) require particular equipment.

kp 5.   There is also a need to review the number of FRUs on the PDA to ensure they reflect the need and can be resourced (for example, if urban search and rescue (USAR) is deployed, four FRUs are mobilised to a single incident).

kp 6.   As with other appliances, it was difficult putting the FRUs back on the run after their involvement at the incident as the areas were designated as crime scenes and the kit impounded.

Equipment

kp 7.   Need a way of restocking appliances if equipment is impounded (or otherwise made unavailable) after an incident.

kp 8. Provision of additional resources by the Procurement Department (personal protective equipment, lighting etc) required drivers. This wasn't a problem on the day, but could have been if the incident had occurred 'out-of-hours'.

kp 9. A range of equipment was made available to the Brigade by other fire and rescue services and outside companies (for example, heavy lifting equipment offered by Channel Rail Link). This generosity was also found at the incidents with shops offering food, water and supplies to crews and the public at the scene.

kp 10. There was a high level of co-operation from our equipment suppliers.

kp 11. The trolleys provided by the RART project for travelling along tube lines worked extremely well at Russell Sq. Intended for single journeys, the trolleys were used to ferry staff and equipment for 39 consecutive hours, covering a distance of around 280 miles.

Staffing and appliances

kp 12. Fire appliance response times were good.

kp 13. Through well established preplanning protocols, appliances were recalled by control staff from non-essential work to front line availability without reference to Gold Control, thereby maximising availability.

kp 14. Unusually, there were very few 'multiple calls' from the public. This lack of calls reduced the ability of control staff to verify information by cross-checking incoming calls. This type of information could have been available from the other agencies and there is a need to consider this further. Having an officer deployed to SO13 at New Scotland Yard provided additional information not usually available, but problems with both mobile and landline phones prevented some of this getting through.

kp 15. There was excellent co-operation and willingness from staff to crew appliances and maintain operational readiness after change of watch. However in some cases this willingness extended too far, with staff who were not formally mobilised (including some who were off duty) attending incidents. This could have had an impact on effectiveness and possibly health and safety issues.

kp 16. Throughout the day the Brigade maintained a full service, able to respond to all other calls received in London.

kp 17. At one point, at the peak of demand, it was verified that 98 fire appliances were still available for mobilising to further incidents if needed.

kp 18. Brigade Control deployed resources effectively and were fully prepared to maintain cover if required for further incidents throughout the coming hours or days.

kp 19. New Dimensions equipment was available at all four incidents and, while under the national framework crews from other fire and rescue services in the UK were on standby, none were required.

kp 20. There is a need to look at the availability and deployment of Assistant Commissioners and senior officers as cover may have become harder to maintain if further incidents or more complicated incidents had occurred.

kp 21. The Multi Agency Initial Assessment Team were deployed to each of the incidents. Although the principles of the team's operation and the joint skills that they can bring to bear remains sound, there were some operating difficulties and a further review of deployment protocols and operating practices may be needed.

Communications

Communications at and between incidents and other locations

kp 22. Hand-held radios did not work effectively at King's Cross (from the Piccadilly line platform to control at top of escalator and there were also intermittent problems between control at top of escalator and outside the station).

kp 23. Incident Commanders felt isolated as they were unable to get information about the other incidents from Gold Control as mobile phones weren't working. There were also reports of some pagers not receiving messages.

kp 24. There were issues with mobile phones being out of use, however 3G phones worked and the TETRA police radio system also worked well. When mobile phones were working, there were concerns about sending sensitive information on unsecured lines.

kp 25. Senior officers not having radios led to delays in updating information while travelling to incidents (and other locations).

kp 26. In the absence of reliable comms between incidents, the Command Planning System was used to send messages, which worked well.

Corporate communications

kp 27. In the initial stages, it was hard for the Press Office to get information on the events, and we were criticised by the media.

kp 28. The Gold Communications Group worked well as did the joint press conferences (held at QE2 conference centre), organised by the Metropolitan Police.

kp 29. The Directors' role in gathering and distributing information back into the organisation was well received. This was aided by video conferencing between headquarters, Brigade Control and Gold Control. However, staff within headquarters and within other areas would have liked to be kept further informed of actions on the day.

Multi Agency

kp 30. All Brigade staff were aware of the potential of there being a CBRN aspect to the incidents. Limited cordons were established on the day with varying degrees of effectiveness: had the incidents involved CBRN, then this may have been an issue.

Gold Command

Preplanning

kp 31. The previous training and planning for incidents with the police, ambulance service, London Underground and other agencies worked very well. In many cases, contact made at these events made working together on the day at incidents and at the SCC much more successful.

kp 32. However, our Commissioner was not invited to COBR and this meant that we were not involved in the decision making at the highest level.

kp 33. Whilst moving SCC from the primary to fallback location was a sensible decision, the relocation caused problems relating to communication and time spent travelling due to traffic congestion.

kp 34. Work done on the day, and on the days following, to improve the communications and IT infrastructure at RMC improved operations on the 21/7.

Operations gold (RMC and SCC)

kp 35. Preplanning that sent an Assistant Commissioner to Gold Control proved useful and effective. The decision to send Assistant Commissioners to the first three incidents at 8 pumps rather than the normal 10 pumps was also positive.

kp 36. Gold Control at RMC worked well, as the staff there were those with the greatest amount of experience and knowledge of the set up. Control staff were in contact with other brigades and were able to monitor the incidents. Following from this, it is necessary to give more staff familiarity with the set up and skills required to staff Gold Control.

kp 37. With the SCC taking the role of 'gold' and RMC also active as Gold Control, there is a need for clarity over the terminology used to identify how they should work together and their respective roles and decision making capacity.

kp 38. Whilst staff were proactive in considering how they could assist, there were some problems with this being done outside of the Gold structure.

kp 39. There was thought to be benefit in the addition of a video conferencing link between the LLACC and Local Authority Gold at SCC. The existing arrangement enabled effective communication even following the temporary loss of telephone communications. Further resilience is

envisaged with the role out of the CTP project from the Cabinet Office and the distribution of satellite telephones.

kp 40. Training both internally, and in partnership with Local Authority staff, including recent exercises, was felt to have been effective for staff from Local Authority Gold Teams to LLACC Liaison Officers. All responding staff worked extremely well throughout the response demonstrating significant levels of good will. Work is underway to secure staffing structures for Local Authority Gold Cells and internally within the LLACC.

Corporate role

kp 41. The role carried out by the Commissioner and Directors at Brigade headquarters was an important one, but it needs to be clarified within the overall operational structure. There is a need for protocols and clear demarcation lines between their role and that of Gold Control.

kp 42. However, there is no obvious meeting point in HQ since the relocation of Brigade Control and Gold Control (and it would need appropriate hardware, video links, phones, CPS etc.)

Section six   Conclusions

What went well:

(a)   Fire appliance response times were good.

(b)   Throughout the day the Brigade maintained a full service using appliances across the London region to meet demand. As well as these major incidents all other calls in London were responded to. At one point, at the peak of demand, it was verified that 98 fire appliances were still available for mobilising to further incidents if needed.

(c)   Multi-agency training exercises did prove a very useful foundation for managing real events. And on the day, all agencies worked well together, both at the scene and at the Strategic Coordination Centre.

(d)   There was excellent co-operation and willingness from staff to crew appliances and maintain operational readiness after change of watch.

(e)   The trolleys provided by the Rescue and Recovery Team project for travelling along tube lines worked extremely well at Russell Square.

(f)   Although all rescue operations were carried out using the Brigade's own resources, a range of equipment was offered to the Brigade by other fire and rescue services and outside companies (for example, heavy lifting equipment offered by Channel Rail Link). This generosity was also found at the incidents with shops offering food, water and supplies to crews and the public at the scene.

(g)   The London Local Authority Coordination Centre responded for the first time in support of London Local Authority Gold receiving 3000 calls in the first week and an additional 2000 calls during the remainder of the response. Throughout the course of the response the LLACC received over 5000 emails. The Centre provided an effective link between London's 33 Local Authorities and Local Authority Gold.

What we've learnt;

(h)   Our reliance on the use of mobile phones for communicating with and between senior officers needs addressing.

(i)   London has insufficient numbers of Fire Rescue Units to meet the demands of a multi-sited major incident, whilst maintaining a satisfactory level of rescue cover across the rest of London.

(j)   As with other appliances, it was difficult putting the Fire Rescue Units back on the run after their involvement at the incident as the areas were designated as crime scenes and the equipment impounded. We need a way of restocking appliances if the equipment is impounded (or otherwise made unavailable) after an incident.

(k)   There is a need to look at the availability and deployment of Assistant Commissioners and senior officers in the event of greater numbers or complexities of incidents.

(l)   Whilst moving SCC was a sensible decision, the relocation caused problems relating to communication and time spent travelling due to traffic congestion.

(m)   Unusually, there were very few 'multiple calls' from the public, which meant that the Brigade did not have the normal intelligence from an incident. The lack of multiple calls reduced the ability of control staff to verify information by cross-checking incoming calls.

(n)   The terminology for Gold Command needs to be clarified. SCC, Gold Control at the Resource Management Centre and the corporate role carried out by the Directors at Brigade headquarters need to be clearly identifiable and responsibilities established.

(o)   There is a need for a clear and quick debriefing process which includes the collection of management information.

(p)   The LLACC managed significant levels of information via e-mail; while this worked effectively it required significant manual handling resulting in delays in the production of situation reports and updates. An information management system would significantly improve the speed and efficiency of information flow while retaining high levels of accuracy.

(q)   There is a need to further develop activation systems both to ensure suitable staffing levels within the LLACC and enable efficient activation of all 33 Borough Emergency Control Centres in support of a pan-London Local Authority Response.

Brigade Control Centre
Brigade Control is the call receiving centre for 999 calls to the fire brigade and has responsibility for sending the initial level of response to an incident; for sending support equipment and personnel; for providing relief crews at protracted incidents; and for relocating fire engines around London so that no one area has less emergency cover than another.

CBRN
Incidents involving Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear agents.

Command Planning System (CPS)
Is a GIS based software package which enables the site of the incident to be mapped out, records of action to be logged and command decisions taken.

Gold Control
Gold Control is located at the Resource Management Centre and is a group which takes a strategic overview of the Brigade's response to large incidents and acts as the central information source and is the primary decision making body.

Gold Coordinating Group (GCG)
The Gold Coordinating Group is the group that sets the strategic aims for the incident and coordinates the responding organisations. The Group is chaired by the Police Gold and the GCG meetings involve those organisations and stakeholders necessary to address the incident priorities at the time. The meetings are held at the Strategic Coordination Centre (SCC).

Incident Commander
The most senior officer at an incident who is responsible for operations at an incident.

Local Authority Coordination Centre (LLAC)
Is a central coordination office, run by the London Fire Brigade, to inform and assist the Local Authority Gold (who is a Local Authority Chief Executive) at Gold Coordinating group meetings.

LUL
London Underground Limited

MAIAT
Multi Agency Initial Assessment Team

Major Incident Procedure
Any emergency that required the implementation of special arrangements by one, or all, of the emergency services. This will generally include the involvement, either directly or indirectly of large numbers of people. The procedure for major incidents is set-out in LESLP.

Mobilising Message Sent
The instruction from the Brigade Control operator to one or more stations and/or officers to attend an incident giving details of the address and incident description.

MOBIS	Mobilising Information System
NSY	New Scotland Yard
Officer-in-charge	The most senior officer on a fire engine (or other fire appliance).
Pre-determined Attendance	A standard number and type of appliances and resources sent to, or informed of, a given incident type.
RART	Rescue and Recovery Team.
Recovery Team	A team run by Local Authorities to oversee all issues relating to the short and long term return to normality of an affected community.
Resource Management Centre (RMC)	Is a centralised office which gathers information on the availability of Fire Appliance and other equipment to ensure adequate cover across London. The centre is also the location for Brigade Control Centre fallback and London Fire Brigade Control.
Restricted Attendance	A restricted attendance ensures that a fire engine can be sent to every incident, but a level slightly lower than the usual pre-determined attendance; this doesn't prevent the crews attending those incidents requesting additional resources as necessary.
Silver Meeting	At incidents involving more than one emergency service a Silver Meeting is a meeting between senior officers of those services at the scene of the incident to discuss tactical and operational issues.
Standby	An ordering given to an appliance to go to a fire station other than their base station. This is normally for strategic fire cover purposes.